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Preface
In late 1994 there was great enthusiasm within Army that the introduction of 
Total Quality Management would, at last, lead to dramatic improvements in many of its 
cumbersome practices. It was also at this time that the very real problem of excessive 
wastage from the Army’s recruit training process was given to my work area. To say the 
very least, this significant issue presented me with a rare and exciting opportunity to 
study the application of Quality Management theory within Army.
It was immediately recognised that a high proportion of recruit wastage was 
due to injuries received in training. Accordingly, the project was given the name of a 
figure whose concern for the individual soldier was legend, the renowned Australian 
Army Medical Officer, Sir Edward 'Weary' Dunlop. As a result of attention generated, 
Project DUNLOP, and the trainee wastage issue in general, received front page national 
media coverage and attracted attention at ministerial level.
Having being DUNLOP's initial project officer, I was most fortunate to have 
had continuous involvement with it until its official end on 1st December 1996. It is, 
however, only in early 1998, that the true outcome of the Project can really be assessed.
At the time of writing Quality Management has been quietly forgotten within 
Army. Nevertheless, both the Army, and the Defence Force as a whole, are in the midst 
of a massive number of sweeping changes. Quality Management or not, this thesis will 
provide valuable insights to all those who would seek to successfully implement change 
within Defence.
Lastly, this thesis reflects the facts as I observed them. If I have made any 
errors of interpretation, these errors are mine alone and I apologise for them in advance.
Lindsay Adams 
Sydney 
January 1998
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Chapter One
Introduction
1.1 Problem Status and Relevance
In September 1994, it came to the attention of the staff of the Army's 
Headquarters Training Command that the wastage rate from the induction training 
conducted at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka was in the vicinity of 20%.
At a time of considerable resource constraints, this seemingly unsatisfactory situation 
caused the then General Officer Commanding Training Command, Major General F.J. 
Hickling, to direct that the recruit training process be examined with the aim of reducing 
wastage to a more acceptable level Note
Using archival material sourced from Army's Personnel Division, it soon 
became apparent to the author that the high wastage rates involved with the recruit 
training process had been a cause of concern to various parts of the Army since at least 
the mid 1970’s Note2, with wastage rates at that stage being around 13% Nole3. Indeed, in 
early 1989, following recruit wastage rates of 26% and 20% in 1987 and 1988 
respectively, the issue was of such concern that the then Chief of the Defence Force 
directed that the Army's induction training be examined to see if it could be modified to 
produce the same product, but with fewer casualties Note4.
This preliminary review of the wastage issue also revealed that many officers 
believed that the causes of recruit wastage lay not only with the basic training conducted 
at Kapooka but also very much with the Army's medical, psychological and recruiting 
selection processes. Most markedly, it was discovered that there was a keen desire in 
many quarters of the Army to address the problem: Army's policy makers were 
concerned with the cost of recruiting individuals only to see approximately one fifth of 
them fail in basic training; key sports medicine specialists believed that the high recruit 
injury rates (an obvious cause of many discharges) could be reduced; many of Training 
Command's specialist training establishments were concerned that they were regularly 
receiving students who still carried injuries from their recruit training; and those Army 
chaplains who had exposure to the recruit training process were extremely concerned 
with the individual and social trauma that often accompanied a recruit's failure to 
complete training Notc 5.
With regard to the cost of recruit failures, it was calculated by the author that 
each discharged recruit was costing the Army an average of $24,000 when expenses such 
as rations, ammunition, clothing, instructor time, medical compensation payouts and 
recruit salaries were taken into accountNote6. Using this figure, it was conservatively 
estimated that a Training Year 1994/95 recruit wastage rate of 17% (ie. 400 recruits 
discharged from a recruit training intake of 2,354) would translate into a $9.6 million 
loss of productivity to the Army in that financial year alone. It should be noted that this 
figure did not even take into account the cost of recruiting those discharged, which was
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initially estimated to be about $2-3,000 per recruit enlisted but later revealed to be closer 
to $9,000 per recruit enlisted Note7. Nor did it take into account the presumably quite 
considerable costs of the psychological and medical services provided to the Army's 
recruiting organisation Note 8.
In addition to the above concerns, it must also be noted that the author 
considered that the experience of addressing the wastage problem would be relevant to 
future career opportunities, both within and outside the Australian Defence Force.
1.2 The Setting
Fortuitously, the recruit wastage problem was raised at a time when the Army 
was actively embracing 'Quality' as a solution to many of its financial and organisational 
challenges. The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Grey, had addressed over 
1400 delegates at the Total Quality Management Institute's (now the Australian Quality 
Council) First International Conference held in Sydney on 29th March 1993; in Army 
Headquarters, a Directorate of Management Development - Army, had been created and 
provided with significant funds Note 9; hundreds of Army 'Quality Practitioners' had been 
trained on five day courses run by consultants; quarterly 'Army Quality Working Group 
Meetings' were conducted by the Directorate of Management Development and attended 
by all of the Army's key functional areas; and certain officers in appropriate management 
positions were able to obtain funding to pursue postgraduate Quality Management 
studies Note 10. The stated intent of all this activity was to "...develop a culture of 
continuous improvement as the basis for Army's management doctrine and practice by 
the sustained application of Quality Management principles" Note n.
Amongst all this enthusiasm, it had soon become evident to this author Note 12 
that it was unlikely that the above overall intent would be achieved. Rather than hoping 
to create the desired outcome by sponsoring generic unfocused quality training, 
Headquarters Training Command put forward the argument that the Directorate of 
Management Development's role, as a change agent within Army, should be the 
co-ordination of a series of focused, cross functional, high payoff improvement projects 
Note 13. The aim of these projects, using quality management tools at the lower end of the 
change scale and Value Management and Re-engineering at the higher end, would be to 
generate what General Donn Starry in his article To Change an Army refers to as a 
"convincing demonstration of value" (1994:25). This was something that had certainly * 
not been achieved to date Note 14.
Given the overall failure to conduct the above high value, cross-functional 
projects, the Command Planning Branch of Headquarters Training Command saw the 
wastage problem as an opportunity to try to prove what quality management theory could 
achieve when applied to a meaningful project. Accordingly, with such significant 
concerns and sums of money involved, in early November 1994, the Branch formally 
adopted the recruit wastage issue as a Command improvement project.
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1.3 The Stakeholders
A key part of the initial review undertaken by the author was the identification 
of all of the key stakeholders in the recruit training process. These emerged as shown 
below in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Army Induction Process Stakeholders
• The Directorate of Personnel Planning-Army, located in the Army's primary 
headquarters in Canberra, which determines the number of recruits required based 
on factors such as the numbers leaving the Service. Included in this function is the 
Soldier Career Management Agency which, according to the Army's needs, 
allocates recruits to various Army trades prior to the completion of their basic 
training.
• Headquarters Training Command, located at Georges Heights, Sydney, which 
commands the 1st Recruit Training Battalion and the Army's various specialist 
training establishments as well as resourcing and co-ordinating their training 
activities.
• The Army recruiting organisation, based on a Directorate of Army Recruiting in 
Canberra and the Army elements of the seven regional Defence Force Recruiting 
Units located in Brisbane, Townsville, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth and 
Hobart. This organisation has the duel task of attracting applicants to join the 
Army, and co-ordinating the selection of those who meet the Army's General 
Entry enlistment requirements.
• The recruits, who could be enlisted for service as a soldier in the Regular Army, 
referred to as General Entry Nott 15, or as a soldier or officer in the Ready Reserve 
Notc 16. On average, only 30% of General Entry applicants are accepted Notc 17 with 
approximately 10-15% being female Notc 18. Their ages range from 17 to 34, with 
the average age being 21Nole 19. Their average education standard is Year 12, 
although this is not a requirement Note2°.
• The 1st Recruit Training Battalion, located at Kapooka Note 21 near the town of 
Wagga Wagga, in southern New South Wales. During a ten week recruit course, 
this establishment has the task of providing recruits with basic military skills such 
as the use of personal weapons, basic fieldcraft and drill. It also seeks to inculcate 
recruits with attitudes and behaviours appropriate to the Army's values and ethos. 
A recent photograph of recruits in training at the Battalion is shown at Figure 2.
• The Army's various specialist training establishments located throughout 
Australia, such as the School of Infantry at Singleton NSW. These establishments 
provide the graduates of basic training with Initial Employment Training in their 
allocated trades prior to their being posted to Army units. •
• the Army's units, which employ the graduates of Initial Employment Training.
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• the Army's medical organisation, controlled by the Canberra based Director 
General of Army Health Services. This organisation includes the dedicated 
medical support provided to the Army elements of the regional Defence Force 
Recruiting Units, the 1st Recruit Training Battalion and the Army's various 
specialist training establishments and units.
• the Army's psychology organisation, controlled by the Army's, Canberra based, 
Director of Psychology. This organisation includes the dedicated psychology 
support provided to the Army elements of the regional Defence Force Recruiting 
Units, the 1st Recruit Training Battalion and the Army's various specialist training 
establishments and units.
Figure 2
Recruits in Training at the 
1st Recruit Training Battalion
Along with knowledge of the stakeholders, a sound understanding was 
gained of why recruits were failing to complete their training. It was discovered that 
in late 1994 a recruit could opt for discharge in two ways; 'Discharge at Own Request' 
or, if the recruit was under 18 years of age, discharge due to the 'Withdrawal of 
Parental Consent'. Discharges initiated by the Army resulted from recruits being 
classified as 'Medically Unfit', usually due to an injury received prior to enlistment; 
'Below Medical Standard', usually due to an injury received during training; or, 'Not 
Suited' (for Army service) due to psychological reasons. Recruits could also be
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discharged if it was decided that their 'Retention (was) Not in the Interests of the 
Service', if they proved 'Unsuitable for Further Military Training' or if it was 
discovered that they were guilty of 'Provision of False Information on Enlistment'.
As already noted, comments from a random telephone survey of the 
Commanders and Deputy Commanders of Training Command's schools indicated that 
the induction process was producing good results and was widely perceived to be 
performing well. There was, however, wide agreement that there was a need to improve 
those aspects that were contributing to a high wastage rate. This view, combined with 
that of other stakeholders in the induction process and the pressure on the system to 
produce more recruits, placed the process in the situation where, no matter how good its 
output, changes were required Note22. It should also be noted, however, that although there 
was much support for the reduction of recruit wastage, in some areas, wastage was 
actually seen as a good and normal situation Note23. Indeed, 'conventional wisdom' 
supposedly decreed that a certain wastage rate was inherent in the system and that it 
could only be lowered by lowering graduation standards Notc24.
It was at this early stage that the project to reduce recruit wastage was given 
the name DUNLOP after the renowned Army surgeon Sir Edward 'Weary' Dunlop.
Aside from honouring a famous Australian Note25, this name was a quite deliberate and 
shameless attempt to win the favour of Army's medical establishment. This was 
considered important as it was thought likely that the greatest impact on wastage 
would be made by reducing the number of recruit injuries. This was a task that would 
be made considerably easier if fully supported by the Army's doctors.
1.4 Conceptual Framework of the Research Approach
The research approach to the Wastage Project was considered by the author to 
be very much hypothetico-deductive. In other words, it set out with a theory that it 
wished to test, as opposed to attempting to develop a theory through ethnographic 
-inductive research (Kellehear, 1993:16). In line with this approach, the central 
hypothesis was that contemporary quality management theory, notably in the areas of 
Change Management and Performance Measurement, could be successfully applied to a 
seemingly intractable Army problem.
In view of the Army's struggle with the introduction of Quality Management, 
the testing of this hypothesis was seen as a key contribution to the overall intent to 
improve the Army's approach to its business.
1.5 Value of the Research
At the commencement of the wastage project it was considered that it had the 
potential to be valuable on three levels.
In the first instance, its success would mean that many hundreds of recruits, 
who would otherwise have been discharged, would successfully graduate from training; 
many hundreds of injuries during training would be avoided; and, the productivity of the
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Army's induction process would be improved by millions, if not tens of millions, of 
dollars. As a result of these outcomes, it was considered likely that the Army's image in 
the community would be improved and that the flow on effects would be likely to reduce 
wastage in the Army's Initial Employment Training (notably at the School of Infantry, 
which, like recruit training, was known to suffer from a high wastage rate due to 
injuries) Note26. Additionally, it was hoped these benefits would flow-on to the Army's 
officer training conducted at the Royal Military College and the Australian Defence 
Force Academy. Further, if such success was enduring, the short term outcomes would 
be multiplied many times over, resulting in significant and lasting benefits, not only to 
the Army, but also to many generations of recruits and their families.
On a second, higher, level it was considered that the wastage project would 
provide valuable insights into the conduct of an important cross-functional project within 
Defence. It was hoped that this might, in turn, positively influence the change 
management and performance measurement aspects of a number of future Defence 
improvement efforts.
Lastly, given that Defence - at least at its higher levels - is essentially the same 
as a large civilian corporation Note27, it was considered that the Wastage Project might 
produce many lessons equally applicable to change efforts outside of the Defence 
environmentNote28.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
2.1 The Approach
In order to focus what could otherwise have been an extremely wide ranging 
review of quality management literature, the themes of ’Management of Change' and, to 
a slightly lesser extent, 'Performance Measurement', were identified as being of 
relevance to the Recruit Wastage Project. To explore these themes, a large range of 
contemporary texts and articles were reviewed. It was, however, also recognised that the 
contemporary guidance gained would have to be implemented within the quite 
distinctive culture of the Australian Defence Force. Accordingly, texts and articles 
specifically dealing with this culture were also reviewed.
Recognising that many more documents would turn up as the project 
progressed, as many texts, articles, internal studies and pieces of correspondence on the 
subject of recruit wastage as could be located, were reviewed. In particular, it was 
considered that these references would provide vital background material to any initial 
cross-functional stakeholder examination of the recruit wastage issue.
It should be noted that, where considered appropriate, this review has been 
updated throughout the project so that the observations made in the discussion section 
could take into account all of the literary influences on the project. John Kotter (1995), 
Gordon R. Sullivan et al. (1995) and James Collins et al. (1996), for example, were not 
read until after the initial project strategy was developed, but they never-the-less 
provided valuable insights into what influenced it during its course.
2.2 The Management of Change
The importance of 'planned change' is highlighted by Robbins (1993:668) who 
distinguishes between change, which is simply reactive, and planned change which is 
intentional and goal orientated. Planned change, however, can take many forms. As 
Dexter Dunphy and Doug Stace point out in their text Beyond the Boundaries - Leading 
and Re-Creating the Successful Enterprise, although executives often believe that they 
know what to do, they are often unsure how to do it (1994:3). Dunphy and Stace argue 
that, no matter how appealing the prospect, there is no one right way such as Total 
Quality Management, Benchmarking, or Re-engineering, etc. to approach change 
(1994:5) and that there are many dilemmas to be faced. These dilemmas include the 
choices between adaptive versus rational strategy development, cultural change versus 
structural change, continuous or incremental improvement versus radical transformation, 
and empowerment versus leadership and command. Dunphy and Stace label these 
choices as the 'soft' and 'hard' approaches to managing change (1994:13) and argue that 
dramatically different approaches to change can work in different circumstances. To 
cope with this situation, the essence of their argument is that any organisational change 
should be approached as shown at Figure 3.
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Figure 3
The Dunphy & Stace Approach to Organisational Change
• Determine the Level o f 'Organisational Fit'
• Determine the Scale o f Change Required
• Determine the Time Available to make the Change
• Determine the Type o f Leadership Required
• Create a Change Strategy
In his article Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, Kotter 
observes that the most general lesson to be learned from successful examples of 
corporate change is that, "the change process goes through a series o f phases that, in 
total, usually require a considerable length of time” (1995:59). In his text he puts 
forward eight very concise steps for transforming an organisation. Taken together, these 
cover such issues as: establishing a sense of urgency; forming a powerful guiding 
coalition; creating a vision; communicating the vision; creating short-term wins; and, 
institutionalising new approaches - form a very powerful and logical plan for bringing 
about change with the minimum resistance from those involved (1995:61). Interestingly, 
Kotter notes that "critical mistakes in any o f the phases can have a devastating impact, 
slowing momentum and negating hard won gains” (1995:60).
Kotter's view of change is consistent with the large number of models 
proposed by authors which describe the phases or steps involved in the change process. 
Kanter et al. for example, in The Challenge of Organisational Change: How Companies 
Experience it and Leaders Guide It, recommend the steps for executing change as: 
analyse the organisation and the need for change, create a shared vision and a common 
direction, separate from the past, create a sense of urgency, support a strong leader role, 
line up political sponsorship, craft an implementation plan, develop enabling structures, 
communicate and involve people, and reinforce and institutionalise the change 
(1992:382-392).
It is interesting to note that while authors such as Kotter and Kanter et al. 
propose set formulae for change this approach is contrary to Dunphy and Stace who are, 
in effect, saying that there is 'no one right way'. This is a view agreed with by Shapiro 
who in Fad Surfing in the Boardroom - reclaiming the courage to manage in the age of 
instant answers, argues that each of the various options of re-engineering, 
empowerment, cultural formation, Quality Management, etc can all create good results 
when modified to meet the needs of a particular organisation (1995:xiii).
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Change, it would appear, can be driven by the desire to exploit an opportunity 
or forced by 'pressures’ such as a dramatic event, increasing competition, customer 
dissatisfaction, new technologies, or even poor organisational morale. Whichever the 
case, in Managing Change in Organisations, Camall contends that to achieve change a 
group of people must first recognise that it is desirable and feasible (1990:68). He argues 
that the "energy for change " in any group or organisation will equate to "the 
dissatisfaction felt with the current situation" multiplied by "the level o f knowledge of 
the'practical steps forward" and "the shared vision" (1990:99); a formula which implies 
that where any of the variables are zero, or close to zero, the rest will be negated and 
change will be unlikely to occur. Camall also argues that, irrespective of the size of the 
other factors involved, the energy for change must be greater than the perceived cost of 
making the change.
Hutton would appear to agree with Camall's approach of assessing the 
likelihood of achieving successful change. In The Change Agents' Handbook - A 
Survival Guide for Quality Improvement Champions, he cautions, "farmers don't plant 
their seeds in parking lots. People who seek change also should try to avoid wasting 
their efforts on situations where there is little hope o f a fruitful outcome" (1994:34). He 
also agrees that an organisation's change journey cannot begin until there is recognition 
by top management of a compelling reason for change (1994:36).
The vital importance of shared vision is extensively covered by James Collins 
and Jerry Porras in their article Building Your Company's Vision. They observe that 
many of those companies that are truly successful commit themselves to what they refer 
to as "Big, Hairy, Audacious Goals" that are huge, daunting challenges (1996:73). 
Collins et al. argue that these goals should be clear and compelling, serve as a unifying 
focal point of effort, and act as a catalyst for team spirit. They should have a clear finish 
line and, to be effective, they require a certain level of unreasoned confidence and 
commitment (1996:75). Also, they need only have a 50 to 70% probability of success. 
The important thing is that the organisation must believe it can do it, even if it will 
require "extraordinary effort and perhaps a little luck" (1996:75). Shapiro develops this 
notion of vision. She observes that the achievement of vision will depend on a "deep, 
gut-level commitment of the person or people who hold the critical resources o f the 
organisation...". Additionally, she notes that "democratically based group processes do 
not necessarily lead to visions that will be implemented" (1995:4).
The understanding of the drivers for change that we gain from Camall, Collins 
et al. and Shapiro is especially useful when combined with Lewin's theory of how 
effective change can take place. Lewin (1951) argues that change involves the phases of 
'Unfreezing', 'Movement' and 'Refreezing'.
Lewin's 'Unfreezing' phase involves the disruption of the organisational status 
quo and the creation of a general dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. 
Depending on the situation, this might be achieved by using surveys of staff and/or 
customers to highlight dissatisfaction or benchmarking studies to compare performance 
with competitors or recognised best practise. Alternatively, a dramatic event or
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circumstance might be exaggerated or even engineered in order to justify sweeping 
change. In the words of a former Chief Executive Officer of a large European company 
quoted by Kotter (1995:60), the challenge is "to make the status quo seem more 
dangerous than launching into the unknown". If this unfreezing phase succeeds in 
creating a genuine sense of urgency regarding the need to change, as advocated by Kotter 
(1995:60), then the change process is off to a good start.
At the conclusion of the unfreezing process, top management should be able to 
state a vision that not only bridges the identified gap in performance but also clearly 
states the desired long term position of the organisation.
Having created an environment for change, the next phase is to move the 
organisation towards its desired future state by developing the attitudes and policies 
which will take it there. This 'movement' will require the development of a practical plan 
which details strategies ranging from how the vision will be communicated to how 
employees will be empowered to act on it. Ideally, this plan should also include the 
engineering of highly visible short-term performance improvements (Kotter, 1995:65).
In particular, it would appear that it is of great importance that top 
management fully understands, accepts and plans for the costs of making the change 
before it is initiated. Indeed, in his article Why Big Companies are so Tough to Change, 
Hammonds (1991:28) contends that depending on the amount of pain associated with the 
change, it is quite likely that it will be top management that is one of the most difficult 
obstacles to overcome. Also, Dichter et al. in their article Memo to a CEO : Leading 
organisational transformations, argue that unless the total commitment of top 
management is gained, any attempt at a change program is unlikely to be successful 
(1993:89).
As the word implies, Lewin's final stage of 'refreezing' requires actions which 
prevent a return to the previous status quo. One such action, for example, could be to 
reward those individuals who act as appropriate role models, thereby reinforcing desired 
new behaviours.
Another key change management issue would appear to be resistance to 
change. In their text The Expertise o f the Change Agent - Public Performance and 
Backstage Activity Buchanan arid Boddy (1992:15) recognise that it is often people and * 
change issues, rather than technical issues, that are the barriers to successful change. 
Accordingly, the issue of 'resistance to change', already alluded to above, will always be 
an important issue. Indeed, in a 1993 survey, entitled Organisational change in 
Australia: what's really happening?, Waldersee and Blackstock found that nearly 60% 
of the major problems experienced by organisations implementing change were related 
to employee resistance (1993:12).
The reasons for this resistance might typically include 'loss of face', concern 
about future competence and/or threatened self interest in the form of lost employment, 
promotion possibilities or status etc (Deakin Australia, 1995:3-14). Typical forms of 
resistance are increased complaints, higher rates of absenteeism and resignations, lower
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productivity and, occasionally, marked aggression (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992:15). In 
particular, Robins (1993:670) concludes that it will be the implicit and deferred 
resistance efforts such as loss of loyalty to the organisation, loss of motivation and 
increased errors that will be the most difficult to detect and deal with.
The strategies used to overcome this resistance to change will largely depend 
upon the degree of change required. In Under New Management, Dunphy and Stace 
conclude that "change agents should select the most effective strategy and mode of 
change, rather than reflexively relying on a change strategy compatible with their 
personal values" (1990:90). These approaches might range from explaining the logic of 
change at one end of the scale, threatening job loss, transfer or demotion at the other 
(University of Wollongong, 1995:28).
It is suggested that the best way to minimise resistance to change is to simply 
examine and counter all those forces acting against change. This method will 
undoubtedly work best, irrespective of the approach to change adopted, where the people 
involved in the change are actively encouraged to participate. Indeed, the experience of 
the New South Wales Government Public Works Product Evaluation Unit suggests that 
it is only through the constructive overlap achieved in a cross functional, 
multi-disciplined environment that maximum creativity and innovation are likely to 
occur (New South Wales Government, 1992:10). As Waterman states in his text The 
Renewal Factor - How the Best Get and Keep the Competitive Edge, "it is only 
common-sense that people are most likely to support what they have had a hand in 
creating" (1987:7).
Given that it is often people and change issues, rather than technical issues, 
that are the barriers to successful change (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992:5), removing key 
obstacles to change and assisting those who need help coping will be vital elements of 
any incremental change process. Key strategies for removing obstacles to the new vision 
might include altering organisational structures so that people are empowered to act in 
support of the vision and adjusting reward and appraisal systems to support the new 
vision so that, as Kotter puts it, people are not made to "chose between the vision and 
their own self interest" (1995:64). Other strategies include firmly, but fairly, removing 
individuals who undermine the vision by paying it lip service while working against its 
initiatives; and convincing people, through ongoing communication, that they really can, 
indeed must, act differently in the new environment.
Having made the above points, it should be noted that not all strategies and 
effort can, or even should, be fully planned in advance. Collins et al. for example, note 
that "visionary companies often realise their goals more by organic process than by 
well-laid strategic plans" (1996:76). Dichter et al. (1993:105) also observe that 
management will undoubtedly learn as it proceeds and that, over time, goals, objectives, 
strategies, performance indicators, and even the vision and mission are all likely to be 
refined and made more specific.
However, while accepting the above approach, Dichter et al. argue that, in 
order to meet people's expectations of change, management must provide clear,
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consistent, and ongoing direction (1993:92). Kotter also backs this stand by arguing that 
management must aggressively communicate its initiatives and motivate people to 
co-operate with the strategies required to make these initiatives succeed (1995:60). He 
also notes that, although words are important, it will be the deeds of management which 
will be crucial to the success of the change and that "nothing undermines change more 
than behaviour by important individuals that is inconsistent with their words" (1995:64)
Dichter et al. also make a strong argument that the complexity of change might 
easily overwhelm if not managed correctly. They suggest that rather than trying to 'fix 
everything at once' it makes good sense to focus on just a few strategies and to devote a 
lot of energy to them to ensure that measurable progress is achieved (1993:105). The aim 
should be to create and celebrate short term wins which encourage people to carry on. 
Kotter advises that such wins must be widely publicised and those involved recognised 
and rewarded for their efforts, noting that if this does not occur many supporters of 
change may simply give up or, worse still, actively join the ranks of those who chose to 
resist the new direction (1995:65).
Finally, Kotter warns that the temptation to declare victory too soon must be 
consciously avoided and that wins achieved in the short term must be quite unambiguous 
and not able to be discounted by those opposing change (1995:65). He also warns that a 
change agent must ensure that a suitable successor is found to carry on the work 
(1995:67). If this succession is not handled properly, years of hard work and progress 
can literally be undone regardless of the momentum built up.
2.3 Performance Measurement
Hutton points out that "You absolutely need measures as indicators of 
progress. You will never know for sure whether something is improving or not - whether 
your efforts are succeeding - unless you can measure something that will serve as an 
indicator" (1994:130). -
As the wording suggests, performance indicators are measures that describe or 
'indicate' a level of performance or productivity. While such 'measures' are far from new, 
Maskell contends that what is new is the increased importance now being attached to 
them (1991:19). Indeed, in an Australian environment, spurred on by studies such as 
Enterprising Nation produced by Dr David Karpin, even the most conservative of 
companies, such as those of the type referred to by Toffler as 'organisational dinosaurs' 
(1995:1), are beginning to focus on improvement via the application of tools such as 
performance indicators and measures.
The Oxford Dictionary defines 'measure' as 'a size or quantity in relation to a 
standard’ when used as a noun, and 'to ascertain the size or quantity or proportions o f  
when used as a verb (Fowler et al. 1966:489). Given that measurements of all kinds are 
part of our everyday lives, most people have no difficulty with the concept of 
performance measurement. At its simplest level, the logic for measuring performance is 
that it allows decisions based on an awareness of the gap between 'current' and 'desired' 
performance.
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As Hilmer puts it in his 1991 paper on competitiveness and productivity, "until 
a firm knows what to measure, it cannot sensibly address the issue o f how to measure 
productivity". The 'what' depends on the firm's strategy having regard to customers, 
competitors and its own skills and resources (1991:15). Having said this, Hilmer makes 
the point that while measures must be consistent with and reinforce strategy, they must 
also be understood and 'owned' by the people who use them. If not, they are unlikely to 
be used as tools for learning and improvement (1991:22).
Hilmer suggests that it is extremely important for an enterprise to "select a set 
of indicators that capture the three aspects o f cost, value and time most critical to its 
success" (1991 :iii). Indeed, the essence of his competitiveness and productivity paper is 
that it is the measures, or rather the assessment of measures within enterprises, that 
provide the inputs to individual and organisational learning, improvement plans, actions 
and remuneration processes (1991 :i). Where successful measures are developed, Adams 
in his article The Development of Performance Metrics, contends that they have the 
ability to clearly communicate strategy throughout an organisation and are likely to be a 
critical factor in determining its success (1995:25). This is a position that seems to have 
been comprehensively verified by Lingle and Schiemann who, having conducted a 
national survey of senior executives in the United States, found that measurement plays a 
crucial role in translating business strategy into results (1996:56).
Given the simplicity and irrefutable logic of measuring performance, one 
might ask why performance measurements are so often ignored or despised?
One possible reason is a recognition by middle managers and workers that 
performance measures, although intrinsically valuable if used well, are often ill 
conceived or implemented in the wrong way or for the wrong reasons. Hilmer warns of 
this problem and stresses the importance of drawing a clear distinction between 
measurement itself and the assessment or interpretation of the measures. He points out 
that measures "can never tell the whole story and at best they provide insights from 
which people can draw inferences" (1991 :iii). His point is that any measure, when not 
seen in this light, can either mislead, be abused or lead to quite dysfunctional results.
In her text Performance Indicators for Government, Mary Duckett identifies 
several common problems with the way performance measures are developed and used. 
She contends that they often tend to focus on levels of activity (ie. we ran 23 workshops 
or trained 2,355 people) rather than meaningful outcomes; report things that are easy to 
quantify as opposed to those that are really important; appear to have been developed in 
relative isolation from the general organisation; or only cover a narrow spectrum of the 
desired results (1992:2).
To prevent the development of misleading and dysfunctional performance 
measures, Hilmer suggests that firstly, "measures should deal with those relatively few  
factors most critical to the enterprise or work group" (1991:17). Or, couched in slightly 
different terms, he is really suggesting that management should focus its performance 
measurement efforts on those 20% of activities that create 80% of the outputs or incur
Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study Page 20
80% of the costs (Hilmer, 1991:17). Whilst making this statement, Hilmer stresses that 
outputs should be considered "in terms o f units and services produced as well as value 
and time factors " (1991:18).
Secondly, measures should highlight tangible factors that relate as directly as 
possible to the work of the individual or group using the measure (1991:19). This 
statement suggests that a measurement that cannot be related to the work at hand is 
probably quite meaningless. For example, a measure that only looks at 'work completed' 
and ignores 'work in progress' is unlikely to give an accurate picture of the work being 
done. Hilmer observes that measures are often less than useful when they aggregate too 
much information and, in doing so, lose their relevance to the individual or work unit 
(1991:19).
Thirdly, Hilmer argues that measures should be designed and presented to 
encourage improved performance (1991:20). A point that is supported by Dichter et al. 
who point out that Federal Express, a US courier company, publishes its daily on-time 
performance as a figure rather than a percentage. If the performance was 99.45 % one 
day and 99.41% the next, everyone would probably be quite satisfied. To avoid this 
situation, the company only publishes an absolute number of late deliveries. In this way, 
if 3,567 packages were delivered late yesterday, everyone can understand that 3,567 
customers were inconvenienced or annoyed (1993:92) Note29. Likewise, Federal Express 
might choose to benchmark the performance of various centres against each other to 
engender an environment of healthy competition.
Lastly, the measures should be able to be related to challenging but credible 
performance goals (1991:21).
Hilmer stresses that a measure in and of itself says little about performance, 
rather, insight on performance is gained by comparison (1991:21). This comparison can 
be with previous performance, the performance of a competitor (ie. often referred to as 
benchmarking) or ideally, it will be with a standard of perfect performance ie. zero 
defect, zero waste or zero delays.
Even with the above 'operational' performance measure guidelines being 
observed, Hilmer notes that other 'higher level' measures will be required to deal with the 
issue of competitiveness in the marketplace. For example, a firm may have no waste, no 
inventories, zero turnaround times and high quality but still be uncompetitive if other 
factors such as under-investment in plant and systems are working against it (1991:23).
A local example of excellent operational performance but less than satisfactory 
'higher level' performance is the development of the third runway at Sydney's airport. 
Looked at from a narrow cost, value and time perspective, the performance measures for 
the project would undoubtedly have indicated that it was extremely successful. It was 
completed ahead of time, under budget and was of high quality. However, looked at 
from the perspective of a wider set of performance measures, the project has been a 
financial and public relations disaster. It has provoked massive public protests and 
incurred a massive public cost, with the public having to foot the bill, via a tax on the
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majority of Sydney's air traffic, for the acoustic insulation of houses in several suburbs. 
The lesson here is that performance measures will only provide managers with accurate 
and worthwhile knowledge if they take into account all the key aspects of the activity.
Finally, it must be remembered that different performance indicators can be 
applied to many aspects of a situation. For example, when deciding whether the level of 
water pollution at a certain beach is safe enough to allow swimming, one swimmer 
might be satisfied with knowing the percentage and number of individuals who get ill 
each year after using the beach. Another might want to have the same data but based on 
particular ocean conditions and times of the day for each month of the year. Whilst, at 
the extreme end of the spectrum, another might want a daily or even hourly indication of 
the percentage and number of contaminants in the water compared with national and 
international health standards. On the other hand, local Government might want to 
measure the changes in all of the above to ascertain the 'improvement' made by 
expensive new water treatment procedures.
Unfortunately, many authors have observed that performance measures are not 
well used within most of Australia's enterprises. When Hilmer was doing his field work 
on the issue of performance measurement, he found that much time had to be spent 
developing measures and then collecting data that should already have been in place 
(1991:26). Given the general tone of the Karpin Report produced in 1995, it appears that 
things have not changed that much. Indeed, even in the United States, Adams agrees 
with this point of view and indicates that many performance measurement systems in use 
are not linked to strategy and are therefore inadequate tools for executing it (1995:25).
Noting the clear logic of the adage that "one cannot manage that which one 
cannot measure", Hilmer considers that the challenge for every enterprise is to drastically 
improve its performance measures so that enhanced competitiveness and productivity 
gains become more than just wishful thinking (1991: 28).
In particular, the challenges of making performance measures work in an 
organisation would appear to be to as follows. The enterprise must: commit itself to the 
serious collection and use of performance measures; ensure that its measures capture the 
aspects of cost, value and time most critical to the organisation, without forgetting the 
key 'higher order' measures; remember that different types of performance measures will 
be required at different levels of the enterprise; be constantly aware of the limitations of 
all measures; review the ability of the enterprise's information systems to capture the 
data required; and, encourage the enterprise's people to achieve in accordance with the 
measures set (Hilmer, 1991:29-30).
2.4 Change and Measurement in the Defence Environment
In their article, Changing the way we Change, Pascale et al. argue that larger 
and older organisations tend to be less receptive to new ideas than their younger 
counterparts (1997:130). From this point of view it might be said that the Australian 
Army is perhaps no different from many other organisations. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to examine how the culture within the Australian Defence Force might
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impact on any change and measurement initiatives.
Although it could be argued that, with the expansions and contractions in size 
before and after conflicts, defence forces might be quite used to change, this would 
appear not to be the case. Certainly the ability of the military to adjust to change has 
received special attention from a number of authors, perhaps none more famous than 
Norman Dixon. His 1976 text On the Psychology o f Military Incompetence has become a 
classic study of the British Army's historical inadequacies in the area of adjusting to 
change amongst its various other foibles.
In the same theme as Dixon, in a 1974 lecture on Military Science in an Age of 
Peace, Sir Michael Howard, observed that "The military profession is, like all other 
professions, also a bureaucracy, and bureaucracies accommodate themselves with great 
difficulty to outstanding original thinkers. Secondly, o f course, the military is a 
hierarchy which is, for perfectly good functional reasons, exceptionally rigid" (1974:5). 
Likewise, in The Soldiers, Stanhope gives a bleak assessment of the military's 
enthusiasm for change. He contends that, "Historically, the Army has resisted change 
until its trenches have been overrun, after which it has retreated in orderly fashion, 
regrouping and defending its new positions" (1979:321). In addition, Kiszely notes that, 
"for reasons of its social origins, education, ethics and mores, the officer corps has 
tended to be highly conventional and conformist" and that, "In this atmosphere, criticism 
or suggestion that things are not being done as well as they could be, has often 
perceived to be tantamount to insubordination, and therefore 'badform'." (1991:15).
While all of the above writers are referring to the British Army, given the 
extremely strong historical links that exist, it can be postulated that the Australian 
experience is not very differentNote 30. It is a proposition that would seem to be supported 
by Nicholas Jans in his paper Military Professionalism: Changes in the Australian 
Defence Force, where he notes that the Australian military, with its distinct cultural roots 
and distinct strategic and political environment, is different but perhaps not markedly so 
from other armed forces (1989:188). It might also be supported by Agnew, who, whilst 
writing on urgent need for the Australian Army to embrace strategic level Human 
Resource Management, questioned whether prescriptive statements and initiatives such 
as the introduction of Total Quality Management could "overcome decades of 
conservative resistance to change" (1994:10).
Interestingly, Furry, whilst a serving Australian Army officer, noted that, "The 
usual difficulty in generating interest in TQM is that Army Officers are used to an 
unending stream of management approaches and programs, most o f which are 
introduced with great fanfare but then fail to live up to expectations" (1990:1). Likewise, 
Anglian, also a serving Australian Army officer, noted in his paper Breaking the Mould: 
Approaches to Military Problem Solving into the 21st Century, that, "Much of what is 
espoused in TQM is anathema to officers and without a clear idea of how it can be 
utilised and what it can offer, it may flounder" (1993:2).
In 1995, Jennings, obviously felt that change management was a critical issue 
for the Australian Army. In his then role of Chief Research Officer with the Australian
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Army Directorate of Research and Analysis, he prepared a paper for the Australian Army 
Chief of the General Staffs 1995 Corporate Strategy Seminar entitled Why Armies 
Change. Having examined the evolution of world armies from 1945 to presentNote 31, he 
concluded that "there are exceptions, but for the most part the book is a depressing 
catalogue of errors of judgement, failures in political and budgetary will and a 
reluctance to embrace large scale change when it is most needed" (1995:2). Using this 
historical perspective, he went on to examine those factors working for and against 
change within the Australian Army. He identifies one of these factors as sectionalism 
and notes boldly (considering his position and high level audience) that the modem 
Australian Army is an organisation "riven by internal sectionalism and rivalry for 
preferment and resources" (1995:10). He concludes that because of this, and other 
factors, such as the tendency towards budget driven crisis management, "there is a 
tendency to favour an incremental approach to change and a risk-averse management 
style" (1995:10).
Grainger, in his essay The Management of Change in the Defence 
Environment, would appear to agree with Jennings when he points out that "..Defence is, 
in fact, extremely adaptable to incremental, minor change", (1989:328) and cites the 
reason for this as the nature of its staffing. Given that Service officers usually only serve 
in any given appointment for two or, less commonly, three years, Note32 Grainger argues 
that most are keen to 'leave their mark' by carrying out some minor change. Change that 
will bring them personal satisfaction and, ideally, some wider acclaim. Conversely, 
Grainger also observes that the result of such short postings, is that major change is less 
often attempted because it is "all too easy to put the matter off to let it become someone 
else's problem" (1989:329). He also notes that "major changes occur in military 
organisation and doctrine only upon the impetus of major or compelling external 
pressures, usually of a political - rather than professional military - nature” (1989:329). 
This is an observation that would undoubtedly be backed by Jennings, who notes that 
many of the pressures for change currently being applied to the Australian Army are a 
direct result of wider pressures for change in Australian society (1995:8).
One text that details a strategy for bringing about change in the military is 
General Gordon R. Sullivan and Anthony Coroalle's Seeing the Elephant. Writing on the 
introduction of massive change in the United States Army, he observes that "effective, 
long-lasting change can seldom be mandated from the top" and that the natural human 
resistance to change has to be taken into account (1995:29). He notes the vital 
importance of a shared vision (1995:29) and the creation of a "learning organisation" 
that "welcomes change as a way to improve" (1995:31). Above all, he talks about the 
importance of the United States Army recognising that the new way ahead would entail 
a significant departure from the way the Army previously thought about and effected 
change" (1995:35).
In a similar vein to Sullivan, General Donn Starry, in his article To Change an 
Army, outlines the following requirements for change; a mechanism to identify the 
required change, a common cultural bias, a proponent for the change, a broad consensus 
for change, continuity, high level sponsorship, and a convincing demonstration of value 
(1994:23-25).
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In regard to the issue of performance measurement in the Australian Army, it 
would seem, from this author's observation over the years, that it is avoided like the 
plague. Where measures do exist they seem to be largely unused, poorly used or they are 
used to judge rather than as a tool for continuous improvement. Indeed, the regard with 
which performance measurement is held by some, is nicely illustrated by the following:
ANOTHER DAY ENDS 
All targets met 
All systems working 
All clients satisfied 
All staff eager and enthusiastic 
All pigs fed and ready to fly
This anonymous quote, which has undoubtedly done the rounds of the 
Australian Defence Force, Public Service and many other industries, is possibly the 
result of a recognition by middle managers and workers that performance measures, 
although they are intrinsically valuable if used well, are often ill conceived or 
implemented in the wrong way or for the wrong reasons.
This judgement is lent considerable weight by Hartmann in his 1993 analysis 
of why, after 17 years of trying, the Australian Army had still failed to introduce an 
effective systems approach to its collective training. He concludes that one of the main 
factors was a fear that, as opposed to the optimisation of training, the primary use of 
such a system would be external assessment (1994:2).
2.5 Relevant Literature on Recruit Wastage
In an organisation where it is often difficult, if not impossible, to access 
archival material due to poor file naming and maintenance Note33, the author was fortunate 
indeed to be able to source a wealth of archival material on the recruit wastage issue 
from Army's Personnel Division. Given the value of this data, several key documents 
referred to are attached at Enclosure 1.
Among the many documents uncovered, the oldest was a letter dated 17th June 
1976 from the Director of Army Psychology to the Director of Army Personnel Planning 
regarding "a wastage o f personnel (from recruit training) which is expensive and 
disturbing”. In this letter (Enclosure 1-1) the author notes that at a recent high level 
conference on the issue of recruit wastage, "No definite conclusions on failure at the 1st 
Recruit Training Battalion were drawn”. In a subsequent letter dated 5th July 1976 
(Enclosure 1-2), the same author accuses the Army's then Director of Recruiting of 
advancing arguments in regard to recruit wastage that are "patently illogical" Note34.
In June 1989 Reynolds, in a detailed report entitled RTB Wastage, attempted to 
review the reasons for recruit wastage during the period 1976-1988. He noted, amongst 
other things, that the introduction of females to 1st Recruit Training Battalion in 1985 
had dramatically added to the problem of wastage due to medical reasons. He observed,
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for example, that in 1987 approximately 61% of the females entering training were 
discharged with well over two thirds of this figure failing due to medical reasons. 
Reynolds concludes this report by recommending, "that we recognise that there is a 
problem with 1 RTB training which appears to be related to the physical standards 
imposed on recruits” (1989:4).
In 1989 the recruit wastage issue was obviously a concern at the most senior 
levels of Defence. This is amply illustrated by a letter dated 25th May 1989 to the Chief 
of the Defence Force (General Gration), from the Chief of Defence Personnel (Rear 
Admiral Beaumont) (Enclosure 1-3) in which the writer noted that the number of 
involuntary separations on medical grounds from the Army's training force was, "very 
high compared with the other Services” Note35. In his margin note response this caused the 
most senior officer of the day to comment that, "there should be further investigation 
into whether Army's practices at Kapooka could be modified to make it less physically 
stressful early in the training period while finishing up with the same product". This was 
a comment that obviously focused the minds of many, as two months later, a detailed 
'interim' report on recruit medical discharges during the period 1984-88 was produced by 
the 1st Recruit Training Battalion Regimental Medical Officer, Captain M.A. Slater.
Slater's key recommendations were that: enlistment medical boards place 
greater emphasis on lower leg fitness and the detection of recruits with a positive history 
of asthma; a clear policy be developed on the use of orthotics by recruits; the recruit 
course be extended by one week to allow a more gradual approach to physical training 
and the incorporation of a regular rest cycle; a basic physical fitness test be introduced at 
the time of enlistment; more thorough enlistment medicals be conducted to identify 
pre-existing injury/illness; and statistics continue to be collected in an attempt to 
determine the causes (of recruit) injury (1989:12-15). Slater also noted that Israeli 
Defence Force studies suggested there was a clear relationship between the lack of 
regular scheduled rest in a recruit training program and training injuries (1989:15). The 
comment by the then Commandant of Kapooka in his covering letter to this report 
(Enclosure 1-4) was that, "Measures to reduce recruit wastage rates cannot be 
introduced in isolation at 1 RTB but must be considered by all agencies involved in the 
initial entry process” Note36.
In response to Slater's paper, the Army's Chief of Personnel directed, in a letter 
dated 24th August 1989 (Enclosure 1-5), that a conference of "the players" be convened 
to "find the right answers and set some changes in motion". This conference 
subsequently took place in Canberra on 29th September 1989. Unfortunately, an 
examination of the conference minutes (Enclosure 1-6) reveals that, although the 
meeting was chaired by the Deputy Chief of Army Personnel (a brigadier), the Director 
of Army Recruiting was represented by the most junior officer present (a captain). 
Additionally, it appears from the minutes that no actual conclusions were reached Note37.
In line with Grainger's observation that it usually takes a major event or 
external political pressure to cause real change in Defence (1989:329), it is interesting to 
note the contents of a March 1991 brief prepared for the Senate Estimates Committee. In
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this brief (Enclosure 1-7), which deals with the occurrence of recruit suicides, it is noted 
that, in response to a 1990 recruit suicide, "Army conducted a review of training at 1 
RTB in an effort to reduce the stress reaction of recruits undergoing training " and, "As a 
result o f this review, the training course was increased in length from 12 to 13 
weeks....to allow recruits more time to transition into military life and to better 
assimilate military training" Note38. In a related internal brief dated September 1990 
(Enclosure 1-8), it was noted that this increase in course length was only one of a whole 
range of measures taken to improve recruit retention. Other measures were the 
introduction of a four day pre-course orientation for new recruits, the reduction of 
physical training standards including a "more gradual" step to the more difficult 
activities, increased flexibility in the completion of training objectives and a, "Review of 
1 RTB staffing requirements to overcome problems such as the accumulation of leave 
credits and increased domestic dislocation due to excessive work pressure" Note39.
One of the most comprehensive documents uncovered on the issue of injuries 
was Major Steven Rudzki's Injuries in the Australian Amy 1987-1991 - A Comparison to 
the US Army Experience which was completed as a Defence Force Fellowship in 1992. 
This work allowed the recruit injury situation to be compared with the Army at large and 
provided further evidence of the tremendous cost the Army was incurring through 
injuries. However, perhaps of most interest of all, was the unpublished work provided by 
Rodney Pope, the resident Recruit Training Battalion physiotherapist, on the correlation 
of recruit injuries with the scores achieved on an aerobic capacity test referred to as the 
20 metre Shuttle Run. As a result of testing successive groups of recruits on the run and 
then observing the aerobic fitness of those subsequently discharged, Pope speculates that 
the introduction of the test prior to enlistment and the rejection of those applicants below 
a certain level, could predictably lower wastage by a much as 6% (1994:4).
With regard to the status of the recruit wastage problem in late 1994, a 1st 
Recruit Training Battalion minute to Headquarters Training Command dated 15th 
December 1994 revealed that, of the 1,263 General Entry Recruits who marched into 
recruit training during the period July-November 1994, 218 (a total of 17%) had been 
discharged Note40. A breakdown of the reasons given for discharge is shown at Figure 4.
Figure 4
Reasons for Recruit Wastage (July-November 1994)
Medically Unfit or Below Medical Standard 101 46%
Not Suited to Military Life due to Psychological Reasons 53 24%
Discharged at Own Request 35 16%
Withdraw of Parental Consent (for under 18 year olds) 22 10%
False Information provided on Enlistment 7 4%
Unsuitable for Further Military Training 0 0%
218 100%
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2.6 Gaps and Omissions in the Literature
Within the contemporary literature, it would appear that gaps by one author, 
such as Camall's failure to recognise the vital nature of top management's attitude 
towards change, are more than adequately covered by others. Likewise, within the 
military context, Jennings does an excellent job of identifying the factors working for 
and against change in the Australian Army but fails to note the important point made by 
Grainger regarding the length of postings.
The one area not well covered in the military specific literature, is how to 
successfully approach change in a military environment. Most, such as Jennings, simply 
point to the challenges without offering detailed suggestions. The exception to this 
statement is Sullivan's 1995 text on change in the American military, Seeing the 
Elephant. His position, however, would appear to be that the military is no different from 
any other major organisation and he draws heavily on mainstream texts such as Kanter, 
Stein and Jick's The Challenge o f Organisational Change (1992).
The wealth of background material in the form of archival data was much 
better than expected, however, many omissions were evident. Reynolds, for instance, 
provides no data on females trained separately prior to 1985, so it is difficult to conclude 
if any change in the female wastage rate actually took place. Also, his figures are 
percentages only, so it is not possible to determine the number of recruits his percentages 
refer to. Slater's 1989 study only covers medical wastage and fails to consider that, for 
example, a large number of recruits discharged for medical reasons may in fact have 
been using injury as a face saving way of exiting the system. Also, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many recruits with undeclared pre-enlistment injuries have been discharged 
on the basis of untruthful statements made on enlistment. If this is the case, without an 
overview of all discharges, it is hard to tell if Slater's figures are truly representative of 
the situation. It is also interesting to note that some of Slater's figures are very different 
from those provided by Reynolds. For example, in 1987 Slater records 21.12 % of 
females being discharged for medical reasons (1988:17), as opposed to Reynolds' 46% 
(1989:4).
The inadequacy of the whole recruit injury data issue is highlighted in a 15th 
September 1989 letter from the Director General of Army Health which states, "In the 
past five years at 1 RTB the reliability o f statistics has been variable depending on the 
availability o f staff, particularly medical officers. The present Regimental Medical 
Officer at 1 RTB is collecting data for a PhD project and therefore the data is sound. 
Reliable, accurate data will come with the modernisation of the Health Records System 
which has been in gestation for 15 years" Note41.
Another problem is that no authors adequately explain their methods for 
calculating the wastage rate. This is important because recruits do not necessarily start 
and finish their training in the same calendar or financial year. Hence statistics based 
solely on calendar or financial years must be suspect. The only consistent method would 
appear to be measurement by cohorts ie. 40 start in a group; four months later x  number 
will have graduated andy number will have been discharged for whatever reasons.
Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study Page 28
Unfortunately, because no source data is available, none of the figures offered by any 
authors are able to be independently substantiated.
In November 1995, the above inconsistency was glaringly highlighted by a 
review of the Defence recruiting function which reported, The ability to draw 
sustainable conclusions regarding training failures and times o f the year is further 
hampered by the inconsistent approach to recording training data. The 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion, 1st Recruit Training Unit (Royal Australian Air Force), and the 
Australian Defence Force Academy record recruit discharges by months, whereas 
Recruit Training Squadron at HMAS Cerberus records discharges by courses, as does 
the Royal Military College and the Royal Australian Air Force College " (1995:10-14). 
However, even this apparently quite comprehensive document, seems to put wastage 
rates in the too hard basket. Instead of attempting to develop comparisons based on 
source cohort data, it contents itself with recommending that, "The Defence Force
Recruiting Branch establish a working party  to determine agreed definitions for
discharges under training, the types o f statistical data required, and the means of data 
collection, transmission, collation, display and interpretation required.. to make 
informed management decisions on the basis o f reliable statistical information" 
(1995:10-20).
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Chapter Three
Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks
3.1 Theoretical Framework
In his 1993 text The Unobtrusive Researcher - a Guide to Methods, Kellehear 
summarises the hypothetico-deductive approach to research as; read first (literature 
review), get an idea (theoretical framework), go out (methods), test it (results), see if you 
were right in the first place (discussion) (1993:20). He also defines a theoretical 
framework as "ideas developed before the empirical encounter with the world"
(1993:18).
Based on this hypothetico-deductive approach, the recruit wastage project was 
designed to apply Change Management and Performance Measurement theories to the 
recruit wastage problem in order to:
► test the theories on a live project with the hope of producing a positive
outcome, and
► draw conclusions of value to those who would attempt similar improvement
efforts, both within Army and in external environments.
In particular, given a set of disparate and often antagonistic stakeholders and a 
culture which has traditionally resisted meaningful measurement, the Project was 
designed to discover whether the use of contemporary Quality Management theories 
could bring effective change to a complex process. If a certain approach could be 
supported with empirical evidence and be appropriately recorded and disseminated, it 
was felt that the Project would meaningfully contribute to the Army's wider 
understanding of how to successfully improve its key processes.
It must be said at the outset that the approach of this thesis was dictated by the 
nature of the problem. The recruit wastage rate issue was a very real problem within the 
author's workplace. It was a problem which demanded a concrete outcome - not simply 
research pointing to a solution. Hence an 'action research' type approach which focused 
on a specific problem was necessary as it would allow the Project to attract the funds and 
staff effort necessary to support its implementation. Interestingly, when discussing the 
nature of research in The Management o f a Student Research Project, Sharp et al. note 
that this type of 'applied' research, is more likely to result in successful completion than 
'pure' or 'basic' research (1996:13).
Given the approach adopted, it is freely acknowledged that the Project is 
situation and setting specific and that it might not be possible to generalise from some of 
its outcomes. Having said this, it is interesting to note the point made by Sharp et al.
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that, 'Outside mathematics, the researcher cannot prove explanations or predictions 
completely, merely render them more probable' (1996: 111).
3.2 Methodological Framework
Following confirmation of the very real value of pursuing the wastage 
problem, and bearing in mind the collective wisdom of authors such as Carnall, Dunphy 
& Stace and Grainger, it was hoped that Project DUNLOP would succeed where other 
attempts had not. Accordingly, at the highest level of abstraction, it was decided to 
approach the project in the following way:
► Phase 1. Use the advice of Dunphy and Stace, to assess how the wastage issue 
should be approached (ie. determine the level of ’organisational fit’, consider 
the scale of change required, the time available to make the change and the 
type of leadership that would be most appropriate) whilst, at the same time, 
ensuring that the strategy developed would stand a good chance of attracting 
the support and resources necessary for it to succeed.
► Phase 2. Implement the Wastage Project strategy using appropriate theoretical 
guidance from the literature reviewed. In particular, it was envisaged that 
middle and senior management workshops would be conducted and some style 
of steering group of key stakeholders formed to progress the Project.
► Phase 3. Assess the strategy's effectiveness in bringing about change via the 
collection and analysis of relevant wastage rate data, the conduct of 
appropriate interviews with stakeholders and intelligent observation.
► Phase 4. Provide relevant and valid insights to those 'change agents' who 
would attempt similar improvement activities within Defence and similar 
environments.
In regard to the methods to be used during the conduct of the Project, it was 
intended to use as much archival data as could be obtained; to conduct an extensive 
number of unstructured interviews with Project stakeholders at all levels; and, for 
benchmarking purposes, to statistically manipulate recruit wastage data sourced from the 
records of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. Where it was considered constructive, it * 
was also intended to conduct surveys of those participating in various aspects of the 
Project.
From the point of view of data collection, it was considered that the short 
life-span (10-12 weeks) of the recruit induction process would readily allow changes to 
be observed and quantified. The process involved relatively small intakes of between 30 
and 50 recruits, drawn from six identical recruiting centres around Australia, going 
through identical training patterns, being administered by four identical recruit training 
companies at the Recruit Training Battalion.
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At the time of Project commencement, there were still a great many unknowns. 
If nothing else however, there was a faith that, if correctly applied, the principles of 
quality management would guide the Project to a good outcome.
3.3 Ethical Issues
At the time of project commencement, the overwhelming ethical issue was the 
immorality of not quickly acting to reduce the wastage and injury rates of recruits in 
basic training. It was noted, however, that there would undoubtedly be ethical questions 
to be addressed if, for example, the Project initiated trials of methods to reduce injuries. 
Fortunately, it was soon realised that consultation with the Defence Medical Ethics 
Committee would be an integral part of any trial conducted by the Army's medical 
establishment.
Also raised by Kellehear is the issue of ensuring that individuals are aware that 
they are a part of an experiment (1993:4). Whilst those participating in wastage related 
workshops and meetings intended to progress the wastage issue, would most certainly be 
aware that they were part of an effort to reduce recruit wastage and prove the validity of 
certain quality management approaches, this awareness would not extend to the actual 
recruits in training. This, however, was considered to be acceptable given that the recruit 
training program had always been subject to frequent amendment as various Chief 
Instructors and Commandants had sought to impose their will upon i tNote42.
It should be noted that in some instances, notably certain interviews, names are 
not given. This is done sparingly but where it occurs, it is done intentionally in order to 
provide anonymity, and therefore confidentiality, to the individuals concerned.
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Chapter Four
Results
4.1 The 'Strategy for Change'
The preliminary review of the wastage issue has already been described in 
detail at Chapter One.
Based on the guidance provided by Dunphy & Stace (1994), the induction 
process' 'level of fit' suggested that a 'developmental transition' was appropriate, as 
opposed to a radical 'transformation' or 'turnaround'. Coincidentally, this type of 
approach was also most consistent with the value guidance provided in the Training 
Command Corporate Plan T ra in in g  to  W in 9 4 /9 5  which encouraged process 
improvement " ...a fter c o n su lta tio n  w ith  a ll  r e le v a n t p a r tie s"  and, where practical, "via 
th e  u se  o f  f a c i l i ta t e d  team s"  (1994:16).
Bearing in mind the importance and cost of the wastage issue, it could not be 
allowed to continue any longer than necessary; however, this said, there was not an 
overwhelming imperative to rectify it 'overnight'. Accordingly, it was decided to address 
the situation over an 18-24 month time-frame using a structure Quality Management 
approach.
It must also be noted that within Headquarters Training Command there was a 
strong predisposition towards using a participative, rather than a directive or coercive, 
approach to address the wastage problem. Fortunately, this desire coincided with the 
appointment of a new Commandant of the Recruit Training Battalion who had no strong 
ownership of the current system. Another issue was that no single Army organisation 
owned the whole induction process. Change in many areas would therefore require the 
co-operation of several different stakeholders.
Although not referred to as such in correspondence at the time, in essence, the 
strategy developed to address the wastage problem was as outlined in Figure 5. This 
strategy, which was based on the guidance provided by authors such as Camall (1990), 
Kanter (1992), and Dichter et al. (1993), did not attempt to pre-plan every contingency. 
Rather, it was expected that the Project would inevitably involve lots of on-the-spot 
trouble shooting to deal with surprises. It was also expected, despite the obvious 
historical difficulties outlined in the archives, that the sponsorship of the General Officer 
Commanding Training Command, combined with a sound approach, would be sufficient 
to ensure the Project's success.
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Figure 5
The Project DUNLOP 'Strategy for Change'
S ta g e  1: C re a te  a  H ig h e r  L e v e l R e c o g n itio n  o f  the  
N e e d  to  C h a n g e
S ta g e  2 : B u ild  G r a s s  R o o ts  'E nergy f o r  C h an ge '
S ta g e  3 : W in K e y  S ta k e h o ld e r  S u p p o r t a n d  O w n e rsh ip  
S ta g e  4 : F o rm  a  S tro n g  G u id in g  C o a litio n  
S ta g e  5 : C re a te  S h o rt T erm  W ins  
S ta g e  6: G o  f o r  the 'Big W ins'
S ta g e  7: C o n so lid a te  Im p ro v e m en ts  a n d  In s titu tio n a lise  
N e w  A p p ro a c h e s
4.2 Creating a Higher Level Recognition of the Need to Change
Within the Planning Branch of Headquarters Training Command it must be 
said that it was assumed that at least two major factors would provide an ongoing 
climate of support for any effort to reduce recruit wastage Note43.
Firstly, it was taken as a given that as the Army was increasingly being forced 
to operate in an environment where funding levels were decreasing and/or constrained, 
productivity enhancement initiatives such as DUNLOP would be looked upon 
favourably. In this regard, it was thought useful to have the costs of the wastage 
quantified so that all concerned could appreciate the financial magnitude of the problem. 
The message that every discharged recruit was costing the Army $24,000 dollars was an 
easy one to grasp and made a compelling argument that this waste of funds should be 
avoided if at all possible.
Secondly, it was assumed that as Australian society was becoming 
demonstrably more concerned with an employers 'Duty of Care' to its employees Nole 44, 
Projects such as DUNLOP would be popular within a Defence Force seeking to cite 
concrete examples of this duty of care being put into action.
A third, more esoteric reason, that might well have figured in the thinking of 
the Army's personnel policy makers, was the known future reduction in the numbers of 
potential recruits that would be available to the Army due to the demographic shadow 
cast by the post World War Two baby boom Note45.
Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study Page 34
Irrespective of the above issues, it was considered that a 'powerful higher level 
recognition of the need to change' already existed given the current concerns in many 
areas (described in Chapter One) and the direct involvement of the General Officer 
Commanding Training Command. Accordingly, this phase was deemed to have been 
achieved when, in mid December 1994, the General Officer Commanding Training 
Command wrote to all of the key induction process stakeholders clearly outlining his 
intent to address the wastage issue and seeking their support.
4.3 Building a Grass Roots 'Energy for Change'
In order to build a grass roots 'Energy for Change' (and to understand the 
wastage problem more fully), an initial examination of the wastage problem was 
conducted at Kapooka during the period 6th-10th February 1995. The vehicle used for 
this examination was a Total Quality Management Facilitator Course specifically 
designed to use the wastage problem as a 'real time' teaching medium. This course was 
conducted by the author and two consultants from APTECH Australia..
Despite the 1st Recruit Training Battalion's extremely high workload, the 
support of the General Officer Commanding Training Command ensured that three 
Recruit Company Commanders, the unit Training and Training Development Officers, 
representatives from the Kapooka medical and psychological units and the unit Physical 
Training Cell were made available to participate in the five day course. In order to 
provided a vital 'supplier' perspective to discussions, representatives from the Melbourne 
and Brisbane Defence Force Recruiting Units were also made available by the 
Directorate of Army Recruiting which brought the course size to 17.
At each stage of the course, rather than using standard hypothetical problems 
as a teaching medium, the course focused on the wastage rate problem. Given the 
tailored group on the course, this strategy proved enormously successful. Indeed, over 
the period of the course, most of the participants became quite passionate about really 
doing something to address the wastage problem.
Together with the existing literature and data outlined in Chapter Two, the 
group's own experience was added to by two detailed (and thought provoking) 
presentations. The first of these was given by Lieutenant Colonel Rod Jewel from the 
Army's Directorate of Personnel Planning. From his long standing personal interest in 
the topic, he was able to outline how the wastage problem complicated the Army's 
manpower planning. The second presentation was made by Major Steven Rudzki, the 
then Officer Commanding of the Albury Wodonga Medical Centre, who presented 
statistics which benchmarked the Army's injury rates with those of civil industry and 
suggested possible ways to address the issue. This presentation was made all the more 
credible by the fact that Rudzki had served as the Regimental Medical Officer at the 1st 
Recruit Training Battalion in a prior posting and had recently completed a Defence Force 
Fellowship on training injuries within the Australian Army during the period 1987-91.
He was also the medical officer responsible for recruits then in training at 
Albury-W odonga.
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Given the sources discussed above, the course came up with 121 potential 
causes of recruit wastage. This list was critically reviewed twice and seven ideas 
identified for further detailed examination as outlined in figure 6.
Figure 6
Seven Key ’Wastage Reduction' Ideas Developed by 
6-10 February 1995 TQM Course held at 1st Recruit Training Battalion
• Improve the selection of recruits via the conduct of a pre-enlistment selection 
weekend.
• Correlate the psychological and Enlistment Officer ratings given to recruits at the 
Defence Force Recruiting Centres with the actual discharges from recruit training 
in order to validate the accuracy of the ratings.
• Improve the medical process in order to better detect pre-existing injuries and 
more accurately ascertain if an applicant is likely to succeed at recruit training.
(It should be noted that this was the area considered to have by far the greatest 
potential to reduce recruit wastage!).
• Improve the Recruit Training Battalion's recruit physical training program in 
order to reduce the number of discharges due to physical training related injuries.
• Examine the effect of high Recruit Training Battalion staff workloads on recruit 
wastage.
• Analyse the issue of recruit 'culture shock' in order to reduce wastage.
• Examine the Recruit Training Battalion's staff performance with the aim of 
reducing recruit wastage.
Each of these areas of examination was voluntarily adopted by a self selected 
sub-group from the course which effectively became the 'champion' of their proposal. 
Each group undertook considerable developmental work on how 'their' proposal could be 
progressed if the time, resources and authority were allocated.
On the morning of the last day of the course the sub-groups presented their 
developed proposals to the Colonel Plans from Headquarters Training Command who 
was extremely pleased with the outcome. Unfortunately, the new Commandant of the 
Recruit Training Battalion, who had been absent from Kapooka for the duration of the 
course, was only available to attend presentations on the afternoon of the final day. 
Furthermore, due to time constraints, he had not been briefed on what to anticipate from 
the presentations. His somewhat unexpected response, as he heard his key staff, one after 
another, outlining the magnitude of the problem they believed existed within his 
organisation was one of growing disquiet followed by an abrupt departure.
Despite the unfortunate outcome of the final briefing session, at the end of the 
five day Total Quality Management course, it appeared that a very sound foundation had
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been laid for addressing the wastage issue. The course had radically challenged the 
values of those participating and created a widespread ’paradigm shift' regarding the 
acceptable level of recruit wastage. It had also created a genuine dissatisfaction with the 
status quo and a real (and voluntary) commitment to the need to change. Indeed, when 
surveyed by the author attendees indicated that the concept and outcomes of the course 
were excellentNote46 and all agreed that the Army had gained good value from its 
conduct.
Another advantage of the course was that it had also successfully identified 
some of those individuals with the talent and desire to become a part of Project 
DUNLOP’s guiding coalition, notably Rudzki and Jewel, as well as several others with 
the desire to act as 'change agents' at the middle management and line supervisor level. 
As well, it had further refined the nature of the changes needed, thereby providing an 
excellent start point for examination by key stakeholders.
It is interesting to note that the focused, problem orientated nature of the above 
Total Quality Management Course was initially opposed by the Army's Directorate of 
Management Development as they were unsure of its value, as opposed to the standard 
generic courses of the day Note47. Had the course not been directly linked to a project 
backed by the General Officer Training Command, it is most probable that it would not 
have proceeded, or if it had, it would not have focused on the wastage issue. Also of 
interest is that the consultants, who had conducted several generic courses for the Army, 
were enthused by its real time experiential learning approach and were most pleased 
with the outcome Note 48.
4.4 Wining Key Stakeholder Support and Ownership
The next step in the DUNLOP Plan was to win Key Stakeholder support and 
ownership of the changes that would be required to achieve real change. This was 
achieved by conducting a highly structured two day examination of the wastage rate 
issue which involved all of the key stakeholders. Using the excellent historical data 
sourced from the Army's Directorate of Personnel Planning (going back to 1976) and the 
data and ideas generated by the Facilitator Course as a basis, the problem solving 
technique chosen for this much higher level activity was an externally facilitated two day 
Value Management Workshop. This activity was held at Kapooka in late February 1995 
and was attended by:
► key Defence Force Recruiting staff (including the Director of Army 
Recruiting, the Senior Army Recruiting Officer - Sydney and the Royal 
Australian Navy officer leading a review team examining the Defence 
Recruiting function);
► key 1st Recruit Training Battalion staff (including the Commandant, Chief 
Instructor, Training Officer, Regimental Sergeant Major and Officer 
Commanding Kapooka Medical Centre);
► representatives of the Army's personnel and financial policy makers;
Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study Page 37
► the Army's medical and psychology experts (including the representatives of 
the Director General Army Health services and Director of Psychology - 
Army, and the Officer Commanding Albury Wodonga Medical Centre;
► the Project Team and key Training Policy staff from Headquarters Training 
Command; and
► several invited guests (including the Chief Instructor of the Royal Australian 
Air Force Recruit Training Unit, the Operations Officer of the School of 
Infantry [a key customer of the recruit training process]) who brought various 
unique perspectives to the workshop.
It is interesting to note that, the 1st Recruit Training Battalion's trainees were 
even represented at the Key Stakeholder meeting via the circulation of a hand-written 
'summary of grievances' that was secretly organised by a visiting chaplain. A heated 
discussion on the validity of this summary, certainly contributed to the creative tension 
that the meeting was intended to generate.
The intention of the Workshop was to use a proven problem solving and 
consensus building technique to explore the wastage issue. Its overall aim, in the words 
used by the General Officer Commanding Training Command in his correspondence to 
all participants, was "to c h a lle n g e  c u rre n t a ssu m p tio n s  a n d  p r a c t ic e s  w ith  a  v iew  to  
p r o d u c in g  w o rk a b le  a n d  in n o v a tiv e  so lu tio n s  to  the w a s ta g e  p r o b le m  ".
The Workshop's stated aims were as shown in Figure 7 Note49.
Figure 7
Project DUNLOP
Key Stakeholder Workshop - Stated Aims
• To b r in g  to g e th e r  the  k ey  s ta k e h o ld e rs  in the rec ru itin g  a n d  re c ru it  
tra in in g  p r o c e s s e s  w ith  the s in g le  a im  o f  a d d re s s in g  the re c ru it w a s ta g e  
p r o b le m
• To g e n e ra te  co n sen su s  on  the o b je c tiv e  o f  P r o je c t  D U N L O P
• To s tim u la te  c r e a tiv e  a n d .'b o t tle d -u p 1 id e a s
• To en su re  jo in t  o w n e rsh ip  o f  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  the w o rk sh o p
• To re in fo rce  the c u rre n t en th u sia sm  f o r  a c h ie v in g  a  m ea n in g fu l a n d  
m e a su ra b le  P r o je c t  r e su lt •
• To g e n e ra te  an  im p r o v e d  le v e l o f  co m m u n ica tio n  a n d  a  tea m  fo c u s  
to w a r d s  th e  w a s ta g e  r a te  p r o b le m  w h ich  w ill  la s t  lo n g  a f te r  the w o rk sh o p  
h a s b e e n  c o m p le ted .
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The Workshop structure was based on an In fo rm a tio n  P h a s e , during which 
perspectives on the wastage problem were given by the Colonel Plans, Headquarters 
Training Command; the Director of Army Recruiting; the Commandant, 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion; and representatives of the Army's Director of Personnel Planning and 
Director General of Health Services. Next was an A n a ly s is  P h a s e , which clarified the 
Workshop objectives and examined the Project assumptions, constraints, key issues and 
concerns; a S p e c u la tio n  P h a s e , which generated ideas and options as to how wastage 
rate might be reduced; and an E v a lu a tio n  P h a s e , which evaluated those ideas produced 
and considered further options. Finally, a D e v e lo p m e n t P h a se , was used to develop an 
agreed Project DUNLOP Action Plan.
Based on the author's discussions with the participants, the workshop was 
considered to be most effective. In particular, the result reinforced the value of hand 
picking people with a positive attitude toward such an activity. It also reinforced the 
value of having a few 'outsiders' involved in the process, with the Chief Instructor of the 
Royal Australian Air Force Recruit Training Unit (for example) providing several 
excellent insights into successful strategies employed by an organisation in similar 
circumstances.
At the conclusion of the Workshop, the participants had agreed that the desired 
outcomes of Project DUNLOP were as shown at Figure 8 Note5°.
Figure 8
Project DUNLOP
Key Stakeholder Workshop - Agreed Desired Outcomes
• To m in im ise  w a s ta g e  ra te s  d u rin g  R e c ru it a n d  In itia l E m p lo ym en t  
T ra in in g
■ • To re d u c e  the c o s ts  o f  su ch  w a s ta g e  to  the A rm y
• To im p ro v e  the A rm y 's  im a g e  in the co m m u n ity  a s  a  re su lt o f  re d u c e d  
fa i lu r e s  a n d  in ju r ies  d u r in g  re c ru it tra in in g
• To m a in ta in  the q u a li ty  o f  the  rec ru its  m a rch in g  o u t o f  r e c ru it tra in in g
• To co n firm  the v a lid ity  o f  the P ro je c t's  m e th o d o lo g y  f o r  o th e r  C on tin u ou s  
Im p ro v e m e n t p r o je c ts  w ith in  th e  A rm y
In all, 50 actions, encompassing the whole spectrum of the Army's induction 
process, were agreed upon for inclusion in the initial action plan. To see these outcomes 
realised, a Project DUNLOP Action Plan was produced. This plan represented the final 
consolidation of the approaches which the participants had agreed to explore in an effort 
to reduce the wastage rate. Despite this success, one of the disappointments of the
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workshop was that the notion of setting visionary performance goals (such as 15% 
wastage by December 1995, 10% wastage by December 1996 etc) was dismissed as 
impractical Note51.
Interestingly, prior to the conduct of the workshop, the Directorate of 
Management Development had, once again, expressed its dissatisfaction with the 
intended Training Command approach Note52. It was strongly opposed to the use of the 
Value Management technique and exerted strong pressure on the Planning Branch of 
Headquarters Training Command to dispense with its preferred workshop facilitator in 
favour of one of their preferred consultants. Had it not been for the fact that a verbal 
agreement was already in place, and that the facilitator was being funded by Planning 
Branch, it is highly unlikely that the Value Management approach would have been 
permitted.
4.5 Forming a Strong Guiding Coalition
One of the key actions agreed upon by the Key Stakeholder Workshop was to 
establish a Project DUNLOP Steering Group which would oversee the implementation 
of all other agreed actions. With the Colonel Plans, Headquarters Training Command as 
its chairman, the plan was for the Steering Group to meet roughly every three months to 
ensure that the momentum gained during the early stages of the Project was not lost Note 
53. No time limit was set on the life of the Steering Group. Rather, it was inferred that it 
would function until the wastage problem was solved - a period generally thought to be 
two years or less.
As a further sign of the investment that Training Command was willing to 
make to ensure that the Project and Project Steering Group received adequate staff 
support, on 5th May 1995, an Army Reserve officer was employed on a full-time basis to 
co-ordinate the Project.
The key results obtained via the Project DUNLOP Steering Group's 
progression of the Action Plan are outlined below in order of their perceived impact to 
date on the wastage problem. It must however, be realised that many of the strategies are 
interrelated, with benefits derived in one area frequently having positive flow-on effects 
in others. Additionally, it must be realised that in several areas, Project DUNLOP simply 
provided added impetus to changes already planned or was used as a means of advancing 
ideas which had been striving for acceptance for some time.
4.6 Creating Short Term Wins
Conscious of the need to get some early 'runs on the board', the Project 
DUNLOP Steering Group initially focused on goals that appeared as though they could 
to be relatively easy achieved. Included in this list were elimination of the ability of 
recruits to take discharge due to the 'Withdrawal of Parental Consent', modification of 
the training regime at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion to reduce injuries, and the 
improvement of recruit motivation during training. The Steering Group was also keen to 
examine the area of psychological screening given that it appeared that approximately
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24% of recruits were being discharged as 'Not suited to Military Life due to 
Psychological Reasons' (see Figure 4).
It must be noted however, that in addition to the above targets, almost all of 
the 50 'Action Items' developed by the Key Stakeholder Workshop remained on a 
'Project DUNLOP Action Plan' that was addressed at each of the Steering Group 
Meetings.
4.6.1 - Parental Consent
Recognising that many recruits who apply to be discharged, later withdraw 
their request once they have recovered from the initial shock of training, one of the first 
quick successes of DUNLOP was to discontinue the policy of allowing recruits under the 
age of 18 to be discharged as a result of a withdrawal of parental consent. This policy, 
which the Key Stakeholder Workshop revealed to be unique to the Army among the 
three Services, allowed for immediate discharge without the normal 42 day cooling off 
period applied to standard requests for discharge. Even though this change would 
potentially only effect around 10% of discharges, it was considered to be a very tangible 
and quick result that would undoubtedly have some immediate effect.
4.6.2 - Recruit Injuries
It was clear from the archival data that the largest proportion of recruit wastage 
was due to discharge for medical reasons and the current figures (see Figure 4) suggested 
that this reason was responsible for 46% of discharges. Given this fact, and the belief 
that this was an area where dramatic early gains could be made, the area of recruit 
injuries was targeted for rapid improvement.
In accordance with the above, on the 17th April 1995, a revised recruit training 
program was instituted which allowed greater rest periods between endurance activities 
and reduced the total amount of running which was known to be a key cause of recruit 
lower limb injuries. These changes were, however, only seen as an interim step.
In October 1995, following detailed consultations with sports medicine 
specialists, the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion requested and received 
the authority from the General Officer Commanding Training Command to 
fundamentally change the recruit physical training program. Specifically, these changes 
involved significant modification to the training methods for running, including; the 
cessation of road runs as a formed body, the introduction of interval training and the 
introduction of a Recruit Basic Fitness Assessment, which incorporated a 2.4 km run, as 
opposed to the then current 5 km run. Also, greater control of the speed of marches was 
introduced, with the loads carried graduated, and deep water running was introduced as a 
cross training technique. The objective of these changes was to reduce the incidence of 
running related lower limb injuries to recruits whilst maintaining the overall fitness level 
of the recruits provided to Training Command's schools.
The statistics on recruit musculo-skeletal injuries between July 1995 and
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March 1996, shown at Figures 9 and 10, provide clear evidence of the success of this 
strategy.
Figure 9
R ecru it U p per L im b Injuries : July  1995 - M arch  1996 Note54
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Figure 10
R ecru it L ow er L im b Injuries : July 1995 - M arch 1996 Note 55
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To prove that this data was not overly influenced by seasonal factors, such as a 
variation in the quality of recruits provided for training at different times of the year, the 
last three recruit platoons to complete their training under the pre October 1995 physical 
training program were compared to the first four recruit platoons to complete their 
training under the post October 1995 physical training program. The results are shown 
by Figure 11.
Figure 11
Comparison of Musculo-skeletal Injuries Sustained 
by Similar Groups Undertaking the Pre and Post October 1995 
Recruit Physical Training Programs Note 56
Period 11 Sep - 4 Dec 95 9 Oct 95 - 22 Jan 96 % change
No of Recruits 113 (3 Platoons) 193 (4 Platoons)
No o f Injuries 30 30
% o f Injuries 26.5% 15.5% 42% fall
One of the many small indicators of the success of the new physical training 
program was the noticeable fall in the number of bone scans required by the pre and post 
October 1995 groups. Shown below is a comparison of bone scans (the usual method 
used to detect suspected stress fractures resulting from physical activity) required by 
male recruits undertaking the pre and post October 1995 physical training programs.
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Figure 12
Comparison of Bone Scans required by Males undertaking 
the Pre and Post October 1995 Recruit Physical Training Programs Note 57
Period 1 Jan - 30 Jun 95 1 Jan - 30 Jun 96 % change
N o of Recruits 1759 1153
No o f Bone Scans 115 51
% o f Recruits 
undergoing scans
6.5% 4.4% 35% fall
It should be noted that, at a cost of approximately $281 per scan, this fall 
equates to a saving of $6,744. This is just one of the many, largely unquantified, savings 
that have undoubtedly resulted from the reduction in recruit injury rates Note 58.
It would be accurate to say that the focus on injuries generated by Project 
DUNLOP had the effect of generally raising the profile of this politically sensitive issue. 
The best example of this was the article, attached as Enclosure 2, 'Train ing in ju ries  
fo r c e  re th in k  on  w om en 's  p la c e  in the m il i ta r y ', published in The A u stra lia n  on 23rd 
June 1995, which focused on the injuries of female trainees at the Royal Military 
College Duntroon. This raised awareness, in turn, appears to have influenced the Army's 
leaders in their consideration of training injuries within the wider Army. In a December 
1995 interview with A rm y  O rdn an ce, when asked about potential changes to the Army's 
Basic Fitness Assessment, the Army's Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Personnel 
replied, "The B a s ic  F itn ess  A sse ssm e n t is  u n d er  c o n s ta n t r e v ie w  b y  the D ir e c to r  G e n e ra l  
o f  A rm y  H ea lth  S e rv ic e s  a n d  T ra in in g  C om m an d , b u t P r o je c t  D u n lop , w h ich  is look in g  
a t  the  w a s ta g e  ra te  o f  rec ru its  a n d  In itia l E m p lo ym en t T ra in ees, h as g iv en  the n e e d  f o r  
re -ex a m in a tio n  m o re  em p h a sis"  (1995:11).
In May 1996 a paper by Major S.J. Rudzki, one of DUNLOP's key supporters, 
entitled D e v e lo p m e n t o f  a  C o s t M o d e l f o r  In ju ry  a n d  P re m a tu re  S ep a ra tio n , provided 
further startling evidence of the significant cost of injuries to the Army. In particular, his 
data relating to the Army's medical discharges, shown at Figure 13, indicated that by far 
the largest number of Regular Army medical discharges were occurring during the first 
year of a soldiers' service (1996: Annex C). Presumably, the great majority of these 
medical discharges were due to injuries received during recruit training.
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Figure 13
T otal N um ber o f  R egular A rm y Soldiers D ischarged as 
M edically  U nfit or B elow  M edical Standard  
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Indeed, based largely on the persuasive evidence from DUNLOP's early work 
on training injuries, on 16th June 1996, the Army's Chief of the General Staff Advisory' 
Committee approved changes to the Army's Basic Fitness Assessment based on the 
Recruit Training Battalion model Nolc59. It is entirely reasonable to expect that this key 
change will result in significant long term benefits to the Army's people and finances.
Ironically, partly due to the success of reducing male recruit injuries, the 
problem of female injuries came to be recognised as one deserving special attention. 
Indeed, in late February 1996 the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion 
claimed that although female recruits only made up some 14% of the recruit intake, they 
accounted for 55% of discharges due to injury and that, relative to their male 
counterparts, female recruits were "three times as likely to be discharged for medical
Note 60reasons .
Given the magnitude of this problem, in late July 1996, Project DUNLOP 
convened a two day workshop at the Royal Military College Duntroon to specifically 
focus on female injuries in training. Interestingly, the key finding of this meeting was 
that it was the level of fitness on entry to induction training, rather than gender, which 
was the key indicator of likely success. The problem appeared to be that, on average, 
female entrants tended to be less fit and therefore, at a heightened risk of injury when 
compared with males Note61.
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Figure 14
Army C artoon on  B asic F itness A ssessm ent 
pu blish ed  14th N ovem ber 1996
4.6.3 Orthotics
ARMY,November 14, 1996, Page 15
Those who do not wear orthotics may not be aware that they are a type of 
footwear insert. They are usually prescribed by a physician and individually 
manufactured by a podiatrist in order to improve the bio-mechanical performance of the 
individual concerned. Early on in the author's investigation of recruit injuries it became 
clear that some injuries were the direct result of prescription orthotics being removed 
from recruits on arrival at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. When raised as an issue the 
Commandant confirmed that this was the current practice and that his belief was that this 
was current Army policy. He also went on record as saying that he disagreed with the 
practice and would like to see it cease. Like the parental consent issue described in 
Section 4.6.1, this seemed to be a relatively clear cut case of poor policy which could be 
quickly corrected to the benefit of all.
This issue, however, was not so clear cut to the Army's medical establishment 
who were almost violently divided. Most believed that 'recruits must prove that they can 
survive the rigours of this training without prescription orthotics' while others argued 
that orthotics were no different in concept from prescription glasses and, in any case, 
were worn by approximately 10% of serving soldiers.
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Although a breakthrough of sorts was made at the 26th February 1996 Steering 
Group meeting, when it was agreed that all recruits could wear moulded off-the-shelf 
inserts, the issue of wearing prescription orthotics remained in contention. To try and 
break this deadlock, at the 6th May 1996 Steering Group meeting, the author provided a 
brief which pointed out that the practice of removing orthotics was not in accordance 
with the extant policy which simply stated that orthotics were 'not to be issued to recruits 
at Kapooka'. The brief also advised that informal Army Legal Corps advice was that the 
Commonwealth might well be leaving itself liable to a claim of negligence and the 
subsequent payment of damages if, for example, it removed from a recruit a prescription 
device and an injury was suffered as a direct consequence of this act.
Interestingly, the Steering Group's medical representative was unmoved by this 
advice and indicated that, in any event, the whole area was under review. Nevertheless, 
the Commandant decided that, irrespective of policy guidance, the practice would cease 
immediately.
4.6.4 - Recruit Motivation
At the same time as recruit injuries were being addressed, the issue of recruit 
motivation was acted upon. This factor was seen as being responsible for the 16% of 
recruits opting for discharge at own request as well as the 10% arranging discharge due 
to the withdrawal of parental consent.
In an effort to enhance recruit motivation, several changes were made to the 
training program in order to introduce recruits to the more interesting training activities 
earlier. The most important of these changes was the introduction of a closely supervised 
introductory live-fire shoot in week one of training. Also, the initial field training 
exercise was brought forward from week nine of the program to week three.
In addition to the above, a completely new motivational activity was 
introduced in the form of a three day adventurous training package in week seven of the 
recruit course. This addition appears to have been extremely successful and is 
highlighted by the A rm y  article ’H ig h  W ire  R e c r u its ’ attached as Enclosure 3.
4.6.5 - Recruit Culture Shock
In an effort to reduce what was perceived to be the 'culture shock' experienced 
by recruits, DUNLOP attempted to address both the actual conditions encountered on 
arrival at Kapooka and recruit expectations prior to arrival. To give applicants a more 
realistic understanding of the training ahead of them, the glossy "Y ea r  o f  C h a lle n g e ” 
video used by Defence Force Recruiting Centres was replaced by a much more 'true to 
life' portrayal of recruit life that was produced with significant Recruit Training Battalion 
input. Also (again with significant Recruit Training Battalion input) a booklet detailing 
the answers to "the 5 0  q u e s tio n s  m o s t c o m m o n ly  a s k e d  b y  r e c r u its ” was produced and 
made available to potential enlistees.
Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study Page 47
Another important initiative taken by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion was the formation of a platoon dedicated to improving the way in 
which recruits are looked after whilst being discharged. Named the 'Weary DUNLOP' 
Platoon, this organisation is well described in the The (Wagga Wagga) Daily Advertiser 
article 'New platoon trains failed recruits to he civilians', which is attached as 
Enclosure 4. Since the Platoon's establishment, on 12th February 1996, recruit letters, 
such as those attached at Enclosure 5, would suggest that it has been very well received.
4.6.6 - Psychological Screening
Noting that the 1st Recruit Training Battalion data from December 1994 
indicated that the second largest reason for recruit discharge was due to psychological 
reasons (24% of discharges), efforts were made to address this area. Unfortunately, no 
progress was made due to the insistence of Army's psychologists that their results were 
'psychological in confidence' and unable to be examined by anyone but themselves.
4.7 Going for the 'Big Wins'
Having achieved good success in some of its short term goals, towards the end 
of 1995 the Project DUNLOP Steering Group started to focus its attention on the more 
difficult targets of pre-enlistment fitness testing, the 'training culture' at the 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion, the concept of 'muster recruiting' and the development of sound 
wastage statistics.
4.7.1 - Pre-enlistment Fitness Testing
Even given all of the injury reduction achievements at Kapooka, it was 
considered that there was still significant scope to further decrease the number of 
discharges by introducing a physical fitness test into the recruit selection process. As of 
June 1996 the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion estimated that 65% of 
recruit medical discharges could be directly related to the lack of such a test at the time 
of recruit selection Note62. Although this issue had been frequently raised since the mid 
1980's Note6\  it would appear to have been strongly resisted by the Defence recruiting 
organisation at every step Note64.
The advantages of such a test had been amply demonstrated by Pope's work 
and are referred to in the article 'You're in the Army Now', published on 8th September 
1996 in the The Canberra Times and attached as Enclosure 6. By using the shuttle test it 
could be statistically shown that those with a low score were more likely to be injured 
and therefore had a higher probability of being discharged for medical reasons Note 65. It 
was also anticipated that the test would inevitably expose many of the applicants 
'previous injuries' and medical conditions, such as asthma, irrespective of whether their 
existence was being hidden or had genuinely been forgotten. This, in turn, would reduce 
the number of recruits discharged under the category of 'provision of false information 
on enlistment'. Regardless of whether the test took the form of a comprehensive 
pre-selection test or a simple elementary fitness test, it was expected that this initiative
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would dramatically reduce the overall wastage rate and the female wastage rate in 
particular.
The reasons given by the Director of Army Recruiting why this could not be 
done ranged from lack of time during the recruiting process to a lack of facilities Note 66. 
Also, the Medical establishment expressed ongoing concern about the legal problems 
that might eventuate should someone be injured during the testNote67.
This resistance was somewhat weakened when comprehensive evidence was 
produced by the DUNLOP Project Officer which showed that almost every state police 
force, ambulance service and fire brigade conducted some type of occupationally 
relevant fitness test as a part of their selection procedure. As an example, police recruits 
in NSW are required to be able to hold, load, grip and squeeze the trigger of a hand-gun; 
drag a 75 kg human shaped dummy for seven metres; climb a mesh fence etc. It seemed 
incongruous that no such occupationally relevant fitness tests was used for Army recruit 
selection.
Despite the pressure being applied though the DUNLOP Steering Group 
process, it was not until direct discussions were held between the General Officer 
Commanding Training Command and the Director General Recruiting (the officer in 
overall charge of recruiting for the three Services) on 22nd July 1996, that it seemed that 
Recruiting was at last going to give some ground. Having said this, in a brief to the 
Defence Force Chief of Personnel, dated 23rd September 1996 (Enclosure 1-9), the 
Director General of Recruiting advised that 16 out of the 18 regional Recruiting Units 
did not have suitable facilities to conduct the test and that he was "not p r e p a r e d  to  fu n d  
a s in g le  S e rv ic e  in itia tiv e  in v o lv in g  a d d itio n a l m e d ic a l e x p en d itu re  o r  the h ir in g  o f  lo c a l  
g y m n a s iu m s  to  c o n d u c t f i tn e s s  tests"  No,e68.
As an aside to the issue of pre-enlistment fitness testing, in late July 1996 it 
was suggested that injuries might also be reduced by incorporating bio-mechanical 
screening procedures into the Army's recruiting medicals. These, relatively simple tests, 
primarily developed by the Australian Institute of Sport for its elite athlete programs, 
would allow those with a predisposition to various types of injury to be detected. This 
enhancement of current procedures was also supported by the DUNLOP Steering Group 
but required action by the Director General of Recruiting.
4.7.2 - The Recruit Training Culture
To address the more complex and sensitive issue of the training culture at the 
1st Recruit Training Battalion, it was agreed, after wide consultation, to initiate a 
comprehensive external review of the appropriateness of the cultural aspects of the 
Army's recruit and Initial Employment Training. Known as the S o ld ie r  In du c tion  
P r o c e s s  C u ltu ra l S tu d y , this detailed external review was conducted by a team from 
Ernst & Young. With the full backing of the DUNLOP Steering Group, this team 
commenced their review in early June 1996 and delivered a final report in late 
November 1996. One of the key elements of this Study was a comprehensive survey of a
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wide cross-section of the trainees and staff currently in recruit and Initial Employment 
Training.
The conduct of the Induction Study involved an extensive number of 
interviews and surveys with those actually involved in the recruit training process. This 
approach at last acknowledged the recruits as one of the key customers of the induction 
process and sought to discover their feelings and degree of satisfaction with it.
The overall finding of the Study was that the Army's soldier induction program 
was extremely successful but nevertheless some improvements could be made 
(1996:7-1). While strongly praising the staff of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion for 
their dedication and professionalism, the Study made a number of quite sophisticated 
suggestions on how the training might be improved. It noted, for example, that the 
training " places to o  m u ch  e m p h a s is  on  f e a r , th re a t a n d  m o tiv a tio n  b y  the s ta f f  'driv ing ' 
th e  s tu d e n ts  a n d  to o  little  upon  s u p p o r t a n d  s e l f  m o tiv a tio n "  (1996:7-2), and that recruits 
were encouraged to conform, as opposed to develop initiative and a commitment to 
excellence (1996:8-4).
A series of strategies were suggested to improve this situation including the 
conduct of regular surveys on various aspects of recruit satisfaction (1996:7-8); 
encouraging recruits to learn in a more democratic way (1996:8-5); improving the 
transparency of training to recruits (1996:8-5); the instituting of weekly 'off the record' 
feedback sessions between recruits and instructors (1996:8.6); the formal gaining of 
confidential feedback on instructors from recruits (1996:8.7); and improving the way 
staff are able to express themselves (1996:8-8).
4.7.3 - Muster Recruiting
Another key motivational strategy advanced by the Project DUNLOP Steering 
Group was the concept of 'muster' recruiting. This concept envisaged recruits actually 
being enlisted into their choice of employment, as opposed to the traditional 'batching' 
system which allocated them an area of employment, convenient to the Army, during 
their sixth week of training Notc69. It was considered that this system, which was already 
being used by the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Airforce, would do much 
to relieve the problem of recruits either discharging at their own request because they 
were dissatisfied with their allocation or, applying for employment transfers as soon as 
possible once they had graduated. This initiative was lent weight by the E x tern a l R e v ie w  
o f  A D F  R e c ru itin g  which observed, "Lack o f  sa tis fa c tio n  w ith  C o rp s  a llo c a tio n s  is 
b e lie v e d  to  b e  a  m a jo r  f a c to r  on r e q u e s ts  f o r  C o rp s  T ra n sfer  a n d  e a r ly  d isc h a rg e  f r o m  
the S erv ic e "  (1995: 11-3). It was also fully supported by the Commandant of the 1st 
Recruit Training Battalion, who noted that disappointment with employment allocations 
was the single greatest de-motivator during recruit training, and the most frequently cited 
cause of 'Discharge at Own Request' submissions Note7°.
Unfortunately, the spirit of this initiative ran directly counter to the position of 
the Army's Director of Psychology who reportedly argued that mustering was "not 
a p p r o p r ia te  to  A rm y  b e c a u se  to o  m a n y  tr a d e s  h a v e  n o  c iv ilia n  e q u iv a le n t", " P oten tia l
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r e c r u its  w o u ld  h a v e  n o  a w a re n e s s  o f  so m e  s p e c ia l is e d  tr a d e s ", and "...the A rm y  n e e d s  to  
h a v e  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  a s s e s s  th e ir  a b i l i ty  a n d  a p titu d e  f o r  th e se  tr a d e s  " Note71.
4.7.4 - Wastage Statistics
In his text In tro d u c tio n  to  S ta t is t ic a l  Q u a lity  C o n tro l Montgomery defines 
statistics as "the a r t  o f  m a k in g  d e c is io n s  a b o u t a  p r o c e s s  o r  p o p u la tio n  b a s e d  on  an  
a n a ly s is  o f  th e  in fo rm a tio n  c o n ta in e d  in a  sa m p le  o f  th a t p o p u la tio n  " and points out that 
statistical methods play a vital role in improvement (1991:21). In DUNLOP's case the 
key statistic / performance measure of interest was the recruit wastage rate and, within 
this rate, the wastage rate for each of the various categories of wastage. One, very 
successful aspect of DUNLOP has already been discussed in the section dealing with 
recruit injuries. This, however, was a success entirely attributable to the professionalism 
of the Recruit Training Battalion physiotherapy staff. The larger issue of gathering 
accurate statistics on the overall wastage rate was, a completely different issue.
In November 1995 the E x te rn a l R e v ie w  o f  the R ec ru itin g  F u n c tio n , in its 
report to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, summed up the situation. It noted that, 
"the a b s e n c e  o f  u sea b le , c o n s is te n t s ta tis t ic s  on  fa i lu r e  ra te s  a s  a  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  r e c ru it  
n u m b ers  a n d  tim e s  o f  the y e a r  in d ic a te s  a  s ig n if ic a n t g a p  in the m a n a g e m e n t  
in fo rm a tio n  a v a ila b le  to  the D e fe n c e  F o rc e  R e c ru itin g  B ran ch "  (1995:10-20). While this 
comment related to all Service induction institutions, nowhere could it have been more 
accurate than at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion.
In DUNLOP's early investigations, sound historical data had simply seemed to 
be unavailable Note72. Accordingly, it was assumed that data presented from the period 
July-November 1994 was both accurate and representative. It was considered that the 
process of collecting data on wastage was so simple that it was something that could 
easily be addressed in due course. As time went on however, it was realised that all data 
emanating from the 1st Recruit Training Battalion was suspect, as it was being manually 
collected and manipulated by individuals who had no training in or understanding of 
statistics Note73. The resultant inaccuracy of the statistical output of the 1st Recruit 
Training battalion is discussed in detail at Annex A. Suffice to say that the only accurate 
record of discharges during the period August 1995 - April 1996 seems to have been 
developed by the author based on source data collected by the Ernst & Young Soldier 
Induction Process Study team. This data set is shown at Appendix 2 to Annex A 
however, the key overall wastage chart is also shown at Figure 15.
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Figure 15
W astage Rate o f all R ecruits from  1st R ecruit Training Battalion  
Intakes : A ugust 1995 - A pril 1996 (from  source data)
Aug-95 Sep-95 Oct-95 Nov-95 Dec-95 Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
Source Data -O- 19.96 19.23 19.37 15.18 20.41 12.19 9.56 10.66 11.16
As can be seen from the data at Appendix 2 to Annex A, it would appear as if 
DUNLOP was most effective in the area of male wastage and that this success is mainly 
due to a decrease in medically related discharges.
As discussed in Annex A, well researched suggestions were made to the 
Project DUNLOP Steering Group on how to correct the desperately poor statistics 
situation, however, despite acknowledging the importance of the problem, the issue 
remained unresolved throughout 1996.
Finally, it should be noted that in mid 1996 the author did attempt to gather 
wastage data from the Training Management Cell of Headquarters Training Command. 
This attempt however was deemed unworthy of pursuit when it was observed, and 
acknowledged by the operator, that the (incomplete) database in use was treating each 
'backsquadded' recruit as being discharged Note74.
4.8 Institutionalising N ew  A pproaches
Unfortunately, the opportunity to consolidate improvements and 
institutionalise new approaches was largely denied to the DUNLOP Steering Group. At 
the 6th August 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group Meeting, the Chairman, on the 
direction of the newly appointed General Officer Commanding Training Command, 
formally advised all stakeholders that DUNLOP would be 'wound up' on 1st December 
1996. No explanation was provided at the time, however, from subsequent informal 
discussions with the Chairman, it would appear that General considered DUNLOP to be 
outside of the 'core business' of his Headquarters Note75.
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As a result of the above decision, all outstanding strategies were 'handed-off, 
with the appropriate stakeholders being made responsible for implementation. This 
hand-off occurred at the 24th October 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group meeting 
held in Canberra. In essence, it left the Director of Army Recruiting to pursue the issue 
of pre-selection fitness testing, the Army's Director of Personnel Planning to pursue 
muster recruiting, the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion to pursue the 
improvement of his unit's training culture in accordance with the guidance offered by the 
Soldier Induction Process Culture Study and the Operations Branch of Headquarters 
Training Command to pursue the improvement of recruit wastage statistics Note76.
Overall, however, it must be said that it appeared to some (notably the author) 
that the Wastage Project was being closed down just as its key initiatives were beginning 
to be realised. Without the stimulus provided by the Project DUNLOP Steering Group, it 
was thought highly likely that several of the 'more difficult' initiatives would be 
sidelined. The Director of Army Recruiting, for example, was in favour of incorporating 
simple bio-mechanical screening procedures into the Army's recruiting medicals which 
would detect those with a predisposition to various types of injury Note77. While these 
procedures would undoubtedly be an excellent addition to the screening process, a 
cynical view might be that this was a ploy to negate, or at least defuse, the argument for 
the introduction of the more onerous pre-selection fitness test.
In addition to the above, it was considered by the author that DUNLOP had 
only just started to reach the stage of maturity (and level of co-operation with the other 
Services) which might have allowed true benchmarking to take place. Since the very 
beginning of DUNLOP the desirability of benchmarking the Army's induction process 
with the induction processes of the other Services had been acknowledged. Indeed, 
representatives of the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force had been 
active participants in all of DUNLOP's key workshops and this co-operation had led to 
several visits between recruit training establishments and the adoption of a number of 
innovations. Notably, the abolition of 'Withdrawal of Parental Consent' as a category of 
recruit discharge and the introduction of an adventurous training roping course for 
recruits were both gained from the Air Force's 1st Recruit Training Unit. Also, the 
development of strong support for the concept of muster recruiting was heavily 
influenced by the experiences of both Navy and Air Force. Despite these interchanges, as 
at December 1996, no attempt had been made to compare recruit discharge data between 
the Services.
It is also worth noting one final area that DUNLOP had effectively left 
untouched. Aside from the initial calculations used by the author to harness interest, no 
attempt had been made to accurately assess the cost of recruit wastage to the Army or to 
seriously articulate the productivity savings that had been, or might have been, achieved 
via the DUNLOP process. This situation, although unfortunate, is perhaps not at all 
surprising given the failure to come to grips with the much more basic issue of collecting 
accurate wastage statistics.
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4.9 Post Project Developments
As stated above, following the handing off of the DUNLOP responsibilities, it 
appeared to this author as though the full potential of the Project might never be realised. 
This might indeed have been the case had a new, and much larger, 'driver of change' not 
fortuitously arrived on the scene.
Early in 1997 the new Chief of the Army unveiled a sweeping plan for change 
known as Restructuring the Army. One of the key elements of this change was a far 
greater reliance on the part-time component of the Army known as the General Reserve.
Traditionally, due to the need to limit their absence from their civil 
employment, Reservists had only undertaken a two week recruit course, as opposed to 
the Regular Army's ten week course. If the Reserve was now to play an enhanced role in 
the Nation's defence, this previously tolerated discrepancy needed to be addressed Note78. 
Accordingly, in February 1997, the Chief of the Army Advisory Group agreed that those 
joining both the Regular and General Reserve elements of the Army would undergo a 
common basic training program. This program was termed Common Induction Training 
and its implementation was made the responsibility of the Army's Chief of Personnel and 
the Commander of its training organisation Note79.
Noting that General Reserve soldiers have to be released from their normal 
civil employment to undergo basic training, a recruit course of ten weeks was no longer 
viable. Accordingly, one of the areas requiring major change was the length of the new 
common recruit course and a period of (approximately) six weeks was decided upon Note 
80. This reduced course length essentially demanded an entire rethink of the Army's 
induction process and to implement it, a working group was established which 
effectively re-raised the Project DUNLOP Steering Group, only under a different name. 
This new group however had a much higher level directive and, accordingly, a much 
clearer focus.
A powerful illustration of the momentum of the Common Induction Training 
initiative is the dramatic re-engineering of the existing ten week recruit course into the 
new six and a half week course which commenced at Kapooka on 21st October 1997. 
Also, because of the time constraints on the General Reserve trainees, another key 
outcome of the Common Induction Training directive was an even greater need to 
reduce injuries which might delay the completion of the course. In essence, the 
traditional approach of 'back-squadding' injured recruits was now much less acceptable. 
This need effectively guaranteed that the pre-enlistment physical fitness test concept, so 
long advocated by DUNLOP, and the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, could no longer be 
avoided by the Defence recruiting organisation. Interestingly, this requirement coincided 
with the appointment of the previous Director of Infantry as the new Director General of 
Recruiting. Having seen first hand the problem caused by injuries in training, this new 
director was in favour of a pre-enlistment physical fitness testNote81. Accordingly, 
Recruiting quickly embraced the concept, issued an excellent guide to the test (shown at 
Figure 18) and officially introduced it to Recruiting Units in mid July 1997.
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It would also seem that Common Induction Training also inspired the 
introduction of a variation of batch recruiting whereby groups of recruits, having 
completed their basic training, move on, as a group, to their Initial Employment 
Training. At a Common Induction Training Working Group meeting attended by the 
author on 23 October 1997 both the Directors of Infantry and Artillery reported that the 
recruit groups they had received under this system had exceptionally good motivation.
At the time of writing, it could not be established if this system will evolve into true 
muster recruiting as advocated by DUNLOP. In the opinion of the new Director General 
of Recruiting this, however, would seem to be a likely outcome, especially given 
changes to the structure of the Defence Personnel Program, brought about by the 
Defence Reform Program Note 82.
Common Induction Training also seems to have further reinforced the need to 
implement the cultural change recommendations of the Soldier Induction Process 
Culture Study. As illustrated by the 26 June 1997 Army article 'No personnel at RISC in 
new Kapooka' at Enclosure 7, the 'dreaded' Recruit Instructor Selection Course (RISC) 
has been replaced by a much less daunting Recruit Instructor Development Course 
(RIDC). A course focused on finding instructors with the right attitude, as opposed to 
those with outstanding instructional skill.
In regard to recruit wastage statistics, the Operations Branch of Headquarters 
Training Command did indeed publish a comprehensive report on the outcomes of 
Training Year 1996/97 in November 1997, the key pages of which are attached as Annex 
B. The report presents some potentially interesting data in relation to age group, delays 
in training and categories of discharge. For example, the most successful male age group 
was 22, with only 7% being discharged, whereas the most successful female age group 
was 24, with 25% being discharged Note83. It is however most disappointing that the 
report lacks clarity in many areas, draws no conclusions and makes no recommendations.
Although the sample size at the time of writing was very small (only 259 
recruits), it is most interesting to compare the pre Common Induction Training wastage 
rates with those being experienced at the time of writing Note84. This comparison, which 
included the eight months worth of source data developed by the author for the period 
August 1995 - April 1996, is shown at Figure 19. It shows unexpectedly high recruit 
wastage during 1996-97 but predictably improved results since the commencement of 
Common Induction Training, which would seem to be reaping the benefits of the newly 
introduced pre-enlistment fitness test.
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Figure 16
Arm y R ecruiting Brochure : Are you fit to join the Army? A simple guide  
to passing the Army's pre-entry fitness assessment (published m id 1997)
^ over Introduction Page
A simple guide to passing > 4
the Army’s pre-entry fitness assessment,
Not surprisingly, physical fitness plays a 
vital role in both the full-time and part-time 
Army, especially during basic training.
In fact, on the day of your enlistment, you 
must pass a fitness assessment or you won’t be 
accepted. So you can see just how important 
it is to be fit. But don’t think you have to he 
a world-class athlete.
The fitness assessment is not an incredibly 
difficult one and most people have little 
trouble passing it. If you’re an active person 
who walks, runs, swims or plays competitive 
sport, you should pass without a worry.
This pamphlet explains what you’ll need to 
do to pass the Army’s pre-entry fitness 
assessment and shows you how to perform 
the exercises properly. There’s also a detailed 
programme designed to help you reach the 
level of fitness needed in only four weeks.
The Army’s pre-entry fitness assessment has 
three parts and you must pass each one to join 
the Army.
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Figure 17
Comparison of Recruit Wastage Data from the periods 
August 1995 - April 1996, July 1996 - June 1997 
and 21 October 1997 - 20 January 1998
Period Male Female Total
Aug 95 - Apr 96 12.32% 28% 14.38%
Jul 96 - Jun 97 15.97% 37.97% 20.03%
Oct 97 - Jan 98 5.6% 11.11% 6.54%
Overall, if the 1996-97 data produced by Headquarters Training Command is 
assumed to be accurate, it would appear as if DUNLOP had no lasting quantitative effect 
on the wastage problem. This outcome is surprising and is therefore somewhat suspect. It 
is indeed unfortunate that this author was denied the opportunity to independently 
examine the source data Note85. It was also disappointing to discover that the 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion did not have its own data which could have been compared with that 
of Headquarters Training Command Nole86.
On a final note, it was pleasing to discover that the Commandant of the 1st 
Recruit Training Battalion has now issued firm direction that the Battalion establish its 
own credible database Note87. This action, if acted upon, might at least ensure that the 
wastage resulting from Common Induction Training has some chance of being correctly 
recorded.
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Chapter Five
Discussion
5.1 So, how did it go?
Viewed from almost any perspective, Project DUNLOP was an exciting 
opportunity to facilitate desperately needed high value change. Kellehear notes that the 
discussion section of a thesis seeks to "to link b a ck  to  the lite ra tu re  rev iew  a n d  
th e o re tic a l fra m ew o rk " , and answers such questions as, "How righ t w ere  w e a fte r  a ll?  
H o w  w ro n g  w ere  w e?  W here d id  w e  g o  w ro n g ?  H o w  are  the fin d in g s  acco u n ted  f o r  in 
lig h t o f  the th eo ry?  D o e s  the th eo ry  n e e d  m od ifica tion  a n d  in w h a t w ays?"  (1993:
1 9 -2 0 ). This chapter seeks to address these questions. Readers should note however, that 
its content relies on them having a sound knowledge of all previous chapters.
5.2 The ’Strategy for Change'
Almost without exception, the importance of planning change was stressed by 
all authors reviewed in literature. DUNLOP took this requirement seriously and, using 
the Dunphy & Stace approach outlined at Figure 3, developed an essentially 'soft' 
incremental approach to change. Shown at Figure 5, this approach appeared to be right 
for the circumstances. It did, however, rely heavily upon, what appeared to be firm 
direction from senior management, to generate the required commitment and teamwork 
between the various stakeholders.
The outcomes of this approach are discussed in detail in the following 
paragraphs.
5.2.1 - Stage 1: Creating a Higher Level Recognition of the Need for 
Change
While Sullivan et al. note that "effective, lon g-lastin g  change can se ldom  be  
m a n d a ted  fr o m  the top"  (1995:29), many of the authors reviewed join with Hutton in 
pointing out the necessity of top management recognising that there is a compelling need 
to change (1994:36). Indeed, Hammonds stresses that, if they do not recognise this need, 
they may be one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome (1991:28).
It is fair to suggest that the Project team (at this stage essentially consisting of 
the author) had a fairly inward, and hence somewhat naive, view of the world. Because a 
directive had been issued by the General Officer Training Command to 'make it so', the 
need to create a 'higher level recognition of the need for change' was essentially taken as 
a given. The General's direct involvement in the issue had obviously created a sense of 
urgency at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, and from discussions with a series of 
stakeholders, there seemed to be widespread support for the concept of reducing 
wastage. All in all, the Project was deemed to have had an excellent start.
Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study Page 58
A better analysis of the senior management input vital to the success of the 
Project, would have identified the importance of having both the Director General of 
Recruiting and, more importantly, his superior, the Chief of Defence Force Personnel, 
firmly committed to the goal of reducing wastage. Had this been recognised at this early 
stage, a 'General to General' arrangement could have been worked out which would have 
saved much frustration at the Project DUNLOP Steering Group level.
Another deficiency in this first stage was the failure to get senior management 
to clearly articulate a vision or desired endpoint and a desired time-frame. Collins et al. 
argue most convincingly that many of those companies that are truly successful commit 
themselves to huge, daunting challenges; what they refer to as "Big, H airy, A u daciou s  
G o a ls" (1996:73-75). They also point out that these goals should be clear and 
compelling so that they might serve as a unifying focal point and act as a catalyst for 
team spirit, irrespective of the chances of success. Using this logic, it would have been 
most desirable to get the General Officer Commanding Training Command and the 
Chief of Defence Force Personnel to jointly issue a directive that required ambitious 
reductions in wastage and identified targets such as 'below 15% per annum by the end of 
95, below 10% pa by the end of 96' etc.
Given that these goals were not set from above, it was easy for DUNLOP's 
stakeholders to refuse to set them for themselves, therefore avoiding the possibility of 
being seen to fail. Within the term of DUNLOP, no "big, hairy, au daciou s goal"  was set. 
Arguably, the consequence of this failing was that one was never achieved.
5.2.2 - Stage 2 : Building a Grass Roots 'Energy for Change'
The concept of developing an 'energy for change' was taken from Carnall. 
Using his argument that the "energy f o r  change"  in any group or organisation will equate 
to "the d issa tisfa c tio n  f e l t  w ith  the cu rren t situation"  multiplied by "the leve l o f  
k n o w led g e  o f  the p r a c tic a l  s te p s  fo rw a rd "  and "the sh a red  v is io n ” (1990:99), the second 
stage of the DUNLOP plan was to create an 'energy for change' at the grass roots level 
prior to bringing together the key stakeholders in Stage Three.
It must be said that this stage was very successful. At the end of the focused 
five day Total Quality Management course held at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, the 
people closest to the problem agreed that there really was a problem and were genuinely 
'dissatisfied'. Importantly, the course had also engendered a strong vision of what could 
be achieved and a feeling of ownership for the potential solutions. In other words, it had 
achieved all of the elements deemed necessary by Carnall. In addition, the course had 
revealed a huge amount of previously unknown information, especially in relation to 
additional stakeholders and the location of pre-existing data.
The single aspect of the course that might have been improved was the 
preparation of the newly appointed Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion 
for its outcomes. The lack of this opportunity was, however, brought on by circumstance 
rather than a lack of recognition of its importance.
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5.2.3 - Stage 3 : Winning Key Stakeholder Support and Ownership
Like the focused grass roots course in Phase Two, the two day Key 
Stakeholder Workshop was designed to create an 'energy for change' but at the next 
level up in the hierarchy. The mix and level of representation at the Workshop seemed 
excellent and its Value Management approach of 'challenging assumptions' and 
developing an agreed 'Action Plan' were very well received.
It is, however, considered that the Workshop went wrong in two areas. Firstly, 
as alluded to in Section 5.2.1, the collective group of stakeholders refused to 
acknowledge the importance of setting any wastage rate targets let alone any ambitious 
target of the type referred to in Section 5.2.1. Secondly, it failed to effectively cull the 
number of actions listed in the Project 'Action Plan'. This effectively prepared the ground 
for a 'shotgun' approach to change to be adopted and failed to heed the advice of Dichter 
et al. who suggested that rather than trying to 'fix everything at once' it makes good sense 
to focus on just a few strategies and to devote a lot of energy to them to ensure that 
measurable progress is achieved (1993:105).
5.2.4 - Stage 4 : Forming a Strong Guiding Coalition
One of the outcomes of the well received Key Stakeholder Workshop was the 
formation of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group. Like the Workshop, this group 
seemed to have the right mix and level of representation and there was no reason to 
expect that it would not be effective. In particular, it was considered that the increased 
personal contact between stakeholders that would result from regular Steering Group 
meetings would play a significant role in facilitating communication and positive 
change.
5.2.5 - Stage 5 : Creating Short Term Wins
In his article Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, Kotter 
strongly advocates the need to create and celebrate short term wins, a strategy designed 
to encourage those involved in the change effort to carry on. He also advised that such 
wins must be widely publicised and those involved recognised and rewarded for their 
efforts (1995:105).
Despite having some 50 actions to deal with, the concept of creating early wins 
was well understood by the DUNLOP Steering Group. It must be said, however, that the 
initial focus was on those areas where it was considered results would be easiest to 
achieve, as opposed to those areas that might have had the most dramatic impact on the 
problem at hand. The pre-enlistment fitness test, for example, was felt to be vitally 
important but achievable only once the Director of Army Recruiting became more 
enthused with the spirit of the Wastage Project.
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As indicated in Chapter Four, DUNLOP's early efforts produced mixed results.
► Parental Consent: The early win regarding a change in the policy of allowing 
under-age recruits to withdraw from training once parental consent was 
withdrawn was real enough. It was however, not overly significant and to 
publicise it would simply have made the Army look foolish for unnecessarily 
adhering to such a policy in the first place.
► Recruit Injuries : The early wins in the area of recruit injuries were, in 
contrast to the above, most significant. As Figures 9-12 show, quite dramatic 
gains were made in reducing injuries and costs. This was an achievement 
which heavily influenced changes within the wider Army in the form of a 
revised Army Basic Fitness Assessment. It must noted however that, in this 
particular area, DUNLOP was simply very lucky. Almost by chance, it 
occurred at a time when it was able to support two physiotherapists at the 1st 
Recruit Training Battalion who were undertaking external studies on their own 
initiative. Had this situation not been in place, it is extremely unlikely that 
such comprehensive and persuasive data would have been available. It must 
also be noted that although the efforts of both physiotherapists were 
acknowledged and appreciated, they were not formally recognised in any 
significant way.
► Orthotics : The win on the issue of orthotics, much like parental consent, was 
a small one which, if publicised, would have made the Army look extremely 
foolish. In any case, given the ongoing internal debate within the Army's 
medical establishment, it was far from being a clear cut victory.
► Recruit Motivation and Culture Shock : In the area of recruit motivation, 
the introduction of the 'high wire' course was a clear success which, as 
illustrated by Enclosure 2, received wide publicity. Its link to wastage 
however was too tenuous and accordingly it was unable to be exploited. 
Similarly, the small wins in the area of culture shock were too tenuous to link 
to any reductions in wastage.
► Psychological Screening : The failure to produce any outcome in the area of 
psychological screening was frustrating and acknowledged as such by the 
Chairman of the Steering Group Note 88.
5.2.6 - Stage 6 : Going for the 'Big Wins’
The concept of achieving 'big wins' was essentially an extension of the 
philosophy of achieving short term wins. The thought was that as the Steering Group 
process gained momentum, some of the more difficult and contentious issues could be 
better handled.
As in Stage Five, this stage produced mixed results. It achieved a brilliant 
success in the area of the training culture at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, but only
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managed limited progress on the issues of pre-enlistment fitness testing, muster 
recruiting and the collection of accurate wastage statistics.
With regard to the development of accurate statistics, it must be said that the 
failure of the Steering Group to address this issue meant that it not only had no grasp of 
changes in the wastage situation but could also make no comment on wastage rates with 
any confidence whatsoever. This was a situation that made it virtually impossible to 
claim any results at all, let alone the 'unambiguous positive results' which Kotter 
suggested were necessary to counter those opposing change (1995:65).
5.2.7 - Stage 7 : Institutionalising New Approaches
Given the unexpected termination of the Project in late 1996, this final stage of 
the Project was not able to be implemented as planned. Instead, it consisted of the 
handing over of uncompleted strategies to the responsible stakeholders with the request 
that they be separately progressed. The one key exception to this was the changes to the 
training culture at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. In this case, the requirement to 
implement the agreed recommendations of the Soldier Induction Process Study was 
included in the Commandant's personal directive from the General Officer Training 
Command.
5.3 Post Project Developments
The events post-DUNLOP provide an extremely interesting contrast to the 
Project itself in that another quite powerful driver to reduce wastage arrived on the scene 
in the form of Common Induction Training, itself being driven by the Chief of the 
Army's 'Restructuring the Army' initiative. This new driver produced a new sense of 
'sense of urgency' to reduce wastage. On this occasion however, change was being driven 
from a much higher level and both the General Officer Commanding Training Command 
(now known as Commander, Training Command - Army) and the Army's Chief of 
Personnel had been directed to develop the Common Induction Training initiative.
Just as DUNLOP was able to build on initiatives that came before it, so too 
was Common Induction Training able to build upon DUNLOP. Accordingly, several of 
the DUNLOP strategies handed off were given new life. In particular, the long fought for 
pre-enlistment physical fitness test was finally introduced in mid July 1997 with 
seemingly quite dramatic results. Indeed, in addition to detecting those statistically most 
likely to be injured during training, the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training 
Battalion also observed that the test works at the psychological level, as those applicants 
with the right attitude are those most likely to put the effort into passing i tNote 89.
5.4 Resistance to Change
Although authors such as Hammonds (1991), Buchanan and Boddy (1992), 
Waldersee and Blackstock (1993), Hutton (1994) and Kotter (1995) stress the 
importance of planning for resistance to change, it is evident that this factor was not
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adequately taken into account in DUNLOP's planning. Indeed, if only from the plethora 
of literature on such resistance in the military, it demanded much greater consideration.
In addition to the general reluctance to set any targets for wastage reduction, 
resistance to DUNLOP was encountered from a variety of areas. Its use of a focused 
Total Quality Management course to prepare the way for higher consideration was 
resisted by the Army's Directorate of Management Development as was its use of the 
Value Management approach to conduct the Key Stakeholder Workshop. Resistance to 
virtually any major change involving recruiting was encountered from the Defence 
recruiting organisation, and very luke warm assistance was obtained from the Army's 
medical and psychological establishments.
In the case of all of the above, it is evident that the 'early wins' were not 
significant enough to influence all players. Also, although Waterman points out that "it 
is o n ly  com m on -sen se  th a t p e o p le  a re  m o s t like ly  to  su p p o rt w h a t they have h ad  a hand  
in crea tin g"  (1987:7), in the case of DUNLOP, it would seem that the benefits of 
co-operative effort (in the absence of firm direction) were somewhat limited.
5.5 Measuring Change
Despite the immense value offered by effective performance indicators, it is 
evident that a widespread lack of understanding of even basic statistics existed in several 
key areas of the induction process. At the end of DUNLOP nothing had been done to 
overcome "the a b sen ce  o f  useable, co n sisten t s ta tis tic s  on fa ilu re  ra tes as a p ercen ta g e  
o f  recru it n u m bers a n d  tim es o f  the y e a r . ." identified by the E xternal R eview  o f  the 
R ecru itin g  F unction  (1995:10-20).
Overall, the Project was incredibly slow to recognise the data problem and, 
when it finally acknowledged the problem, it failed to take effective action. Because of 
this failure, the project (aside from a quite superficial initial analysis) did not ever truly 
explore the link between wastage and financial productivity, and despite good contacts 
with the other Services, was never able to meaningfully benchmark the 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion's wastage rates with those of the Royal Australian Navy or Royal 
Australian Air Force or any other institutions.
5.6 The Role of the Sponsor
Kotter makes the point that sponsors must not only direct change they must 
also aggressively communicate their initiative and seek to motivate people to co-operate 
with the strategies required to make it work (1995:60). As discussed in Section 5.2.1, 
DUNLOP seriously underestimated the issue of sponsorship and what the sponsor must 
do. Although the sponsorship of the General Officer Commanding Training Command 
had an obvious and direct effect on Training Command, and to a lesser extent, on the 
Army, it proved insufficient to truly influence the wider Defence players. Accordingly, 
because an understanding had not been reached with the superior of the Director General 
of Recruiting, DUNLOP experienced considerable resistance to change in this area. 
Likewise, the importance of the sponsor stating exactly what the desired end point was,
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was not appreciated. This was an oversight that led to considerable frustration as the 
Project proceeded.
This experience can be contrasted with the change driven by the Common 
Induction Training initiative, which suffered from neither of these deficiencies.
In order for a project to get a good start it might well be necessary for the 
sponsor to use every means at his or her disposal to charge the change process with 
energy and sweep people along. Just some of the strategies that might have been used are 
a series of personal letters to key stakeholders; a series of visits to key stakeholders to 
"walk the talk"; the linking employee appraisals with how they have helped (or not 
helped) to support the project's vision; and, ongoing upward liaison to ensure that the 
highest level of management is aware of and visibly supportive of the project's endstate. 
All of these activities should be stage managed to inspire the project's people, to create a 
sense of excitement about its future direction and engender a feeling of confidence in the 
vision.
The issue of sponsor succession is also of considerable importance to a 
project, especially in a military environment which has a two year posting cycle. As 
Kotter points out, if this succession is not handled properly, years of hard work and 
progress could literally be undone, regardless of the momentum built up (1995:67). In 
retrospect, this is exactly what happened to DUNLOP.
5.7 The Sum of the Parts
To sum up the outcome of DUNLOP it is useful to reflect on Camall's formula 
for creating the " e n e r g y  f o r  c h a n g e " .  This formula dictates that this energy will be equal 
to " th e  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  f e l t  w i th  th e  c u r r e n t  s i t u a t io n "  multiplied by " th e  le v e l  o f  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  th e  p r a c t i c a l  s te p s  f o r w a r d "  and " th e  s h a r e d  v i s io n "  (1990:99).
In the case of DUNLOP, it might be argued that the level of dissatisfaction 
created was adequate within Training Command, but not great enough for some of the 
key non-Training Command participants. Given the lack of higher guidance obliging 
them to act with urgency, the moral and productivity imperatives of the wastage issue 
were simply too vague to effectively motivate them. (A situation which can be contrasted 
with Common Induction Training, where higher guidance has obviously provided the 
motivation to act).
One thing that DUNLOP certainly did not lack was the second element of 
Carnall's formula. In addition to a strategy to approach the problem, a mass of 
knowledge and ideas were available to the Steering Group from: earlier studies of the 
wastage problem, conducted by the likes of Slater (1984); the staff of the 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion; the likes of Rudzki and Pope; the S o ld ie r  I n d u c t io n  P r o c e s s  C u l tu r e  
S t u d y ; the other Services; and non-military organisations such as the state police forces 
and fire brigades. The one exception to this wealth of knowledge was an accurate 
appreciation of the true wastage situation. A glaring failing for any group seeking to 
improve a process.
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The final element of a shared vision can also be identified as a weak point for 
the Project. There was no agreed "b ig , h a ir y ,  a u d a c io u s  g o a l ", or time-frame, that 
inspired bold action.
The combination of the above circumstances in fact leads to a very weak 
" e n e r g y  f o r  c h a n g e " .  It is an interesting confirmation of Carnall's approach that this is 
exactly the fate that befell DUNLOP. It was a fate that meant that the Project, like the 
wider efforts of Total Quality Management within the Army, failed to produce what 
Starry referred to as a " c o n v in c in g  d e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  v a lu e "  (1994:25). Hence it did not 
survive to go onto bigger and better things Note 90.
5.8 Limitations on Work
It must be recognised that this thesis does suffer from a number of limitations.
Firstly, due to the very real need to quickly develop a strategy to address the 
recruit wastage problem, not enough was read prior to its commencement. Accordingly, 
the merit of many ideas was only appreciated after the opportunity to incorporate them in 
the Project had passed. Perhaps the most significant of these 'missed ideas' was the need 
to carefully consider how to overcome resistance to change before it actually becomes a 
problem. Nevertheless, it is pleasing to note that several concepts developed in the 
literature after the commencement of the project, were in fact taken into account during 
its planning. Perhaps the most important of these relates to the need for an ambitious 
vision to inspire urgency and bold action.
It must also be recognised that, once the Wastage Project was set in motion, 
the author was only one of many (often higher ranking) participants. While much could 
be influenced, there was also much that could not. This however was the price to pay for 
being involved a project of consequence where many stakeholders had very real and 
different agendas.
Likewise, it is recognised that the Wastage Project was only one activity. 
Having said this, it was considered that its outcomes would be able to be generalised. 
Also, although future projects would be different in many ways from DUNLOP, it was 
considered that it was likely that its conclusions would be able to be replicated.
Fourthly, it must be said that there are undoubtedly aspects of the Wastage 
Project that this thesis has not done justice to. This is simply due to its complexity and 
the many different stakeholders involved. In some cases however it might be due to the 
fact that the author was simply too close to the issues and this reduced the degree of 
objectivity that was exercised. Also, some pieces of data could not, or were not, 
collected due to real or perceived organisational restraints imposed on the author as a 
serving officer in the Australian Army. For example, the author did not seek to interview 
the Commander of Army's Training Command regarding his decision to close down 
DUNLOP. In cases such as this, comments are based on observation and third party 
input.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Conclusions
Sharp et al. point out that quite different conclusions might be reached by 
different analysts (1996:21). At the very least, it must be said that Project DUNLOP 
failed to produce credible data that proved that it had succeeded. Having said this, the 
worth of its policy innovations cannot be denied and, lack of data aside, it undoubtedly 
laid the foundation for dramatically lower wastage under the Common Induction 
Training system. It also allowed the author to draw a series of conclusions that will 
hopefully be of real value to those who would attempt similar improvement efforts, 
within and external to the Army.
The key conclusions drawn from DUNLOP are considered to be as follows:
► Creating a 'Strategy for Change': The experience of Wastage Project adds 
weight to the validity of Camall's 'Energy for Change' formula (1990:99). 
Those seeking to bring about effective change must ensure that there is indeed 
a genuine dissatisfaction with the status quo, a shared vision of what needs to 
be achieved and an articulated strategy for moving towards the new state. In 
addition, even when all of these aspects are in place, it is highly desirable that 
a project quickly achieve a 'convincing demonstration of value' to cement its 
place in the organisation.
► Resistance to Change : The degree of resistance to change suffered in the 
Defence environment is likely to be inversely proportional to the degree of 
commitment to the change displayed by top management. If this full 
commitment does not exist, as it did not in DUNLOP, expect organisational 
politics to take precedence over issues such as the 'common good'. Indeed, 
Army projects would do well to start on the premise that they will be operating 
within a culture that is quintessential^ conservative, bureaucratic and largely 
unconcerned with costs.
► Measuring Change : Change agents within the Army should be alert to the 
fact that performance measures are likely to be misunderstood, inaccurate 
and/or poorly used, however, they are vital to proving a project's success. 
Accordingly, the temptation to bypass the difficult, and seemingly less 
interesting, task of improving these measures must be strongly avoided.
► The Role of the Sponsor : In the Defence environment the attitude of top 
management towards change will be critical. Prior to commencing a project it 
is therefore advisable to ensure that all of the senior managers involved are 
fully supportive and openly committed to its success. In particular, it is most 
desirable to have an agreed "big, hairy, audacious goal" (with a time-frame)
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that inspires bold action. If this is not achieved, as happened in DUNLOP, 
Hammonds makes a most valid point that senior management might present 
"one o f the most difficult obstacles to overcome" (1991:28).
6.2 Recommendations
In regard to the Army's recruit induction process and the use of Quality
Management techniques within the Australian Army, the following is recommended:
► The method of wastage rate calculation proposed at Annex A, together with 
the use of a simple fraction non-conforming control chart, should be adopted 
by the 1st Recruit Training Battalion to monitor, and further reduce, recruit 
wastage.
► Reference to this thesis should be made on appropriate Defence management 
courses so interested parties might have a reasonable chance of being able to 
access it via the Defence Library System.
► The Army should actively seek to conduct a series of high value improvement 
projects which draw upon the experience of DUNLOP and any other like 
projects undertaken both within and outside of Defence.
6.3 Suggestions for Future Work
The following suggestions are made for future work:
► The military is in desperate need of improvement in many areas. High value 
projects such as DUNLOP should be frequently attempted and the results 
added to the knowledge base of how best to approach change in the military 
environment.
► It would be interesting to examine the implementation of Total Quality 
Management within the Army, to explore why it failed and to draw lessons of 
potential value to other large organisations approaching the same challenge.
► Quality theories might be better accepted in some areas of the military if they 
were expressed in familiar military terminology. It might therefore be 
interesting to see if such an approach produced better results than the use of 
standard terminology.
Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study Page 67
Notes
1. Direction issued at Training M anagement conference held at 1st Recruit Training Battalion on 28th 
October 1994. See minutes of conference on Headquarters Training Command Minute OPS 
7135/94 (file 93/113) dated 3rd November 1994.
2. Director of Psychology Minute P / l74/76, Review  Boards a t 1 RTB, to the Director of Personnel 
Planning regarding dated 17th June 1976. [Enclosure 1-1]
3. Director of Psychology Minute A84/3956, RTB Wastage, to the Assistant Chief of the General 
Staff (Personnel) - Army dated 20th June 1989.
4. Margin note by the Chief of the Defence Force on Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Personnel) 
Minute 844/89, D efence M anpow er Statistics - Involuntary Separations, to the Chief of the 
Defence Force, dated 25th May 1989. [Enclosure 1-3]
5. Discussions conducted by author during the period 11th-18th November 1994 with the following:
a. Staff Officer Strength Management, Army Directorate of Personnel Planning (Canberra).
b. Operations Officer, School of Infantry (Singleton).
c. Commanding Officer, Albury-Wodonga Medical Unit (Albury-Wodonga).
d. Deputy Commander, 5th Training Group (Perth).
e. Commanding Officer, School of Infantry (Singleton).
f. Commanding Officer, School of Artillery (Sydney).
g. Commanding Officer, School of Engineers (Sydney).
h. Staff Officer Personnel, 1st Recruit Training Battalion (Kapooka).
i. Chaplain, Army Chaplain Centre (Sydney).
6. Director of Costing and Financial Analysis - Army, Minute 013/94, Costing o f  Recruit Training - 
1 R TB F inancial Year 93/94, dated 13th January 1995.
7. An External Review  o f  into the A D F  Recruiting Function, November 1995, Volume 1, page 4-7, 
paragraph 4.32, which gave the 1994/95 cost of enlisting a recruit as $9,086.37.
8. Ibid, page 8-3, which estimated the medical costs per recruit enlisted to be $179.
9. In accordance with Chief of the General Staff Advisory Group Submission Number 26/92 
(Introduction of Total Quality Management), on 26 March 1993, funds of $0.55 million in 
Financial Year 1993/94 and $0.52 million in Financial Year 1994/95 were provided to "provide the 
initial investm ent to im plem ent TQM  program s".
10. This sponsorship included the author and two other officers from the Planning Branch of 
Headquarters Training Command, Sydney.
11. This objective is identified on page 4 of A rm y Office S ta ff Instruction 17/94 (file A93-33240/1), 
The Army Improving Management Program : Quality Management in the Army, dated 5th July
1994.
12. Perhaps as a result of some of the insights gained whilst enjoying the benefits of postgraduate 
Quality M anagement studies.
13. Discussion between author and Staff Officer Grade One Management Development, December 
1994.
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14. An observation based on the author's attendance at regular Army level Quality Forum meetings.
15. It should be noted that the Army's General Entry Soldier and General Service Officer induction 
processes are similar except that the basic training for the later is much more comprehensive and 
takes place at the Royal Military College in Canberra over a much longer period.
16. Service in the Ready Reserve involved one year of full time training / service followed by four 
years o f part-time Army service in nominated units. In early 1996 a decision was made to 
discontinue the scheme. Ready Reserve officers undertook four weeks of basic training at 
Kapooka followed by further training at the Royal Military College, Duntroon in Canberra.
17. Based on statement by the Director of Army Recruiting at the Project DUNLOP Steering Group 
meeting held on 4th July 1995.
18. Based on Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion data presented at the Project DUNLOP 
Steering Group meeting held on 26th February 1996.
19. Op Cit, An External Review  o f  into the A D F  Recruiting Function, page 10-7, paragraph 10.19.
20. Ibid, page 10-10, paragraph 10.26.
21. Those recruits selected for the Army’s Adult Trade Training Scheme are trained by 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion staff outposted to the Army Logistic Training Centre, Latchford Barracks 
(previously known as the Army's College of Technical and Further Education) located at Albury 
Wodonga.
22. See Note 6.
23. A statement based on the author's interview with one of the senior officers of Headquarters 
Training Command on 18th November 1994. It is also backed up by observations later made by 
Soldier Induction Process Culture Study  (see Section 4.7.2 of the text) as reported by Mugford 
who noted that, 'other things being equal, ...., high wastage rates are often culturally accepted as 
defensible, usually by reference to rhetoric such as 'you can ’t make omelettes without breaking  
eg g s” {1996:12).
24. Based on words used by the Chairman of Project DUNLOP Steering Group, Colonel Peter 
Lawrence, in an address (delivered jointly with the author) to a joint meeting of the Pubic Sector 
Quality Network and the Canberra Evaluation Forum in Canberra on 19th June 1997.
25. At considerable personal risk'W eary'Dunlop, cared for Australian prisoners of war on the
infamous Thai-Burma Railroad. After the Second World War he continued to work with all victims 
of war and in 1976 was named Australian of the Year. His contribution to Australian society was 
also recently commemorated on a 45c postage stamp and a 50c coin.
26. Based on research conducted for the author by the Training Management Cell of the Operations 
Branch of Headquarters Training Command. This research indicated that the School of Infantry 
Initial Employment training course had a wastage rate of approximately five percent.
27. Noted by Nicholas Jans (1989:172).
28. This notion is supported by authors such as Richard Pascale et al. who in Changing the way we 
Change, point to the similarities between Sears (a large American Retail Company), Royal Dutch 
Shell (a large petroleum company) and the United States Army (1997:128-139)
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29. For more information on the Federal Express approach to performance see Shapiro (1997:101).
30. Having said this, Dixon, for one, makes the point that Australian soldiers have always been 
relatively free from the more extreme 'spit and polish' tendencies of their British comrades 
(1976:176).
31. Based on his review of Peter Tsouras' book Changing Orders: The Evolution o f  the W orld Arm ies 
1945 to P resent (Arms and Armour Press, London, 1994).
32. Jans' work, for example, indicates that overall, the rate of job rotation of Australian military 
officers serving in Defence higher headquarters seem to be high, with only 51% having been in 
their current positions for ten months or more. Op Cit, page 183.
33. A comment based on author's experience as a serving Army officer during the period 1984-1997.
34. Director of Psychology Minute P/202/76, R ecruit W astage -1  R TB , to the Director of Personnel 
Planning, dated 5th July 1976. [Enclosure 1-2]
35. Op C it, Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Personnel) Minute 844/89, Defence M anpower 
Statistics - Involuntary Separations, to the Chief of the Defence Force, dated 25th May 1989. 
[Enclosure 1-3]
36. See paragraph 19 of Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion Minute R538-1-44, M edical 
A spects o f  R ecruit Training, to Headquarters Training Command, dated 19th July 1989. 
[Enclosure 1-4]
37. See R ecord  o f  P roceedings o f  a M eeting on ARA (Australian Regular Army) Recruit Wastage in 
Training, Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, on 29th September 1989. 
[Enclosure 1-6]
38. See Senate E stim ates Com mittee B r ie f on 1 RTB Suicide Rate, Cleared by Assistant Chief of 
Personnel - Army, March 1991. [Enclosure 1-8]
39. See Internal brief on Recruit Wastage, Cleared by Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, dated 
September 1990. [Enclosure 1-7]
40. 1st Recruit Training Battalion Minute 871-1-5, Recruit Wastage, to Headquarters Training 
Command, dated 15th December 1994.
41. This is perhaps a good indication of how slowly the Defence bureaucracy sometimes works.
42. A fact deduced by the author from many discussions with 1st Recruit Training Battalion staff and 
later commented on by Commandant of the Battalion, in his article on Army Recruit Training 
where he noted that "...the course has had  num erous adjustm ents as changing situations have 
required m odifications to length, style and content" (Buchanan 1996:119).
43. Assumptions made by author in December 1994.
44. At this time, the activities of, for example, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
had a reasonably high profile due to rulings affecting the Department of Defence.
45. For example, Agnew, while serving as a major in the Army's Directorate of Plans and Analysis in 
1994, published an article in the Australian Defence Force Journal in which he noted that there 
would be a significant reduction in the total target age group for the Army recruiters in the short 
and medium term - at least until 2007 and probably out to 2031 (1994.9).
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46. Course participants were asked to rate its various aspects out of 10 where a score of 10 indicated 
excellent. Using this system 'Course Concept' received an mean rating of 9 with a mode of 9. 
'Course Outcomes' received an mean rating of 9.1 with a mode of 9.
47. This opposition was outlined in a draft minute sent to the author by the Deputy Director 
Management Development on 24th January 1994 in which he expressed a desire to "...see the 
pro jec t undertaken using the correct TQ M  pro ject m ethodology..." and recommended that "the 
1/95 F acilita tor Course be conducted  as a standard course".
48. Comment based on author’s discussions with the course facilitators (Mr John Brown and Ms Annie 
McGinniskon of APTECH) on 10th February 1995.
49. See P roject D U N LO P Two Day W orkshop (28th February - 1st M arch 1995) W orkshop Report, 
dated 15 th March 1995.
50. Ibid.
51. Based on Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion comments made during the 28th February - 
1st March 1995 Project DUNLOP Two Day Workshop.
52. Based on discussions between Colonel Training, Headquarters Training Command and the Director 
of M anagement Development - Army, and the Colonel Training, Headquarters Training Command 
and the author during early February 1995.
53. It should be noted that the core composition of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group consisted of:
a. the Colonel Plans, Headquarters Training Command (Chairman);
b. the Director, Personnel Planning - Army;
c. the Commandant, 1st Recruit Training Battalion;
d. the Director of Army Recruiting;
e. a representative of the Surgeon General of the Australian Defence Force,
f. a representative of the Director of Psychology - Army; and
g. the Project DUNLOP Project Officer, Headquarters Training Command.
54. In regard to the data shown at Figure 9 it should be noted that:
a. all data was collected by the Recruit Training Battalion Physiotherapist, Captain M.J.
Cunningham; .
b. all recruits during this period were referred to the Physiotherapy Section by the same
doctor and referral patterns did not alter significantly; and
c. any recruit suffering injury was only counted once ie. subsequent or recurrent injuries
were not counted.
54. Notes for Figure 10 as per Figure 9 at Note 53.
56. In regard to the data shown at Figure 11 it should be noted that:
a. all data was collected by the Recruit Training Battalion Physiotherapist, Captain M.J. 
Cunningham;
b. the training timings of the two groups overlapped for eight weeks;
c. all recruits during this period were referred to the Physiotherapy Section by the same
doctor and referral patterns did not alter significantly; and . . .
d. any recruit suffering injury was only counted once ie. subsequent or recurrent injuries were not
counted.
57. All data collected by the Recruit Training Battalion Physiotherapist, Captain M.J. Cunningham.
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58. Based on data presented by Captain M.J. Cunningham to the Project DUNLOP Steering Group 
meeting held on 6th May 1996.
59. General Officer Commanding Training Command direction to Colonel Operations, Headquarters 
Training Command dated 16th June 1996 following the Chief of the General Staff Advisory 
Committee meeting held mid June 1996.
60. Based on Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion data presented to the Project DUNLOP 
Physical Training Continuum Workshop held 20th-21st June 1996. Refer to Workshop Report 
(Headquarters Training Command, Minute 696-10-5) dated 5th July 1996.
61. See Pope, R. (1996) Injury R isk  in Soldiers : Is G ender a M ajor Determ inant?  Presentation 
delivered to Project DUNLOP Female Injuries Workshop held at Canberra on 31st July and 1st 
August 1996 (unpublished).
62. Comments made by Commandant of 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Project DUNLOP Physical 
Training Continuum W orkshop held 20th-21st June 1996. Refer to Workshop Report 
(Headquarters Training Command Minute 696-10-5) dated 5th July 1996.
63. See, for example, the reports produced by Reynolds (1989) and Slater (1989).
64. An observation based on the very anti-fitness test comments of the Director of Army Recruiting in 
successive Project DUNLOP Steering Group meetings.
65. Op Cit, Pope, R. (1996)
66. See Information Brief for Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, M edical Screening at Point o f  
Enlistment, cleared by Director General of Recruiting, dated 23rd September 1996. [Enclosure 
1-9]
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. A system that applies to approximately 84% of recruits enlisted during Training year 1996-97
according to Annex A of a draft, undated discussion paper distributed by the Army s Directorate of 
Personnel Planning to members of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group in mid 1996.
70. Statement by Commandant of the 1 st Recruit Training Battalion in 1st Recruit Training Battalion 
Minute 871-1-26, dated 6th June 1996.
71. See Army Personnel Division Minute 017/96 (file A95-10610), Plan DUNLOP 2 M eeting  - 
Sum m ary o f  Proceedings, dated 22nd January 1996.
72. Based on author's experience when asking for statistics to use in early DUNLOP workshops.
73. Based on author's observations and discussions with 1st Recruit Training Battalion staff during the 
period December 1994 - June 1995.
74. Based on observations made by author during a visit to the Training Management Cell in mid
1995.
75. Author interview with the Chairman of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group dated mid October
1996.
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76. These hand-off strategies were outlined in a minute from the General Officer Training Command to 
all o f DUNLOP's key stakeholders. See Headquarters Training Command 696-1-14 (OGOC 
35025/96) P roject D U N LO P - H a n d -o ff Strategies, dated 14th November 1996. [Enclosure 1-10]
77. Discussions between author and the Director Army Recruiting held during September and October 
1996.
78. 10th July 1997 Chief of the Army Strategic Advisory Group, Common Induction Training - 
Progress Report, cleared by Colonel Plans, Headquarters Training Command, dated 8th July 1997.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Author interview with Director General of Recruiting on 27th November 1997.
82. Ibid.
83. Training C om m and R ecru it /  In itia l Em ploym ent P lan Report Training Year 1996/97, dated 24th 
November 1997, prepared by M ajor M.J. Billingham, Operations Branch, Headquarters Training 
Command.
84. Author interview M ajor Palmer, 1st Recruit Training Battalion, dated 20th January 1998.
85. It should be noted that Billingham's Training Com m and R e c ru it/In itia l Employment Plan Report 
Training Year 1996/97  was only issued on day that he left his job. Previous requests to examine the 
database were politely denied on the basis that the 1996-97 report was not ready for viewing.
86. Op Cit, author interview with Major Palmer, dated 20th January 1998.
87. Ibid.
88. Op Cit, address by the Chairman of Project DUNLOP Steering Group (delivered jointly with the
author) to a joint meeting of the Pubic Sector Quality Network and the Canberra Evaluation Forum 
in Canberra on 19th June 1997.
89. Or, to quote the words used by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at a Common 
Induction Training conference held in Sydney on 23rd October 1997, a healthy body more than 
likely equals a  health mind".
90. Based on the author's observation, the same can be said of the Directorate of Management 
Development - Army (see references in Sections 1.2,4.3, 4.4 and 5.4) which was disbanded in late 
1996 - arguably for failing to demonstrate its value. Unfortunately, without the Directorate, the 
Quality Management movement within Army was left without a formal sponsor and was quickly 
forgotten.
A l. Quote attributed to the famous Scottish physicist Lord Kelvin.
A2. Based on author's interview with Staff Officer Training, 1st Recruit Training Battalion, dated 30th 
April 1996.
A3. Based on author's brief to the Project DUNLOP Steering Group entitled 'Project DUNLOP Data  
Collection P la n ’, dated 3rd May 1996 (Held on file K96-00510).
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Annex A
The Accuracy of Recruit Wastage Statistics 
July 1994 - April 1996
"When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in
numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure i t ....
your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind" Note A1
As noted in Section 4.7.4, in early 1996 all recruit wastage data emanating 
from the 1st Recruit Training Battalion came to be viewed with suspicion as it was 
evident that it was being produced by individuals who had little training in or 
understanding of statistics. In April 1996 it was, for example, confirmed that the 1st 
Recruit Training Battalion's method of calculating the wastage rate was as follows NoteA2.
Total No of actual discharges since 1 July 100
% Wastage Rate = -------------------------------------------------------  x ------
Total No of recruits marched in * since 1 July 1
* ie. these recruits might be training, have already graduated or have already been discharged.
Based on this method of calculation, wastage data for the period July 1994 - 
April 1996 was presented to the 6th May 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group by the 
Commandant of the Recruit Training Battalion. An exact copy of this data, as presented, 
is attached as Appendix 1. For ease of comparison, however, a portion of it is shown at 
Figure A-l.
Figure A -l
M onthly Recruit W astage Rates during the period August 1995 - April 1996 
(According to Data Provided by 1st Recruit Training Battalion in M ay 1996)
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The great weakness with this method was that it included not only those 
recruits that had graduated or been discharged but also those recruits still under training. 
This figure was not only irrelevant to the true discharge rate but also guaranteed that any 
figure produced from the calculation would be distorted. For example, if a large influx of 
recruits was to take place for any reason, ie. if 10,000 recruits started training in any 
given week, the wastage rate (since 1st July) would drop dramatically. This would occur 
because the total number of recruits discharged since 1st July would suddenly only be a 
very small fraction of the total number of recruits marched in since 1st July. This 
situation is illustrated as follows:
Total No of actual discharges since 1 July 100
% W astage Rate = ---------------------------------------------------------  x ------
(as at 26th April 1996) Total No of recruits marched in since 1 July 1
150 100
1500 1
= 10%
Total No of actual discharges since 1 July 100
% Wastage Rate = ..........................................................................  x
(as at 3rd May 1996) Total No of recruits marched in since 1 July 1
165 100
eg. = ........  x -----
11.500 1
= 1.43%
This method of calculation also resulted in a situation where the Recruit 
Training Battalion considered that the only valid comparison of wastage rates could be 
made with the rate that existed 12 months before it, a logic that was flawed given the 
effect of sudden large intakes for whatever reason.
This situation, which could only be described as totally inadequate, went 
essentially unchallenged until early 1996, when the author sought to clarify the situation. 
In a paper presented to the 6th May 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group, it was 
suggested that there was an urgent need for a wastage rate "formula" which was clearly 
defined, easily understood, and (most importantly) which represented a 'true wastage 
rate figure. Also, once this formula was established, it was suggested that it should be 
used on an ongoing basis to clearly chart DUNLOP's progress in addressing the wastage
rate issue Note A3
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In order to obtain a true wastage rate, it was recommended that the calculation 
only deal with relevant figures ie. the number of recruits who marched in with a certain 
intake and the number of those same recruits who failed to graduate for whatever reason 
- noting that this calculation could also be made at any time during the training of the 
intake to check on its progress in relation to the norm. For example:
Total No of actual discharges from the intake 100
% Wastage Rate = --------------------------------------------------------  x -----
(for a given intake) Total No of recruits in the intake 1
6 100
eg. = ~  x —
48 1
= 12.5%
It was also suggested that, for the purpose of gaining an overall perspective, a 
rolling average discharge rate could be calculated. For example:
Total No of actual discharges from
Average % Wastage the last 10 intakes to graduate 100
Rate (for the last 10 = ....................................................................  x .......
intakes to graduate) Total No of recruits in the last 10 1
. intakes to graduate
54 100
eg . =  —  x —
480 1
= 11.25%
However, even given the advantages of the above, it was strongly suggested 
that the best means of visually representing and examining wastage trends over time was 
the control chart, and given the variable size of recruit intakes, the control chart 
identified as most applicable was the fraction non-conforming chart. It was pointed out 
that the development of such a chart would simply involve the plotting of the percentage 
wastage from each recruit intake on a graph. It was also explained that with very little 
extra effort control limits could be established which would allow management to 
investigate unusually high or low wastage rates in order to discover why they had 
occurred.
Following the above revelations and recommendations, the Project DUNLOP 
Steering Group agreed to pursue improvement to the method of calculating wastage 
rates. Accordingly, with data input assistance from the Soldier Induction Process Culture 
Study team, during mid 1996, detailed recruit wastage data was developed by the author 
for the period August 1995 - April 1996. The overall chart developed by the author from 
this data is shown at Figure A-2, however, for reference, the complete set of
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source data developed for all categories of wastage is at Appendix 2. This was the first 
time that such data had been presented to, or considered by, the DUNLOP Steering 
Group.
Figure A-2
Percentage of Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons 
from Recruit Intakes during the period August 1995 - April 1996 
(According to Source Data developed by the author in July 1996)
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At the Project DUNLOP Steering Group Meeting held on 6th August 1996, the 
author's source data was compared with wastage data previously presented for the period 
July 1994 - April 1996 by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. As can 
be seen, the differences are significant.
Figure A-3
Recruit Wastage during the period August 1995 - April 1996 
(Comparison of 1st Recruit Training Battalion data and data developed by the author)
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Appendixes:
1. Recruit Discharge Rates: July 1994 - April 1996 (as presented to the 6th May 
1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit 
Training Battalion)
2. Recruit Wastage Data : August 1995 - April 1996 (as developed from source 
data by the author)
Page 1 - Recruits Discharged at Own Request
Page 2 - Recruits Discharged due to Withdrawal of Parental Consent
Page 3 - Recruits Discharged as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury)
Page 4 - Recruits Discharged as Below Medical Standard
Page 5 - Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Service Life
Page 6 - Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Further Training
Page 7 - Recruits Discharged due to the Provision of False Information
Page 8 - Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons
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1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged at Own Request (Cat A)
Inlake
Source
Aug-95 Sep-95 Oct-95 Nov-95 Dec-95 Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
totals
Brisbane 8 4 3 ' 1 1 4 6 0 . 3 30
Sydney 3 3 2 3 0 17 1 4 0 33
Melbourne 2 3 1 1 0 3 4 0 0 14
Adelaide 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 7
Perth 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 8
Hobart 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 7
Darwm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 16 12 6 8 1 33 12 5 6 99
Total intake 387 159 161 165 37 639 397 165 204 2314
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Total intake 
% W astag e
Aug-95 Sep-95 Oct-95 Nov-95 Dec-95 Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
11 
6 
2 
3 
1 0 0
23
476
4 .8 3
6
3
4
t0
10
15
206
7.21
5
310000
9
191
4 .71
1
41
1
0
2
0
9
191
4.71
1
0
0
0
3
49
6.12
5
19
3 
2
4 
3 
0
36
681
5 .29
6 
. 1 
4 
2 
0 
0 0
13
429
3 .0 3
2
400
10
0
7
197
3 .55
3
0
10
2
10
7
242
2 .89
totals
40
40
17
10S
70
122
2664
4 .5 8
I 8 U
Ö ‘ ■"'  2
% o f R ecru its  (M a le  & Fem a le ) D ischarged  at O wn R equest
Irom  1 RTB R ecn«t lf*» k e s  Aug 95 - Apr »6
Oct-ss No*-es o#c-*s J* v9*
M onthly H ta k «
Frt-S« «-»«
Aug-SS
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1 RTB Male Recruits Disch due to Withdrawal of Parental Consent (Cat B)
Intake
S o u rc e
A u g -9 5
Brisbane 0
Sydney 0
M elbourne 0
Adelaide 0
Perth 0
H obart 0
D arw in 0 .
S a p -9 5 O c t-9 5
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
N ov-9 5 D e c -95
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
J a n -9 6 F e b -9 6
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
M a r-9 6 A p r-9 6
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
totals0000000
T otals 0
Total Intake 387 
%  W a s ta g «  0 .0 0
0 0 0
159 161 1650.00 0.00 o.oo
0 0 0
37 639 397
0.00 0.00 0.00
0 0 0
165 204 2314
0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
%  o f M a le  R e c ru its  D is c h a rg e d  d u e  to  W ith d ra w a l o f P a re n ta l C o n s e n t
from  1 RTB Recrurt In takes Aug 95 - Apr 96
Aug-95 Sap-9 5 Oc «95 Nov-95 Dec-95 J«rv96
M onthly In takes
1 RTB Female Recruits Disch due to Withdrawal of Parental Consent (Cat B)
intake
S o u rc e
A u g -9 5 S e p -9 5 O c t-9 5 N ov-9 5
Brisbane 0 1 0 0
Sydney 0 0 0 0
Melbourne 0 0 0 0
Adelaide 1 0 0 0
Perth 0 0 0 0
Hobart 0 0 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0
T otats 1 1 0 0
Total Intake 89 49 30 26
% Wastage 1.12 2 .0 4 0.00 0.00
D ec-95 Ja n -9 6 Fe b -96 M a r-9 6 A p r-96
totals
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 2
12 42 32 32 38 350
0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .5 7
%  o f F e m a le  R e c ru its  D isch  du e  to  W ith d ra w a l o f P a re n ta l C o n s e n t
(Torn 1 RTB K e e n «  Aug 95 - Apr i>6
6r
9S Sep 95 Dec 95
kAoc*Hy ircefces
9 r
A pr 96
Total (Male & Female)
Intake
Source
Aug-95
Brisbane 0
Sydney 0
Melbourne 0
Adelaide 1
Perth 0
Hobart . 0
Darwin 0
Totals 1
Total Intake 476
% Wastagt 0.21
Recruits Disch due to W ithdrawal of Parental Consent (Cat B)
Sep-95 Oct-95 Nov-95
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
208 191 191
0  4 6 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Dec-9 5 Jarv-96 Fe b -96
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
49 681 429
0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
M ar-96 A pr-96
totals
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 2
197 242 2664
0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 8
%  o f R e c ru its  (M a le  & F e m a le ) D is c h a rg e d  d u e  to  W ith d ra w a l o f C o n s e n t
from  1 RTB R ecnjrt In takes Aug 95 - Apr 96
A u p 9 5  Sep-95 Nov-95 Dec-95 J«rv96
M o rtN y  In takes
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1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury) (Cat H)
Intake
S o u rc e
A ug -9 5 S e p -9 5 O c t-9 5 N ov-9 5 O ec-95 J a n -9 6 F e b -9 6 M a r-9 6 A p r-96
totals
Brisbane 11 1 2 2 1 5 1 0 0 23
Sydney 6 2 2 3 0 6 2 0 • 0 21
M elbourne 3 1 3 1 1 2 2 0 0 13
Adelaide 3 0 0 3 1 2 1 0 0 10
Perth 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Hobart 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 26 5 7 10 3 15 7 0 0 73
Total Intake 387 159 161 165 37 639 397 165 204 2314
%  W a s ta g « 6 .7 2 3 .1 4 4 .3 5 6 .0 6 8 .1 1 2 .3 5 1 .7 6 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 3 .1 5
o*
%  o f M a le  R e c ru its  D is c h a rg e d  as  M e d ic a lly  U n fit
from  1 RTB R e c r jit  In takes Aug 95 - 96
10 
9
6 
4
2 
0
Aug-95 S«p-95 Oc 95 Nov-95 Oec-95 J*rv9€ Mar-96 Apr-96
M onthly Intakes
1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury) (Cat H)
Intake
S o u rc e
A u g -9 5 S e p -9 5 O c t-9 5 N ov-9 5 D ec-95 Ja n -9 6 F e b -96 M ar-96 A p r-9 6
totals
Bnsbane 5 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 11
Sydney 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Melbourne 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Adelaide 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 4
Perth 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Hobart 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T otals 16 10 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 33
Total Intake 89 49 30 26 12 42 32 32 38 350
%  W a s ta g « 1 7  9 8 2 0 .4 1 6 .6 7 3 .8 5 1 6 .6 7 4 .7 6 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 9 .4 3
%  o f F e m a le  R e c ru its  D is c h a rg e d  as M e d ic a lly  U n fit
from  1 RTB Recrm t In takes Aug 95 - Apr 96
â ,0r* . I
Aug-95 Sap-95 Oc» 95 Nov-95 Oe«-95 Jerv96
Morthéy Intakes
F#to-96 Mar-96
Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury) (Cat H)
intake A ug -9 5
S o u rc e
Bnsbane 16
Sydney 10
Melbourne 7
Adelaide 4
Perth 2
Hobart 3
Darwin 0
Sep-95 Oct-95
4 3
4 2
4 3
0 0
2 0
0 0
Nov-95 Dec-95
3 1
3 0
3 3
0 0
1 0
0 0
Jan-96 F e b -96
6 1
6 2
2 2
3 1
0 0
0 1
0 0
M ar-96 A pr-96
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
totals
34
27
20
14
4
70
Totals 42 15
Total Intake 476 208
%  W a s ta g « 8 .8 2 7 .2 1
9 11 5 17
191 191 49 681
4 .7 1 5 .7 6 1 0 .2 0 2 .5 0
7 0 0 106
429 197 242 26 64
1 .6 3 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 3 .9 8
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1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Below Medical Standard (Cat J)
Irkake A u g -9 5  
S o u rc e
S e p -9 5 O c t-9 5 N o v-9 5 D e c -95 J e n -9 6 F e b -9 6 M ar-96 A p r-9 6
totals
Brisbane 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 4
Sydney 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
Melbourne 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
Adelaide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Perth o 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Hobart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3 11
Total Intake 387 159 161 165 37 639 397 165 204 2314
%  W a s ta g e  0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .3 1 0 .7 8 1 .8 2 1 .4 7 0 .4 8
%  o f M a le  R e c ru its  D is c h a rg e d  as  B e lo w  M e d ic a l S ta n d a rd *
1 RTB R e c ru t In takes Aug 95 • A4*  96
Auo-95 S *o-95  Oct-95
* Usuofty as a ra«u* o f mpunas dunr*g aamng
Dac-95
M onthiy In takes
1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Below Medical Standard (Cat J)
Intake
Source
Aug-95 Sep-95 O d-95 Nov-95 Dec-95 Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
totals
Brisbane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 O' 2
Sydney 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3
Melbourne 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Adelaide 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Perth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hobart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T otals 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 8
T otal Intake 89 49 30 26 12 42 32 32 38 350
%  W a s ta g e 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 1 2 .5 0 1 2 .5 0 0 .0 0 2 .2 9
%  o f F e m a le  R e c ru its  D is c h a rg e d  as  B e lo w  M e d ic a l S ta n d a rd *
from  t RTB Recrurt In takes Aug 95 - A^jr 96
A uo-iS  S«o-9S Oct-95 Mer»95 D «  9S J«v9 6  f .b - 9 6  U s -96 *p .-9 «
• U tua ty  a t a rasu* o f t y n * 1 ck^ng eaa«p*g M ontfky Irkakes
Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Below Medical Standard (Cat J)
Intake A u q -9 5
Source
Brisbane 0
Sydney 0
Melbourne 0
Adelaide 0
Perth 0
Hobart 0
Darwin 0
Sep-95 Oct-95
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0 •
0 0
0 0
Nov-95 Dec-95
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Jarv-96 Feb-96
1 2
0 1
0 2
0 2
1 0
0 0
0 0
Mar-96 Apr-96
2 1
4 1
0 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
totals
6
6
3
3
100
Totals 0
Total Intake 476
%  W a s ta g e  0 .0 0
0 0 0
208 191 191
0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
0 2 7
49 681 429
0 .0 0 0 .2 9 1 .6 3
7 3 19
197 242 2664
3 .5 5 1 .2 4 0 .7 1
%  o f R e c ru its  (M a le  & F e m a le ) D is c h a rg e d  as B e lo w  M e d ic a l S ta n d a rd *
from  1 R TB R « c n it  Aug »5  - Apr 96
Auo-95 S to -95  Ocf-95 Nov-95 D»c-9S J m -M  F«b-96
* Dsuaky am •  ras iA  o f aipunas dunng H w g  M oo t N  y In takes
96 Apr-96
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1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Svc Life (Cat L)
Intake
S o u rc e
A u g -9 5 S e p -9 5 O c t -95 N o v-9 5 D ec-95 J a n -9 6 F e b -9 6 M a r-9 6 A p r-9 6
totals
Brisbane 6 1 2 1 0 8 3 1 3 25
Sydney 4 1 3 2 0 4 1 1 0 16
Melbourne 5 0 2 0 1 2 5 0 1 16
Adelaide 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 8
Perth 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 6
Hobart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
D arw in 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tota ls 18 4 8 5 1 18 9 4 5 72
To ta l Intake 387 159 161 165 37 639 397 165 204 2314
%  W a s ta g e 4 .6 5 2 .5 2 4 .9 7 3 .0 3 2 .7 0 2 .8 2 2 .2 7 2 .4 2 2 .4 5 3 .1 1
%  o f M a le  R e c ru its  D is c h a rg e d  as U n fit fo r  S e rv ic e  L ife
from  1 RTB R ecn jrt In takes Aug 95 - Apr 96
Auo-95 Sao-95
' Usually du« to psychological reasons
Nom-95 D#c-9S Jan-96
Monthly In takes
r-96 Apr-96
9
1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Svc Life (Cat L)
Intake
Source
Aug-95 Sep-95 Oct-95 Nov-95
Bnsbane 1 0 2 0
Sydney 2 1 0 0
Melbourne 0 0 0 0
Adelaide 0 0 0 1
Perth 0 0 0 0
Hobart 0 0 0 0
Darwm 0 0 0 0
Totals 3 1 • 2 1
Total Intake 89 49 30 26
%  W a s ta g e 3 .3 7 2 .0 4 6 .6 7 3 .8 5
Dec-95 Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
totals
0 1 0 1 2- 7
0 0 1 0 1 5
0 1 0 1 2 4
0 0 1 0 1 3
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 2 2 6 19
12 42 32 32 38 350
0 .0 0 4 .7 6 6 .2 5 6 .2 5 15 .79 5 .43
%  o f F e m a le  R e c ru its  D is c h a rg e d  as U n fit fo r  S e rv ice  L ife
from  1 RTB R ecnat In takes Aug 95 - Apr 96
Amo-96 S«o-95
'  UswaAy du« to p ry c h o to ^c *  reasons
Nom-95 Oec-95 Jerv96
M onthly In takes
Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Unfit for Svc Life (Cat L)
Intake A ug -9 5
S ou rce
Bnsbane 7
Sydney 6
Melbourne 5
Adelaide 2
Perth 1
Hobart 0
Darwin 0
T olals 21
Total Intake 476
%  W a s ta g e 4 .4 1
Sep-95 Oct-95
1 4
2 3
0 2
1 0
1 .1
0 0
0 0
5 10
208 191
2 .4 0 5 .2 4
Nov-95 Dec-95
1 0
2 0
0 1
3 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
6 1
191 49
3 .1 4 2 .0 4
Ja n -9 6 Fe b -96
9 3
4 2
3 5
2 1
2 0
0 0
0 0
20 11
681 429
2 .9 4 2 .5 6
Mar-96 Apr-96
2 5
1
1 3
1
0
1
1
0
0 0
6 11
197 242
3 .0 5 4 .5 5
totals
32
21
20
11
6
10
91
2664
3 .4 2
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1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Further Trg (Cat M)
Intake
S o u rc e
A u g -9 5 S a p -9 5 O ct-95 N ov-9 5 D ec-9S Ja n -9 6 Fe b -96 M a r-9 6 A p r-96
loiais
Bnsbane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sydney 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Melbourne 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Adelaide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perth 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Hobart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total Intake 387 159 161 165 37 639 397 165 204 2314
% Wastage 0.00 0.63 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
%  o f M ale  R ecru its  D ischa rg ed  as U n fit fo r Fu rthe r Trg
from  1 RTB R ecru it In takes Aug 95 * Apr 96
Dec-95
M onthly In takes
Sep-95 Nov-95
1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Further Trg (Cat M)
Intake
S ou rce
A u g -9 5 S ep -9 5 O ct-95 N ov-95 D ec-95 Ja n -96 Feb-96 M ar-96 Apr-96
totals
Bnsbane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sydney 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
Melbourne 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adelaide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hobart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
Total Intake 89 49 . 30 26 12 42 32 32 38 350
%  W a s ta g e 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 3 .1 3 5 .2 6 0 .8 6
%  o f F em a le  R ecru its  D ischarged  as U n fit fo r F urthe r Trg
from   ̂ RTB R e cn *t In takes Aug 95 - Apr 96
A*j9-9S  W - B S  O c t9 S  N o~BS D*c 9S J«rvB« F.6-B « M »-9«  **» (
Monthly In takes
Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Unfit for Further Trg (Cat M)
Intake A u g -9 5 S ep -9 5 O d -9 5 N ov-9 5
S ou rce
Bnsbane 0 0 0 0
Sydney 0 0 0 0
Melbourne 0 1 0 0
Adelaide 0 0 0 0
Perth 0 0 1 0
Hobart 0 0 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0
Totals 0 1 1 0
Total Intake 476 208 191 191
% Wastage 0.00 0.48 0.52 0.00
D ec-95 Ja n -9 8 Feb -96 M ar-96 A pr-96
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 -0 1 2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 2
49 681 429 197 242
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.83
totals0
310100
s
2064
0.19
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1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged due to Provision of False Info (Cat P)
Intake
S ou rce
A ug -9 5 S ep -9 5 O ct-95 N ov-95 D ec-95 J a n -9 6 F e b -9 6 M a r-9 6 A p r-96
totals
Bnsbane 4 1 1 1 - 0 2 1 0 0 . 10
Sydney 3 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 9
M elbourne 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Adelaide 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Perth 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
Hobart 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Darw in 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tota ls 7 2 4 2 1 7 3 0 2 28
Tota l Intake 387 159 161 165 37 639 397 165 204 2314
%  W a s la g t 1.81 1.26 2 46 1.21 2 .7 0 1.10 0 .7 6 0 .0 0 0 98 1.21
%  o f M a le  R e c ru its  D ischa rg ed  due to  P rov is ion  o f F a lse  In fo rm a tio n
from  1 RTB R ecruit In take« : Aug 95 - Apr 96
Aug-95 S#p-95 Oct-95 N o -  95 D #c95 Jarv96 Fmb-9€ M«r-96 Apr-96
M ontN y intakes
1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged due to Provision of False Info (Cat P)
Intake
Sourca
Au g-95 Sep-95 Oct-9 5 Nov-95 Dec-95 Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
totals
Bnsbane 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 6
Sydney 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Melbourne 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adelaide 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Perth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hobart 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 1 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 2 10
Total Intake 89 49 30 26 12 42 32 32 38 350
% Wastagi 1.12 2.04 13.33 3.85 0.00 2.38 0.00 0.00 5.26 2.86
% o f F e m a le  R e cru its  D ischa rg ed  due to  P rov is ion  o f Fa lse  In fo rm a tion
from  1 RTB Recrurt in takes Aug 95 - Apr 96
15
Kug-n w a s  Oti as 0 «  as J— 94 FrtvSS M »  9S *«»-9«
Monthly Irkakes
Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch due to Provision of False Info (Cat P)
intake
Sourca
Brisbane
Sydney
M elbourne
Adelaide
Perth
Hobart
Darwin
Totals 
Total intake
% Wastage
Aug-95 Sap-95 Oct-95 Nov-95 Dec-95 Jan-98 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
5 
3 0 0 0 0 0
6
4 7 6
1.66
110000
3
208 
1 44
20
1010
a
191
4 .1 9
00000
3
191 
1 57
00
0
0
1
0
0
1
49
2.04
2
2
1
2
10
0
8
681
1.17
0
0
1
0
0
3
429
0 .7 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
197
0.00
0
1
0
1
0
4
242
1.65
totals
16
11
2
4
3
20
36
2664
1.43
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1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons
Intake
S ou rce
A ug -9 5 S e p -9 5 O ct-95 N ov-9 5 D ec-95 Jen-96 Feb -96 M a r-9 0 A p r-90
totals
Bnsbane 29 7 8 5 2 20 13 1 7 92
Sydney 16 6 8 g 0 29 - 5 7 2 B2
Melbourne 10 7 6 2 2 8 12 0 2 49
Adelaide 7 2 1 6 1 7 2 2 0 26
Penn 4 0 2 0 1 8 1 1 3 20
Hobart 1 2 1 3 0 3 1 1 2 14
Darwin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 67 24 26 25 6 75 34 12 16 205
Total Intake 387 159 161 165 37 639 397 165 204 2314
%  W a s ta g e 1 7 .3 1 1 5 .0 9 1 6 .1 5 1 5 .1 5 1 6 .2 2 1 1 .7 4 8 .5 6 7 .2 7 7 .8 4 1 2 .3 2
%  o f M ale  R e c ru its  D ischarged  due to  all R easons
from  1 RTB R ecnjrt In take*  Aug 95 - Apr 96
20-------
*  S
Aug-96 Sap-96 Oct-95 Nom-95 Dac 95 J *v 9 €  Fat>-96 Mar-96 Apr-96
Morktify in takes
1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons
Intake
S ource
A ug -95 S ep -9 5 O ct-95 N o v-9 5
Bnsbane 10 6 8 2
Sydney 9 4 2 1
Melbourne 4 4 0 0
Adelaide 3 0 0 1
Perth 0 1 1 0
Hobart 2 1 0 0
Darwin 0 0 0 0
Totals 28 16 11 4
Total Intake 89 49 30 26
%  W a s ta g e 3 1 .4 6 3 2 .6 5 3 6 .6 7 1 5 .3 8
Dec-95 Jan-96 Feb-90 Mar-90 Apr-90
totals
0 3 0 5 3 37
0 2 2 3 3 20
1 t 1 1 3 15
3 2 4 0 2 15
0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 0 0 0
4 6 7 9 11 98
12 42 32 32 38 350
3 3 .3 3 1 9 .0 5 2 1 .8 8 2 8 .1 3 2 8 .9 5 2 8 .0 0
40
35
'S 30 
?  25
* 10
0
% o f F em a le  R ecru its  D ischarged due to  all R easons
Irom  1 RTB R e c ru  I im a *e s Aug 95 - Apr 96
Aug-96 Sap- 96 Oct-96 Non»-96 Oa< 95 J«rv96 Fab-96
M oriW y intakes
Mar 96
Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch due to all Reasons
intake
Source
Bnsbane
Sydney
Melbourne
Adelaide
Penn
Hobart
Darwin
Totals 
Total intake 
%  W a s ta g e
A ug -95 S ep -95
39 13
25 to
14 11
10 2
4 1
3 3
0 0
95 40
476 208
1 9 .9 6 1 9 .2 3
Oct-95 Nov-95
16 7
10 10
6 2
1 7
3 0
1 3
0 0
37 29
191 191
1 9 .3 7 1 5 .1 8
Dec-95 Jen-90
2 23
0 31
3 9
4 9
1 8
0 3
0 0
10 83
49 G81
2 0 .4 1 1 2 .1 9
Feb-90 M a r-9 6
13 6
7 10
13 1
6
1
2
1
1
0
1
0
41 21
429 197
9 .5 6 1 0 .6 6
Apr-90
totals
10 129
5 100
5 64
2 43
3 22
2 17
0 0
27 303
242 2604
1 1 .1 6 1 4 .3 8
% o f R e c ru its  (M a le  & F em a le ) D ischarged  due to  all R easons
from  1 RTB Recrurt m u k «  Aug 9S - Apr 96
70 r ­I'S h
fi ’ °
*  s
AU9-9S S.P-9S Oct-»5 N o-9S  D .c-95 J— »« F**>‘ 9S
M c rtN y  W » k «
r-96 A<k -96
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A n n ex  B
Recruit Wastage Data 
July 1996 - June 1997
The attached pages are exact copies of pages taken from the following:
Training Command
Recruit / Initial Employment Training Plan 
Report
Training Year 1996/97
Prepared by :
Major M.J. Billingham.
Published:
24th November 1997
Page 2 - Intake A chievem ent TY 96/97
Page 3 - Intake A chievem ent (M ale) TY 96/97
Page 4 - Intake A chievem ent (Fem ale) TY 96/97
Page 5 - D ischarge Reason N um bers
Page 6 - D ischarge Reason Percentages
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INTAKE ACHIEVEM ENT TY 96/97
80
60
40
20
0
100
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Key Internal Correspondence
1-1 D irec to r o f  Psycho logy , M inute P /174/76 , R e v ie w  B o a rd s  a t  1 R T B , to  the D irecto r o f 
P ersonnel P lanning , dated  17th June 1976.
1-2 D irec to r o f  P sychology , M inute  P /202/76, R e c ru it W astage  - 1  R T B , to the D irecto r o f 
P ersonnel P lann ing  dated , 5th July 1976.
1-3 A ssistan t C h ie f o f  the D efence F orce (Personnel) M inute 844/89, D e fe n ce  M a n p o w e r  
S ta tis tic s  - In v o lu n ta ry  S e p a ra tio n s , to  the C h ie f o f  the D efence Force, dated  25th M ay 
1989.
1-4 C om m andan t 1 st R ecru it T rain ing  B attalion M inute R 5 3 8 -1-44, M ed ic a l A sp e c ts  o f  
R e c r u it  T ra in in g , to  H eadquarters T raining C om m and, dated 19th July 1989.
1-5 A ssistan t C h ie f o f  Personnel - A rm y, M inute 627/89, A R A  (A u stra lia n  R e g u la r  A rm y)
R e c r u it  W a sta g e  in  T ra in in g , to D eputy  A ssistan t C h ief o f  Personnel - Arm y, dated  24th 
A ugust 1989.
1-6 R e c o r d  o f  P r o c e e d in g s  o f  a  M e e tin g  o n  A R A  (A u stra lia n  R e g u la r  A rm y ) R e c ru it W astage
in T ra in in g  h e ld  o n  2 0  S e p te m b e r  1989 , chaired by the D eputy A ssistant C h ief o f 
Personnel - A rm y, dated  27th Septem ber 1989.
1-7 In te rn a l b r ie f  on  R e c ru it  W a sta g e , cleared by A ssistant C h ief o f Personnel - Arm y, dated 
S ep tem ber 1990.
1-8 S e n a te  E s tim a te s  C o m m itte e  B r ie f  on  I  R T B  S u ic id e  R a te , cleared by A ssistant C hief o f 
Personnel - A rm y, M arch 1991.
1-9 Inform ation  B rief fo r A ssistan t C h ief o f  Personnel - A rm y, M ed ic a l S c reen in g  a t P o in t o f  
■ E n lis tm en t, c leared  by D irector G eneral o f R ecruiting, dated 23rd Septem ber 1996.
1-10 H eadquarters T rain ing  C om m and, file 696-1-14 (O ffice o f the G eneral O fficer
C om m anding  M inute  35025/96) P ro je c t D U N L O P  - H a n d -o ff  S tra teg ie s , dated  14th 
N ovem ber 1996.
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S u b j e c t  i 337x2^7
's.
•CAPJiS AT 1 3T3 -  c ó l i
________ CPE e»22
:C3 c?  I17TIRBSTIB PARTIBS 2 JuZ 76
P /1 7 4 /7 6
BEP
1 . In  r e c e n t  m onths th e  r e s p o n s ib le  o f f i c e r s  o f  P e r s  Branch have
e x p r e sse d  co n cern  a t  a  co n cu rre n t in c r e a s e  i n  th e  numbers o f  r e c r u i t s  a t  
1 3T3 who h ave  b een  p r e s e n te d  t o  Boards o f  Be v ie w  end su b se q u e n tly  d isch a rg e  
T his r e p r e s e n t s  a  w a sta g e  o f  p e r so n n e l w hich i s  e x p e n s iv e  and d is tu r b in g .
2 . A c o n fe r e n c e  o f  o f f i c e r s  r e p r e se n t in g  in t e r e s t e d  p a r t ie s  was h e ld
1 3TB t o  exam ine th e  prob lem , i t s  l i k e l y  c a u se s , i t s  e f f e c t s ,  and i f  
c o n s id e r e d  a d v is a b le  o r  p o s s i b l e ,  to  make recom m endations a s  to  i t s  
a m e lio r a t io n .  Those n r e s e n t  in c lu d e d :
B r i g  B . S . STÏÜBC u rlìi CofS rQ, Trg
Col R .B .P . LLCYB CO 1 RT3
Col A .G. CIUCS B P sych
Lt Col C .? . BCBBS BRIC
The f o l lo w in g  i s  b a sed  on n o te s  made by B P sych  fo l lo w in g
Comd
th e  c o n fe r e n c e .
3 . R e le v a n t s t a t i s t i c s  prep
d is c u s s e d .  They shewed c l e a r ly  
p r o p o r tio n  o f  r e c r u i t s  d is c h a r g e r  
term s th e  p r o p o r t io n  c f  f a i l u r e  z. 
in  th e  g e n e r a l  em ploym ent f i e l d ,  . 
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a l e r t  s t a f f s  t o  a p:
ared  by BP? and B F sych  were produced and 
th a t  an in c r e a s e  i n  th e  numbers and 
was o c c u r r in g . --Itnough  i n  a b so lu te
hus e v id e n c ed  w ould n o t  be c o n s id ered  hug  
in  th e  Am y c o n te n t  th e  in c r e a s e  was 
r c b le n  w hich co u ld  in c r e a s e  to  an i n t c l e r
l e v e l
/ CC 1 ctTB made a number o f  observa uuens:
/.fid i..
s \ / n z -  2 / I
b.
j »
9 ~;ZrS charged  ¿._m r r a m in g  . 
£.hle sta n d a rd  c f  rerfcrm an ce  
s u f f i c i e n t  f e r  them t o  e n te r
e e r m r s  t o  an 
=.nd a t t i t u d e  to  the  
I I ?  a t  Corps S ch o o ls;
th a t  he 
t i e n  o f  
Army;
and h i s  s t a f f  were now a b le  to  make earl; 
th e s e  u n l ik e ly  to  maue a p p r o p r ia te  ad jus
i  d en ti.
cü ù tO
ca­
me
th a t  m ost o f  th e  t r a in in g  f a i l u r e  * 
a t t i t u d i n a l  sh ortcom in g  ( i . e . ,  th e  
w anted  t o 'b e  s o ld i e r s  and r e s i s t e d  
r e c o v e r y ) ;
was a t t r ib u t a b le  to  
s e  who no lo n g e r  
a tte m p ts  a t  t h e ir
th a t  a tte m p ts  to  p e r se v e r e  w ith  su ch  f a i l u r e s  were 01  ̂
l i t t l e  a v a i l  and r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e i r  a f f e c t i n g  th e  t r a in in g  o f  
e t h e r s .  P e r se v era n ce  was th e r e f o r e  u n econ om ica l iu  th e  lon^  
and s h o r t  te r n ;  ■
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e« th a t  in  h i s  o p in io n  in c r e a s e s  i n  Be v ie w  B eards w ert -
a t t r ib u ta b le  to  p o o rer  q u a l i t y  o f  r e c r u i t s  e n l i s t e d .
*ken t h i s  was -ch a llen g ed  as  t o  q u a l i t y  ( s e e  b elow ) ’̂ t  
was fu r th e r , im p lie d  th a t  cu rre n t a t t i t u d e s  t o  em ploym ent 
.. w ere su ch  th a t  r e c r u i t s  were now l e s s  t o le r a n t  o f
d i s c ip l in a r y  c o n s tr a in t  th an  th e y  w ere i n  th e  p a s t ;  en d
f .  sum m arising h i s  p o s i t i o n  CO 1 3TB s u g g e s te d  th a t  th e  
‘ q u a lity *  o f  r e c r u i t s  was d e c l in in g  and th a t  t o  red u ce  
d isc h a r g e s  through B eview  Boards w ould n e c e s s i t a t e  a  
lo w e r in g  o f  s ta n d a rd s , and i n  th e  lo n g  run cau se  uneconom ica l 
w astage o f  p e rso n n e l o r  perform ance a t  a  l a t e r  s ta g e  i n  th e  
r e c r u it  l i f e  c y c l e .  •
5 .  BH2C, i n  r e la t in g  t o  th e  query o f  r e c r u i t  q u a l i t y ,  s t a t e d  t h a t  
th e  q u a l i t y  o f  a p p lic a n t  had d e c l in e d  c i t i n g  a s  e v id e n c e  a  r e c e n t  in c r e a s e  
i n  a p p l ic a n t  r e j e c t io n  r a te s ,  and s u b j e c t iv e  ' p r i o r i t y '  a s se ssm e n ts  by  
e n lis tm e n t  s t a f f s .
6 . B P sych  r e j e c t e d  th e  n o t io n  th a t  th é  sta n d a rd  o f  r e c r u i t  had
d e c l in e d  i n  th e  p a s t  few  y e a r s  b a s in g  h i s  argum ent on com parisons o f  
r e c r u i t  t e s t i n g  r e s u l t s  from a  p e r io d  i n  19 7 4  w ith  th o se  frcrn th e  f i r s t  
th r e e  m onths i n  1 5 7 6 - In  no m easurable way were th e  p o p u la t io n s  d if f e r  " t. 
The r e c e n t  r i s e  i n  r e j e c t io n  r a t e s  c i t e d  by BH5C was a t r a n s i t o r y  
phenomenon brought about by r a t e s  resum ing form er l e v e l s  a f t e r  a sharp  
d e c l in e .  ..
7 . ¿ I s o  r e j e c t e d  was th e  n c t ic n  o f  a  change i n  community a t t i t u d e s
to  employment s u f f i c i e n t  to  cau se r a p id  in c r e a s e s  i n  r e c r u i t s  whose 
r e t e n t io n  was u n econ om ica l. Such r a d ic a l  and fundam ental changes would  
n o t be e x p e c te d  to  occur i n  such a s h o r t  t im e . H ecent s t r in g e n c ie s  o f  
th e  c i v i l i a n  employment m arket a ls o  would be e x p e c te d  to  g iv e  th e  Army a  
b e t t e r  c h o ic e  c f  b e t t e r  a p p lic a n ts  who would be more r e lu c t a n t  to  s e p a r a te .
8 . Problem s o f  th e  in tr o d u c t io n  o f  th e  S ystem s Approach to  T ra in in g
were d is c u s s e d  as a l i k e l y  c a u se . The T ra in in g  O f f ic e r  1 ¿T3 d isc o u n te d  
t h i s  on th e  grounds th a t  a p art from a llo w in g  e a r l i e r  r e c o g n it io n  o f  th e se  
f a i l i n g  to  a c h ie v e  t r a in in g  o b j e c t iv e s  and th e  in t r o d u c t io n  c f  q u a l i t y  
c o n tr o l m ethods no s ig n i f i c a n t  changes nave b een  in tr o d u c e d  t o  t r a in in g .
o . I'o d e f in i t e  c o n c lu s io n s  on f a i l u r e  a t  1
cue hand CO 1 3TB was s t a t in g  th a t  m e  q u a l i ty  c f  
d efen d ed  th e  non r e d u c t io n  o f  t r a in in g  s ta r .c a r e s . 
e v id e n c e  c f  B P sych  and BP? r e j e c t e d  m an  nhere n
3T3 were drawn. On th e  
r e c r u i t s  had d e c lin e d  
On th e  o th e r  hand th e  
ad been  any d im in u tio n  o f
d
r e c r u i t in g  s ta n d a r d s .
1 0 . A nart from h i s  a ccep ta n ce  c f  th e  argum ent co n cern in g  th e  d e s i r a b i l i  
o f  e a r ly  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  end rem oval c f  th e  u n econ om ica l r e c r u i t  th e  c o n c lu s i  
c f  CcfS EQ Trg Cord co u ld  n o t  be a s c e r ta in e d .
•11. A lthough  th e  co n fere n c e  was in c o n c lu s iv e  i t  i s  added th a t  i t  i s  __
th e  d>*: n ic n  o f  ^ "r> 'l- ■A-v -  n-r s rr>rec Tprr-ji t  w a sta re  a t  1 BiuB P sych  th a t  th e  c a u se s  o f  in c a s e d  r e c r u i t  w astage a t  1 Bi- 
have s t i l l  n o t  been  d eterm in ed . T ^iatever th e y  ere' th e y  a re  n o t r e la t e d  to  
changes i n  th e  stan d ard  o f  e n tr a n t .  I t  seem s t o  n e g a te  m e  System s  
Awnrcach w hich  se e k s  to  'o b j e c t iv i s e *  th e  le a r n in g  p r o c e ss ,w h e n  in s t r u c t o r s  
'r e r s o n a l is e V  i t s  f a i l u r e s .  fu rth erm ore th e  s o lu t io n  t o  th e  problem  i s  _ 
c o n s id e r e d  t o  be more l i k e l y  t o  be i n  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  r e s t r a i n t s  on Beview  
B eards th an  i n  th e  t ig h te n in g  o f  e n tr y  q u a l i f ic a t io n .^
y c h o lo g yH  Jun J6
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>jV RECRUIT YTASTAGE -  1 RT3
DGPP
P/202/76
* '• . k
For Information: 
TSS*'DHEC-A .
• v h  '
r —
References: A. EBEC-A 272/76 of 20 May 16 1 .■ *■ ■.• V  ' . V *  VV' *
B. EBEC-A 227/76 of 13 Jun 16 —  .  -
1 # . It is surely time to lay the spectre of the lower quality of recruit
entering 1 RTB as presented in the References.
2. EhateDRSC-A is saying iss
a .  R e c r u it  w a sta g e  i s  h ig h  b ecau se th e  sta n d a rd  o f  r e c r u i t  i s  low  
-  w it n e s s  th e  h ig h  r e c r u i t  w a sta g e .
_ b .  R e c r u it  s ta n d a r d s  a re  lo w  b ecau se th e r e  i s  a  h ig h  r e j e c t  r a t e
. o f  a p p l ic a n t s .
’ 3* • B o th  argum ents a r e  p a t e n t ly  i l l o g i c a l .  The f i r s t  r e q u ir e s  no
comment. H ie seco n d  r e f e r s  t o  th o se  n o t  s e le c t e d  f o r  e n li s tm e n t  and m ore  
a p t ly  i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  m ain ten an ce  o f  th e  stand ard  o f  th e  r e c r u i t  p o p u la t io n .
4. DPSYCH b e l i e v e s  th a t  by j u s t i f y i n g  t r a in in g  f a i l u r e  on th e  b a s i s  o f
a haphazard " p o st—s e le c t io n "  c a t e g o r iz a t io n  o f  a p p lic a n t s ,  DREC-A i s  d o in g  
h im s e lf  a  d i s s e r v i c e  and c o u ld  in  th e  lo n g  te r a  go a  m is c h ie f  t o  manpower 
c o n t r o l .  The c la im  t h a t  a p p l ic a t io n  r a t e s  o f  1$7° have b a r e ly  m et A m y s  
need  i s  i l l  fou n ded  and g iv e s  a  f a l s e  im p r e ss io n  o f  th e  r e c r u i t in g  s i t u a t i o n .  
DEEC-A i s  s im p ly  th e  v ic t im  o f  A m y p o l i c y .
5 ,  The s o u l  s e a r c h in g  con cern  o f  E n listm en t O f f ic e r s  o v e r  R eview  Board
d isc h a r g e s  a t  R e fe r e n c e  A i s  commendable but m is d ir e c te d , p a r t i c u l a r ly  i n  a  
c lim a te  o f  in e x p l i c a b le  w a sta g e . Kot o n ly  can th ey  n o t  in f lu e n c e  th e  R eview  
Board d e c is io n s ^  w hich  more f r e q u e n t ly  th an  n o t are  made f o r  r e a so n s  t o t a l l y  
fo r e ig n  t o  any p r e - e n l i s tm e n t  in fo r m a t io n , but th e r e  i s  a danger th a t  tk e y  
may be tem p ted  t o  o v e r  c o r r e c t  i n  fu tu r e  but u n r e la te d  a r e a s .  J B jey  
l e t  th e  t r a i n e r s  t r a i n  end ta k e  some com fort from th e  th o u g h t th a t  u n t i l  1975  
thd A u s tr a l ia n  Army to s h ig h ly  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  t r a in in g  m a rg in a l m anpower. 
That " tr a in in g  f a i l u r e s "  e r e  n o t  e d m itte d  to  be f a l l u r e s  o f  t r a in in g  s h o u ld  
n o t d i s t r e s s  th em . K ot o n ly  can  th e y  n o t  c o n t r o l_th o se  who ap p ly  b u t a l s o  
th e y  h ev e  m a in ta in e d  c o n s ta n c y  i n  th e  in p u t  o f  t r a in in g  q u a l i t y .
6 . Will no-one admit that the current training standard at 1 STB has
been raised? _____
UUbl93-$-IO
772.8
/
(a . g . oïïsiîs)
C olon el
D ir e c to r  o f  P sy c h o lo g y
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Department of Defence
ACPERS 844/89
f t  $  W'
DEFENCE MANPOWER STATISTIc/s - INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS
References:
A. AJERS Minute 277/89 24 Feb 1989
B. ACPERS Minute 542/89 of 5 May 1989
1. You would recall that in commenting on the ADF Manpower 
statistics for 31 Dec 88, I drew your attention to the number of 
involuntary separations on medical grounds from Army’s Training 
Force which was very high compared with the other Services. I 
adyised I had asked SGADF to investigate whether this was a 
consequence of initial training or whether those might be problems 
with Army’s medical screening process or possibly some different 
reporting terminology in use.
2. SGADF has advised that:
a. terminology is the same for the whole ADF (confirmed 
by FASMIMP); and
b. medical screening processes are performed by the same 
DFRC Medical Officers for the whole ADF to the same 
general standards (JSP(AS)701).
This leads him to conclude that the differences in wastage rates of 
trainees is a product of both the immediate initial training Arrtiŷ  
enlistees are subjected to, and in the level of medical intervention 
and investigation provided, particularly at 1 RTB, Kapooka.
3. He has commented further that whilst errors do occur at the 
DFRC’s, the error rate is not statistically significant and is 
currently acceptable. He makes the point also that the intensive 
training stress, both physical and mental, to which Army enlistees 
are subjected produces training injuries, some of which are 
aggravation of old injuries leading to recording them as 
’pre-existing conditions*.
JP
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4« In view of SGADF's advise, I propose no further action
unless circumstances change.
-  2 -
5. For your information.a
A.L. BEAUMONT
RADM
ACPERS
£ T M a y  89 ^ n l*
w  <r; -u -
^  /, J A .
^ * 1  ^ A'
- j T L  l -  *< ^ 5  ^
t  ¡ i  ^  ^ )
Fuâ  J_
V F  ‘
■* /■
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From: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE (PERSONNEL)
%
A c F ß f c S - A
c 'b F lô
jVMäldb Mb
M vvA ovflk vutu+ub ^cw ¿U ÿ; £
jç *  J a aV aMus> jJ u 4 L , «5
svuÿ+b jjuu A  COPS "A ô Akx .
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1st RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION 
Milpo Kapooka
(069) 210 210 KAPOOKA NSW 2661
In reply quo«
Headquarter Training Command 
For Informaton:
Department of Defence (Army Office) - DGAHS 
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF RECRUIT TRAINING
FILE AT* DATE:
GENERAL
1. 1RTB is concerned about medical discharge rates (approximately
10%) and injury rates during Recruit, training. In the former little 
guidance has been provided, on what is an acceptable wastage rate, but 
it is clear that it can be reduced. ' *
2. 1RTB is conducting a number of trials, and gathering detailed 
statistics to isolate and quantify all jthe factors involved. The attached 
report' by the RMO 1 RTF* was the •stimulus for much of this research 
within 1RTB, and it has ĉlear implications for the Army as a whole. 
The report makes recommendations which, if implemented, should 
significantly reduce wastage rates, conserve resources and save money.
LOWER LEG FITNESS
3. The RMO has highlighted the emphasis placed on the use of
lower limbs in recruit training. The statements made in paragraph 7a, 
b and c also apply to the Army at large. It is therefore logical to 
suggest that close attention needs to be paid to lower leg fitness during 
induction medical examinations. a
Recommendation: That initial medical boards place greater emphasis
on lower limb fitness during enlistment procedures.
ASTHMATICS ;
Applicants who.admit to any history of asthma should be fully 
screened prior to enlistment. Careful examination at the enlistment 
stage should assist in the identification of asthmatics and reduce the 
treatment costs associated with discharge at 1RTB.
Recommendation: That initial medical boards undertake a comprehensive
examination of Applicants who present with a positive history of asthma.
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5*, It would appear that there is no policy preventing he
enlistment of applicants who use orthotic devices. Until such time as a clear 
policy is issued 1RTB will cease' the practice of removing orthotic devices 
from recruits who have been enlisted.
Recommendation: A clear policy be promulgated to recruiting medical officers 
and 1 RTB on the use of orthotic devices in the Army.
REGULAR REST CYCLE
6. 1 RTB is the only training organization that operates on a
seven days/week training cycle. The increased emphasis on running in the 
physical training programme, combined with the continuous nature of all types 
of training, has resulted in a greater incidence of lower leg injuries than has 
been evident in the past. . *
. * •
7. • The RMO 1 RTB feels that a regular rest cycle within the
training programme is required to allow for the healing of the body and the 
psyche between physical exercise loading. S  . • •
Recommendation: That the Recruit Course be extended by one week to enable 
a regular rest cycle to be incorporated into the programme. '
- . ’ « '•
FEMALE PHYSICAL TRAINING
• ‘ +  *  "
8. The physical training programme for females is merely a. 
modified version of the male programme.* As a result females sustain a 
consistently higher rate of injury.
Recommendation: There is e need for the Army to design and develop a
physical training programme specifically for females.
PRE-ENLISTMENT PHYSICAL FITNESS LEVELS
9. It is the perception of medical and training staff at 1 RTB
that many recruits (particularly females) do not have an adequate level of
physical fitness on enlistment. For example in a recent female platoon in
excess of 80% of enlistees had undertaken no physical activity of any kind 
in the last five years. The introduction of basic physical fitness tests at the 
enlistment point should be considered to identify those applicants who have 
an unacceptable standard of physical fitness.
10. No additional physical training can be programmed to cater
for this perceived lower level of general fitness. This perceived lower level 
of general fitness may be a contributing factor to increasing medical 
presentations and injury. In addition, as outlined in paragraph 7, little or 
no rest is provided between training activities. Although the extension to
the course sought in paragraph / 7 will not enable extra physical training to 
be programmed it would enable the program to be less demanding.
*■ ’ * •
Recommendation: That the Recruit Course be extended by one week to allow 
a more gradual approach to physical training to be adopted and that DAR 
investigate the introduction of a basic, physical fitness test at point of
enlistment. >
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PRE-ENLISTMENT INJURY/ILLNESS
11. The report has revealed that some 75% of medical discharges
over the period 1984-88 involved recruits who suffered from some form of 
pre existing injury or illness which precludes them from training. In other 
words some 1075 recruits (or approximately 22 platoons) should not have been 
enlisted at all.
12. The training and medical costs associated with enlisting recruits
with pre-existing injury/illness have not been calculated however they are 
considerable. As an example a recruit enlisted with a lower leg injury could 
be expected to visit a specialist, undergo a bone scan (normally in Canberra) 
and be placed on up to eight weeks convalescence leave. It may be more 
cost effective to redirect treatment costs to a more thorough medical screening 
at enlistment. At the very least enlistment MO should pay closer attention 
to lower limb fitness and Asthma histories. * •
Recommendation: That more thorough enlistment medicals be conducted to
indentify pre-existing injury/illness and that enlistment MO pay closer attention 
to lower limb fitness in medical examinations.
SHORT TERM INCREASES IN RECRUIT THROUGHPUT
■ . .  • *
13. In 1987 Project Booster was initiated to boost the number
of general enlistees in a given financial year. It is apparent from thé statistics 
displayed in the attached report that the effort failed ^with the increase in 
throughput being completely negated by an ' increase in discharge. It would 
appear that medical standards adopted to facilitate booster were, at the best, 
suspect. ..  *
Recommendation: Every effort should be made to provide a Steady State
throughput commensurate with the resources available at 1 RTB. Surges should 
be limited to the resource equability available and in future sijniliar efforts 
such as Booster should be avoided. ; V \
CHANGES IN RECRUIT MORBIDITY
14. . The four most common causes of discharge in the period 
1984-88 were:
a. knee pain;
b. back pain;
c. Asthma; and
d. Pes Planus.
In addition there has been a marked increase in lower leg injuries, particularly 
stress fractures, over the last nine months. It must be observed that the 
increased incidence of stress fractures is partially a result of greater medical 
interest in this type of injury.
15. In an attempt to determine whether training methods are
responsible for the increase in incidence of stress fractures a number of trials 
are currently being conducted. These are Weight Load Marching trial, and 
in female platoons, a sandshoe trial which is aimed at a more gradual 
introduction to the wearing of boots. An attempt is also being made to collect 
a statistical data base. A computer. system would be invaluable in this effort.
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Recommendation: That collection of •-statistics continue in »an attempt 
to determine the causes of injury.
CONCLUSION:
16. The attached report is the first attempt to analyse the causes
of recruit medical discharges. The most telling statistic to emerge from 
the, study is that 74.5% of medical discharges in the period 1984-88 had 
pre-existing injury/illness. It should also be noted (from Table 3) that 
the incidence of these discharges remain constant throughout the four 
year period. In essence, if ‘measures were taken to reduce enlistment 
of recruits suffering pre-existing injury/illness then the medical wastage 
rate would be an acceptable 2%. It would not be possible to totally 
prevent all recruits with pre-existing problems from enlisting however 
it should be possible to reduce their numbers by raising' the awareness 
of enlisting MO. . -
17. Injuries inflicted on recruits at 1 RTB are exacerbated by
the lack of a regular rest cycle. . We are attempting to reach a high 
level of physical fitness in a very short time without acknowledging the 
(perceived) lower level of entry fitness. . An extension to the course 
would assist in providing a regular rest cycle as well as providing more 
flexibility in the training programme and assist in reducing stress on 
instructor staff. The introduction of a pre-enlistment physical fitness 
test should also reduce wastage. , .  *
18. The report has shown the value of recording statistics on recruit 
wastage. 1RTB in attempting to broaden its data base to include statistics 
on training causes of wastage. The collection effort would be vastly 
improved by the provision of an appropriate computer system. This report 
only covers medical wastage in 1 RTB. It may be appropriate for HQ 
Trg Comd to investigate the incidence of medical wastage in IET Schools.
19. Measures to reduce recruit wastage rates cannot tie introduced
in isolation at 1RTB but must be considered by all agencies involved 
in the initial entry process. . * •
i.F. AHEARN
Colonel
Commandant
\
Enclosures:
1 1 RTB Recruit Medical Discharge Interim Report : 
1984-88.
Department of Defence
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1« Having visited 1 RTB and read the attached papers,I am in no doubt as to the significant problem faced on this subject and the need to solve it. There is no single solution, so a number of lines need to be pursued. Some catalyst is needed to produce results.
2. In order to forge a way ahead, I would like answersto these questions:
a. What is recruit wastage in training costing us in dollar or other terms?
b. What is a reasonable level of recruit wastage to aim for? (Intuitively, I suggest 10% of which half would be for medical reasons).
c. How might that objective be achieved?
(1) By providing additional training time?
- in basic or IET or both?- for all, or just women?
(2) By reducing terminal objectives?
- for all, or just women?- where would the objectives be met?
(3) By improved screening at the Recruiting point?
- by more thorough medical exams?
- by fitness tests?
(4) By revised physical fitness training and/or 
tests?
- for all, or just women?
- by less emphasis on running?
- by improved footwear?- by allowing orthotics?
(5) How else?
- 1
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3* In order to find the right answers and set some
changes in motion/ I see some merit in a conference of the players involved, viz:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Manning 
Recruiting 
Training advisers 
Medical adviser 
Equipment adviser
- DPP
- DAR
- DAT &/or HQ Trg Comd
- DMS-A
- Mat Br
Please convene a conference of the players in the near 
future. Para 2 above might be useful as an agenda.
4. I would appreciate your assistance later in
responding to GOC Trg Comd letter of 17 Aug 89 (attached).
He raises the need for a steady - state throughput at 1 RTB 
and Experience tells me that such will never be achieved: 
in any event, it relates to staffing problems at 1 RTB which 
should not bear on the recruit wastage problem.
5. The proposal for creation of a Centre for Clinical
Army Research, while relevant to the subject, need not be 
pursued. I will take it up separately with DGAHS. However, 
the need to keep adequate statistics on the subject is 
essential and needs consideration as to what and by whom.
6. I would like to effect necessary changes by the end
of this year and before the numbers in training rise in the 
new year.
P.R. PHILLIPS
MAJGEN
ACPERS-A
Aug 89
A8 V7938
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RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A MEETING ON 
ARA RECRUIT WASTAGE IN TRAINING
1. A meeting was held in the 1-2-18 Conference Room, Army
Office at 1030 hrs Wed 20 Sep 89 to discuss the problem of ARA
recruit wastage in training. The meeting was attended by:
BRIG B.M. Edwards DACPERS-A (Cha irman)
COL G. McCormack COL OPS Trg Comd
COL W.H. Hall DPSYCH-A
LTCOL R. Heyde Cl 1RTB
LTCOL M . DeV r i e s SOI Med Svc DMS-A
LTCOL M. Hall Mat Br rep
LTCOL R.J. Linwood SOI Ind Trg DGAT-A
MAJ B.J. Great or ex S02 Ind Trg/Trg Spt DGAT-A
LTCOL R . A . W i g n e y SOI Concepts and Research DPP-A
LTCOL R.E. Newton SOI Strength Management DPP-A
MAJ N.J. Reynolds S02 Research DPP-A
CAPT A. Wi 1 cock DAR rep
MAJ G .C . Hu g h e s S02 Concepts DPP-A
F o o t w e a r
2. The subject of footwear was discussed first, to allow
the Mat Br representative to leave early should he so desire. 
Criticism was made of the current GP Boot and the issue KT26 
runner. Although the boot is not designed for running, it is 
unsuitable for all training involving shock to the feet such as 
.jumping, forced marching and drill. Additionally there are 
problems with the standardization of the lasts for the boots and 
the rigidity of the back of the boot. It is felt that these 
problems contribute significantly to the medical wastage rates 
from 1RTB. Mat Br was asked, in consultation with 1RTB and 
DMS-A, to look at a solution to the problem. Although a product 
improvement is being looked at now, a new GP boot will be four to 
five years away.
3. Although the current running shoe is considered an
improvement on the previous Dunlop Volley, the KT26 is inadequate 
particularly for running. The requirement for running in the 
PTT/BFT, and the community trend towards distance running, has 
created a major problem. A running shoe which provides 
cushioning, support for ankles, f1 exibi1ity an suita e genera 
purpose characteristics is required. The ASI^S
runner is recommended by 1RTB and is supported ŷ  . . ,
should be informed that an improved running shoe is given high 
priority by ACPERS-A and Trg Comd. There is no need to design
suitable runners available
an
Army runner 
évaluât ion.
as there are for
4. The policy on o r t h o t i c s  was discussed,
representative stated that a-distinction
The DMS-A
n e e d s  to be m a d e  b e t w e e n
orthotics, which require
t h a ” ° the ^ m y ^ h i u l d  not a c c e p t  any a p p l i c a n t  w h o  needs to w e a r  
O T t h o t i c s .  The use of inner soles and s i m i l a r  d e v i c e s ,  h o w e v e r
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The Cos t s  A t t r i b u t a b l e  to Recrui t  Wastage
Al t ho ug h  v ar i ous  amounts have been p r e v i o u s l y  quot ed s 
c o s t s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to r e c r u i t  was t age ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f or  a 
common f i g u r e  to be used by Army. DPP-A, in c o n s u l t a t i o n  wi t h  
 ̂GMS —A and BAR, i s  t o e  omp i 1 e s ome i n d i c a t i v e  c o s t s  f or  
R e c r u i t  f a i l u r e s  at  var i ous  s t ages  of  t r a i n i n g  and under var i ous  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  c . g .  r e qu i r i ng  medi cal  t reatment  and compensat i on.
A Re a s o n a b l e  Le ve l  of  Re c r ui t  Wastage
With the current  wastage  rat e  of  20% i t  i s  e x t r e me l y  
d i f f i c u l t  to man the Army. Al though an a c c e p t a b l e  was t age  rate  
cannot  be e a s i l y  de t ermi ned,  i t  was f e l t  that  i t  needs to be 
bel ow 12%, w i t h  somewhere between 5 and 10% bei ng the i d e a l .
Measures  to Reduce Re c r u i t  Wastage
7.  Me di c a l  was t age  at 1RTB has i nc r e as e d  over the l a s t  ten 
years  due to a combi nat i on of  f a c t o r s .  These i nc l ude  a lower  
s t andard of  p h y s i c a l  f i t n e s s  of  a p p l i c a n t s ,  an i n c r e a s e  in the 
c our s e  i n t e n s i t y  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in r e l a t i o n  to runni ng,  and the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a common, s y l l a bus  for f e mal e s .  A more s e n s i b i . 
approach towards  the development  of  p h y s i c a l  f i t n e s s  in the Army 
coul d reduce  the pr e s e nt  high medi cal  was t age .  Phy s i c a l  f i t n e s s  
t r a i n i n g  s houl d  be a cont inuum which commences at 1RTB and goes  
through to u n i t s .  The current  high l e v e l s  of  ph y s i c a l  t r a i n i n g  
at 1RTB are not d i r e c t e d  by p o l i c y .  Trg Comd, in c o n s u l t a t i o n  
wi t h  Me di ca l  and PTI s t a f f ,  needs to deve l op  a ph y s i c a l  t r a i n i ng  
pl an on the l i n e s  of  the shoot i ng  p o l i c y .  A lower s t andard i s  
r e qui r e d  at 1RTB, but the phys i c a l  t r a i n i n g  devel opment  n e e d s , to 
c o nt i nue  through IET i nt o  u n i t s .  Thi s  may produce a requirement  
for more q u a l i f i e d  s ub- uni t  P TI s . : Other areas  of  t r a i n i n g  should 
a l s o  be s i m i l a r l y  examined.  Perhaps ot he r  s ubj e c t  coul d be 
pushed i n t o  IET or u n i t s .
8.  The Army cannot  a f f or d  to i n c r e a s e  the l engt h of  time 
for t r a i n i n g  at 1RTB, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h  the current  undermanning 
s i t u a t i o n .  Every week added to t r a i n i n g  adds 100 pl us  s o l d i e r s  
to the T r a i n i n g  Force  and due to the c o n s t r a i n t s  of  the 
Au t h o r i s e d  Average  S t r e ng t h ,  reduces  the Trai ned Force by the - 
same amount .  Eq u a l l y  IET shoul d not be ext ended.
9.  Thi s  t rend of  i ncreas ed p h y s i c a l  s t andards  has l ed to 
f a l s e  t r a i n i n g  o b j e c t i v e s ,  such as p a s s i n g  BFT, be i ng i nc l uded in 
many c o u r s e s .  BFT shoul d be conducted by u n i t s .  A l l  t r a i n i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  shoul d conduct  p hy s i c a l  t r a i n i n g  but not  BFT.
10 . Tr a i n i n g  of  Women. I t  seems i n c o n s i s t e n t  to be 
demanding t hat  women complete a l l  the t ermi na l ’ o b j e c t i v e s  w h i c h  
r e l a t e  to combat and combat r e l a t e d  d u t i e s  ot he r  than t hos e  w h i c h  
are f or  s e l f  p r o t e c t i o n .  The t ermi nal  o b j e c t i v e s  for women at 
r e c r u i t  and IET shoul d be examined.  Once t h i s  exami nat i on  has 
been c o mpl e t e d ,  measures  i nt roduced shoul d f l ow on to o f f i c e r  
t r a i n i n g .
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#  ̂ S c r e e ni ng at R e c r u i t i n g  C e n t r e s . Improved s c r e e n i n g  at
r e c r u i t i n g  c e n t r e s  coul d reduce the subsequent  hi gh medi ca l  
wa s t a g e  in t r a i n i n g ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  amongst t hos e  wi t h  p r e - e x i s t i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s .  Do c t o r s  need to be made aware of  the s t r e s s e s  p l ace d  
on r e c r u i t s  by e i t h e r  v i s i t i n g  1RTB or v i e wi ng  the v i de o  
Remember Kapooka*.  A p r e - e n l i s t m e n t  p h y s i c a l  t e s t  i s  not  
s u i t  a b l e a s : -
a * coul d  l ead to the r e j e c t i o n  of  many c a n d i da t e s  who
c o u l d ,  wi t h  t r a i n i n g ,  have been s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l d i e r s :  
and
k* i t  coul d  l ead to compensat i on probl ems .
Steady S t a t e  Manning Throughput
12.  61 p l a t o o n s  per year i s  the requi rement  for  s t e ady  
s t a t e  at 1RTB, but t h i s  assumes no change to AAS and a c ons t ant  
was t age  r a t e .  In r e a l i t y  t h i s  i s  not p o s s i b l e .  It  may be 
p o s s i b l e  to a d j us t  the t ime of  maximum i n t a ke s  to 1RTB to match 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  school  l e a v e r s  in January.  DPP-A, in 
c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  Trg Comd and DAR, is  to examine the f l ow to 
1RTB. The r e c r u i t  demographi cs  need to be exami ned,  as w e l l  as 
the a d v e r t i s i n g  programme and the a b i l i t y  of  Trg Comd to handl e  
the i npu t .
Di s c ha r g e  at Own Request
13.  D i s c h a r g e  at own r e ques t  at week 10 was o r i g i o n a l l y  
proposed to cut  back IA* s and at t empt ed s u i c i d e s  by p r o v i d i ng  
hope to r e c r u i t s  in t r a i n i n g .  The p o l i c y  i s  not  caus i ng  
i n o r d i n a t e  probl ems ,  so i t  shoul d be r e t a i n e d .  It  i s re ques t e d  
that  r e c r u i t e r s  c o nt i nue  the p r a c t i c e  of  not  a d v i s i n g  p o t e n t i a l  
c a n d i da t e s  of  the d i s c h a r g e  at 10 weeks o p t i o n .
Cone 1u s ion
14.  Trg Comd needs to de t ermi ne  the p h y s i c a l  t r a i n i n g
s t andards  r e qu i r e d  at 1RTB and the impact t h i s  wi l l  have on Corps 
s c ho o l s  and p h y s i c a l  t r a i n i n g  in the F i e l d  Army.  It  i s  i m p l i c i t  
in our p h y s i c a l  t r a i n i n g  p o l i c i e s  that  u n i t s  c o nt i nue  PT. ^
Perhaps ACOPS-A needs  to go to the F i e l d  Army and remind them of  
t he i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
G .C . H tiGHES
MAJ
S02 C o n c e p t s DPP-a
£ .7  Sep 89
Enclosure 1-7
introduction *
. Recruit wastage has increased by 12% since 1980 to a
high of 22% in 1987. Army's requirement to improve retention, and the recent suicide at 1RTB has prompted a review of RTB 
procedures. As a result a number of initiatives have been introduced to reduce this attrition rate.
Retention Initiatives
. From 6 Jun 90 the 12 week recruit course was increasedin length to 13 weeks. This allows for;
. a reduction in the intensity of training,. a softer approach with recruits during their
initial transition to military life,. a reduction of stress levels amongst 1RTB staff 
and,. a lowering of back-squadding (and subsequent distress) among recruits.
. Commencement of a four day pre-week one induction courseto introduce recruits to the requirements of military 
training.
. The physical training regime has been changed so thatrecruits are no longer required to pass a Basic Fitness Test (BFT) and Combat Fitness Tests (CFT) before march out. They must now pass a recruit fitness test which is 
of lesser standard than the BFT or CFT.
. Flexibility in training matters has been increased. Forexample certain requirements to pass terminal objectives 
at specified stages may now be waived in some instances 
provided the objective is passed prior to march out.
. This flexibility is apparent in the progression 
through physical training where the step to more difficult activities is more gradual.
. Review of 1RTB staffing requirements to overcomeproblems such as the accumulation of leave credits and increased domestic dislocation due to excessive work - 
pressure. The staffing review is designed to increase 
retention through improved quality of training.
Prepared by: MAJ D. Craig, S02 Other Rank Strength Management,
DPP-a , Ext 56171
Cleared by: MAJGEN P.r . Phillips, ACPERS-A Sep 90
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c etjàTE ESTTMATE COMMITTEE
P B t e f  O N  1 w t b  s u i c i d e  r a t e
I n t r o d u c e r s
• 1 RTB is responsible for training new Recruits foremployment in the Regular Army. Given the disciplined 
and demanding nature of training, stress on some^ recruits is inevitable and the possibility of suicide or 
suicide gesture is always present. 1 RTB staff receive training in counselling, interviewing and stress management skills, and take great care to reduce the 
risk of suicide.
Suicide at 1 RTB
• The number of deaths resulting from suicide at 1 RTB
since 1985 is one, having occurred on the 6 April 1990.
Suicide Gesture Rate
. Determining the rate of Suicide Gestures at 1 RTB ismore difficult due to the requirement to determine the nature of a suicide gesture. Recruits have used ^he verbal threat of suicide as their primary means of 
securing discharge. Army psychologists have the responsibility to assess the nature of these threats and 
recommend the appropriate course of action.
. 1 RTB Psychologists and medical staff report that theincidence of Suicide Gestures is less prevalent today 
than in 1985. The average number of suicide gestures (those notified through the Army's Notification of Casualty system) has declined from 4.6 per year for the period 1985-1987, to 2.6 per year for the period 1988­
1990.
Policy A s p ects.
. In response to the 1990 suicide, Army conducted areview of training at 1 RTB in an effort to reduce the stress reaction of recruits undergoing training.
. As a result of this review, the training course was '* lengthened from 12 to 13 weeks. This was done to all̂ v*Recruits more time for transition into military life and to better assimilate military training. Since implementation of this new policy there have been no suicides, and the incidence of suicide gestures has 
reduced.
Prenared by: MAJ D. Craig, S02 Other Rank Strength Management,F DPP-A, Ext 56171
C l e a r e d  by: MAJGEN A.J. Fittock, ACPERS-A Mar 91
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INFORMATION BRIEF FOR ACPERS-A 
ON MEDICAL SCREENING AT POINT OF ENLISTMENT
Background
• Project DUNLOP has highlighted the need to decrease 1 RTB wastage. Injury screening at 
the place of enlistment, is one significant area the Project team believes that overall 
wastage will decrease. The preliminary Project DUNLOP data collection report covering 
the period Aug 95 - Apr 96 indicates the following:
• 14.38 % overall wastage; 12.32 % male and 28.00 % female.
• 3.98 % of the overall wastage were discharged as medically unfit due to 
a prior injury; 3.15 % male and 9.43 % female.
• 0.71 % of the overall wastage were below medical standards.
• Two major medical strategies have been identified by the Project DUNLOP Steering 
Group to reduce l RTB wastage. These are enhanced injury screening and physical 
testing at ADFRUs.
Enhanced Injury Screening
• The Female Training Injury Workshop held on 24-25 Jul 96 highlighted the need to 
improve injury screening prior to enlistment. Of particular concern is 72% of 1 RTB 
injuries are lower limb injuries. Ms Donna Harvey, EO Australian Sports Injury 
Prevention Taskforce, AIS, a participant of the workshop, has produced a draft document 
to increase focus on injury screening at .ADFRUs medical examinations. A SGADF staff 
member, MAJ Rudzki, assisted in the compilation.
• DGAHS is considering the increased screening option. If DGAHS accepts the perceived 
benefits of the proposal, the intention is to have stakeholders consider the best method of 
implementation. This will include staff from SGADF, HQ Trg Comd, DGR, 1 RTB, and 
Ms Harvey. The screening may be applicable for all Army entrants, and if proven to be 
cost effective could be used on a tri-service basis.
• The intended outcome of the screening protocol is to identify potential recruits who have 
an existing injury that is not fully rehabilitated, and those that have a high risk of 
sustaining an injury and are unlikely to complete the course.
• Given the high incidence of lower limb injuries resulting in either 'backsquadding", 
discharge, compensation payments and the loss of Army goodwill, it is believed that 
additional up front medical screening will be cost effective. •
• DGR is happy to support the initiative, including providing the manpower to produce any 
documentation and to coordinate meetings. DGR will not accept any additional medical 
costs for the initiative. Funding would need to be diverted from the Army Program.
Given the potential savings from wastage and compensation payments, transfer of funding 
is considered appropriate.
Pre-Enlistment Fitness Screening
• 1 RTB has conducted physical fitness testing on Day 3 at Kapooka since Feb 96. The test 
includes a 20m shuttle run, pushups and situps. Recruits who pass the test proceed with 
training. Those that fail are placed in a remedial training program. HQ Trg Comd
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statistics indicate that the test is a predictor of injury and that further investigation is 
required to validate the relationships between fitness levels on entry, injury and discharge 
rates at 1 RTB. HQ Trg Comd and 1 RTB believe that this testing should be conducted 
prior to enlistment. DGAHS, the Physical Fitness Training Adviser, is still to be 
convinced of the requirement.
• The space required to conduct the test is approximately the size of a basketball court.
Two minor ADFRUs have suitable facilities, the other 16 ADFRUs/Careers Reference 
Centres do not. 40 minutes is needed to conduct the test.
• Potentially the pre-enlistment fitness testing will identify those applicants more likely to 
sustain injury at 1 RTB and could prove cost effective. DGR supports any initiative that 
will reduce wastage, however does not have the resources to conduct an Army specific 
fitness test. This includes facilities, transport, showers, and time. Conducting the fitness 
test on test day would not be feasible.
• An alternative is to conduct the test within the six week period from time the applicant is 
warned in for enlistment and attestation day. The test would need to be a held at a suitable 
military gymnasium or a civilian contract would need to be established. These details are 
to be investigated.
Predictor of Injury
• Both initiatives are aimed at reducing wastage, and overall costs to Army. HQ Trg Comd 
and the A1S believe that empirical evidence justifies the conduct of fitness tests. The 
question is where the test is conducted. DGAHS is yet to be convinced that the testing 
should occur and has asked HQ Trg Comd to provide documentary evidence.
• The AIS support enhanced medical screening as a predictor of injury.
Recommendation ~
• It is recommended that you note that investigations into enhanced medical screening and 
pre-enlistment fitness testing are occurring. •
• It is recommended that you note that DGR is not prepared to fund a single Service 
initiative involving additional medical expenditure or hiring of local gymnasiums to 
conduct fitness tests.
23 Sep 96
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PROJECT DUNLOP - HAND-OFF STRATEGIES
References:
A. PDSG VII of 24 Oct 96
B. HQ Trg Comd 696-1-14 34003/96 dated 6 Nov 96
l. Project DUNLOP will cease on 1 Dec 96. Actions which are ongoing, and the 
responsibility for effecting agreed strategies is detailed at Annex A. A Lessons Learnt' paper 
based on the project's stakeholder's comments, invited at Reference B, will be issued by 29 
Nov 96 .
2. SiPCS Implementation. The SIPCS Report will be distributed by 20 Nov 96. The 
recommendations flowing from the Report are to be addressed through the following 
strategies:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Strategy 1 - Adult Learning. COMDT 1 RTB to conduct an externally facilitated 
analysis to determine improvements to training delivery using the Recruit Instructor 
Selection Course (RISC) as the principal change tool. This refers to 
recommendations 1-8, 13 - 17, 20-21 and 23. Responsibility - COMDT 1 RTB - 
included in personal directive.
Strategy 2 - Cultural Change. COMDT 1 RTB to implement cultural change 
through the conduct of an internal review of current practices with a particular focus 
on Recommendations 9-12. Responsibility - COMDT 1 RTB - included in 
personal directive.
Strategy 3 - Personnel Issues. Recommendations 25 - 28 (smoking, alcohol, fitness 
testing, gender difference in training) have Army and Defence implications; they are 
also the subject of extant Army policies. These recommendations should be referred 
to ACPERS-A. Additionally, the application of these policies at 1 RTB needs review 
by the COMDT 1 RTB in line with Strategies 1 and 2. Responsibility - COL 
ADMIN ■ to refer Personnel Issues to Pers Div.
Strategy 4 - Prototyping. Recommendation 22, which proposed that all initiatives be 
first trialed and modified in a small organisation (pi or coy) was not universally 
accepted. w!here¡this approach offers advantages, it should be considered. 
Responsibility - COMDT 1 RTB.
LANS\CPM\PROJECTS\DUNLOP\PROJ_DUN.LOP\696-1 - 14\H-0_STRT SAM
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DATED NOV 96
S tra teg y
A rea
C u r re n t  S itu a tio n D esired O utcom e S tra tegy L ead  A ction by
l form at ion 
nd Data 
lanagement
Data collection is fragmented and 
consequently data is not trusted by the 
various stakeholders.
A data collection system that:
1. Allows accurate monitoring of 
wastage
2. Is able to identify factors 
affecting wastage.
3. Is trusted by all stakeholders
Continue development of Trg Comd Throughput 
Planning D ata Base with the development of the 
R ecruit W astage M odule.
Transfer an operational capability for monitoring 
wastage to 1 RTB by 30 Jun 97
Ops Br HQ Trg 
Comd with 1 RTB
lulture The S1PCS is complete. Broad strategies 
to implement the SIPCS 
recommendations are to be agreed on 24 
Oct 96.
Minimisation of the impact of cultural 
factors on wastage rates, without 
compromising standards.
1. A dult L earn ing . Comdt 1 RTB to conduct 
an externally facilitated analysis to determine 
improvements to training delivery using the 
Recruit Instructor Selection Course (RISC) as 
the principal change tool.
1. COMDT 1 
RTB with COL 
ETD
2. C u ltu ra l C hange. Comdt 1 RTB to 
implement cultural change through the conduct 
of an internal review of current practices with a 
particular focus on Recommendations 9-12.
2. COMDT 1 
RTB
3. Personnel Issues. Recommendations 25 - 
28 (smoking, alcohol, fitness testing, gender 
difference in training) have Army and Defence 
implications; they are also the subject of extant 
Army policies. These recommendations should 
be referred to ACPERS-A. Additionally, the 
application of these policies at 1 RTB needs 
review by the COMDT 1 RTB in line with 
Strategies 1 and 2.
3. DPP-A& 
COMDT 1 RTB
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If  S tr a te g y  
1 Area
C urrent Situation D esired O utcom e S tra tegy L ead  A ction by
Fitness /
injury
screening
No injury screening currently takes place 
possibly compounding non-disclosure. 
AIS has supplied suitable injury screen. 
Physical screening currently takes place 
at 1 RTB
Minimise the effect of injury on the 
wastage rate from: 
pre-existing injury and / or 
non-disclosure; 
injury at 1 RTB;
Fulfil Army's duty of care obligations 
by minimising risk of injury to 
individuals.
1. In ju ry  screening: DAR to request SGADF 
approval to enhance medical examination with 
an injury screening programme delivered by 
physiotherapists.
2. Fitness screening:
HQ Trg Comd to inform SGADF of the high 
correlation between low initial fitness screening 
result and risk of injury at 1 RTB (based on 
Pope's paper).
Gain Defence concurrence to prohibit recruits 
commencing training until they have met the 
entrance level of physical fitness.
1. DAR with 
DPPlans-A and 
DGAHS
2. COL PLANS
Muster /
batch
recruiting
Limited batching occurs Reduction of the effect of dis­
satisfaction of corps allocation on 
wastage
Pers Div to develop a change strategy paper  
acknowledging the value of muster / batch 
recruiting. The improved recruit / IET planning 
throughput process appears suitable to enable 
mustering to be effected with minimal change to 
extant procedures. Future policy changes will 
include adopting Phase 2 Psych assessment at 
enlistment.
DPPLANS-A with 
DPsych
Physical
Training
Continuum
No PT continuum - active investigation 
under way.
DGAHS preparing policy paper on PT 
Continuum.
1 RTB trialing remedial PT programme. 
DPPLANS-A considering options for PT 
streaming.
Ops Br HQ Trg Comd is investigating 
determination of suitable job-related 
physical fitness standards 
DGAHS has agreed retrospective study 
of medically discharged females from 
95/96.
Develop a physical training 
continuum for recruit and initial 
employment training that takes into 
account job requirement, gender and 
initial fitness level while minimising 
training injury.
Pers Div to establish Army policy on job-related 
physical fitness standards. If appropriate, 
recently developed UK Army job-related 
physical fitness standards could be validated. 
Training outcomes would then need to be 
developed by TAs to achieve those standards.
DPPLANS-A
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Training injuries force rethink on wom ens place in the military
t y e ^ g h ^ ^ ^ a m o u f la g e - c r e a m - s m e a r e d fe m a le  D u n tro o n  o f f ic e r  c a d e t K e rry  A ffo lte r  s o a k s  up  th e  p u n is h m e n t o n  f ie ld  e x e rc is e  in  s o u th e rn  N S W  —  P ic tu re : R A Y  S T R A N G E
B y  D E B O R A H  H O P E
FEMALE officer cadets like 
Ms Kerry Affolter have trained 
alongside their male peers at the 
Royal Military College, Dun­
troon, for the best part of a 
decade, studying, drilling, shar­
ing barracks, playing war 
games, slogging through RMC’s 
arduous physical training.
But now a heavy toll on 
female officer cadets and 
recruits in impact injuries suf­
fered during their training has 
forced the Federal Govern­
ment and the Australian 
Defence Force establishment 
to reassess whether women are 
capable of undergoing the 
same kind of physical regime as 
men.
A phalanx of high-level com­
mittees, reviews and task for­
ces has been established to 
investigate the issue of females 
suffering a higher rate of injur­
ies than their male counter­
parts during training.
Most recently the vice-chief 
of the Defence Force, Vice­
Admiral Robert Walls, has 
instigated a review which will 
inquire into the army’s require­
ment that women be trained to 
combat fitness standard. This 
follows ADF alarm over a high 
rate of women leaving the 
army through its compen­
sation scheme.
In other moves, the Minister 
for Defence Science and Per­
sonnel, Mr Punch, initiated 
Project Dunlop to investigate a 
20 per cent wastage rate among 
army recruits training at. 
Kapooka base in southern 
NSW. The project has dis­
covered female recruits suffer 
injuries at twice the rate of 
their male colleagues.
An ADF medical ethics com­
mittee is carrying out a retro­
spective analysis of medical
records from Kapooka and 
Duntroon in an attempt to 
establish injury patterns 
among trainees. And a series of 
reviews and panels has been 
set up to investigate the role of 
women in defence organis­
ations and find solutions to the 
services’ “glass ceiling” .
The background to the inves­
tigations is a culture of army 
machismo in which women 
have had to prove their tough­
ness to be accepted as profes­
sional equals of men.
Despite the heavy physical 
toll, most of the women cadets 
support Duntroon’s rigorous 
training, believing that every 
officer needs to understand 
infantry training.
There is a strong support 
network among the women 
which helps them to endure 
the physical and mental 
demands. Asked if she ever 
thinks of leaving, Ms Affolter 
replies, laughing: “Every day.”
New research by Dr Hugh 
Smith, of the Australian 
Defence Force Academy, has 
found that one in five first-year 
male officer cadets in Aust­
ralia’s armed services last year 
believed military training was 
less effective because of the 
presence of women on a course. 
Figures for the army are 
higher, with 30 per cent of male 
and female officer cadets say­
ing this is the case.
Mr Punch describes the 
rethinking as an essential 
second-generation issue for 
women in the military. If the 
first generation of issues was 
about access for women to 
ADF positions, the new gener­
ation is about accommodating 
them, he said.
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WARPATH
■ Although barred from combat, female officer cadets at 
Duntroon are expected to keep up with the men in the gruelling 
physical training. But, as Deborah Hope reports, there is 
concern that injuries force a high rate of needless wastage
O for it Amanda! 
Push it! Run it!” 
■  w n  comes a female 
W  chorus from the 
hill, where 120 
Duntroon officer cadets are 
watching their colleague make 
her second attempt at the run, 
dodge and jump section of a 
combat fitness test.
Rigged out in sweatshirt, army pants 
and boots and 9kg of webbing and 
weaponary, staff cadet Amanda Wil­
liamson this morning has already com­
pleted a 6m rope climb and a “fireman’s 
carry”, lugging across her shoulders 
another cadet for 100m. In the run, 
dodge and jump Williamson has 50 
seconds to make it through an obstacle 
course including two 1.3m walls, diffi­
cult step-overs and a leap across a 
ditch. On the home run, she makes an 
impressive bound at the final wall and 
passes the test. Of the 110 male and 10 
female cadets present for the test, only 
one, a male, fails.
Character-building physical chal­
lenges like this are central to the 
tradition and ethos of military training 
at the Royal Military College, Dun­
troon, the Australian Army’s officer 
training establishment.
While young women such as Wil­
liamson cannot join combat corps 
when they graduate as officers, her 
success in Duntroon’s gruelling physi­
cal training and combat fitness pro­
grams is essential to her acceptance as 
a professional equal among her peers.
A decade after Duntroon opened its 
elite doors to female officer cadets 
however, the Federal Government is 
questioning whether female physi­
ology is capable of undergoing the 
same intense physical training as men.
The reason is a costly toll on female 
army recruits and officer trainees in 
lower-limb injuries, especially the pain­
ful impact injury shin splints, fractures 
and hip problems as well as back 
injuries.
The issue is political dynamite for 
defence science and personnel minis­
ter Gary Punch. Punch’s thinking on 
the matter is economical as much as 
humanitarian. “It is time for a mature 
look at the differences between the 
female and the male body,” he says. 
This is not just about footwear. It is 
about whether enough science is being 
applied to the training.”
For Australia’s army the issue cuts 
deep into its tradition of machismo, an 
ethos female recruits and officer 
cadets have had to fit into since being 
admitted into training alongside their 
male peers.
To Colonel Diane Harris, second-in­
charge at RMC and director of military 
arts, the issue of physical training for 
female officer cadets is fundamental to 
their acceptance as the equals of their 
male colleagues. One of the four most 
senior women in our army, Harris’s 
female-only officer training in the 
Women’s Army Corps 20 years ago 
involved no weapons handling, mini­
mal physical training and etiquette 
advice, such as the appropriate
occasions for a female officer to wear 
gloves. She says, “I feel it is very 
important female cadets do the same 
training as males. In the past they have 
been regarded as sub-professional. 
Now they get equal treatment.”
The question being raised by 
observers, however, is whether this 
kind of rugged physical training is 
really necessary for, a modern defence 
force, or just part of an outmoded, 
masculine and irrational tradition.
According to Dr Greg Pemberton, a 
Duntroon graduate and military histo­
rian, the physical training insisted on 
by Royal Military College “actually 
entrenches men’s attitudes, because 
women will always look inferior physi­
cally”. ■
Pemberton continues, “We should 
say, are we going to retain a larger pool 
of women in the forces if we look at 
training more carefully. Machismo has 
always been more important than 
science in the army but we have to 
question the value of that tradition. 
You have to ask first of all whether this 
kind of training is necessary for any 
part of the armed forces. A lot of it is 
just army machismo. I mean, does 
every bank teller have to be Arnold 
Schwarzenegger in case there is a 
bank robbery? If women are being 
injured the army needs to analyse 
what exercises are necessary for good 
command skills.”
Project Dunlop, a taskforce estab­
lished to investigate a 20 per cent 
wastage rate among new recruits at 
the army’s Kapooka training camp 
near Wagga Wagga in southern NSW, 
this year found female recruits suffer 
injuries, especially of the lower-limb 
variety, at twice the rate of their male 
colleagues.
As a result, Kapooka has introduced 
modified training programs for female 
recruits, reducing the weight they 
carry on endurance marches, cutting 
the distance they must march and run, 
allowing them to train in running 
shoes instead of regulation-issue army 
boots and introducing more warm-up 
regimes to reduce the likelihood of 
stress fractures.
At Duntroon, only minor con­
cessions have been made for female 
cadets. A culture of peer pressure to 
succeed rules — officer cadets often 
conceal injuries for fear of damage to 
their career prospects or, worse, medi­
cal discharge or being put out to 
pasture on medical management.
Of the 43 women included in Dun­
troon’s current 240-strong officer course 
intake, eight have dropped out1— but 
only two for medical reasons. The figures 
do not reflect the picture drawn by 10 of 
Duntroon’s female cadets interviewed 
for this article. All 10 had suffered 
injuries ranging from broken ankles and 
dislocated shoulders to bone fractures, 
back problems and shin splints.
/  Machismo has 
9 always been 
more important 
than science in 
the army }
Late in May, I visited the Monga 
State Forest near Braidwood to meet 
and observe female cadets participat­
ing in a 10-day field exercise. At the 
wheel for the hour-long drive from 
Canberra was Private Kim Nicolls. 
Laughingly describing her 13-week 
recruit training at Kapooka as “hell”, 
Nicolls recalled breaking her jaw when 
she fainted on the parade ground.
Waiting to meet us at the entry to the 
military zone were staff cadets Chris­
tina Van der Hulst and Rebecca Fleu- 
ren, both withdrawn from the field 
because of shin pain. After a short, 
steep drive into the bush we met a 
platoon preparing for an ambush exer­
cise. Disguised beneath camouflage 
gear and camouflage make-up, carry­
ing weapons, webbing, humping packs 
and with hair well out of sight, it was 
almost impossible to distinguish cadets 
Nerrolie McDonald, Kerry Affolter, 
Donna Benson and Leanne Carroll 
from their 26 male colleagues. Each had 
been injured at some point during their 
military training with shin or back 
problems. McDonald had undergone 
surgery for a compartmental bone 
fracture — a result, she said, of training 
in army boots.
A week later, back at barracks, Car­
roll has a bandaged foot,, broken, she 
explains, in a fall during the rope 
climbing section of her combat fitness 
test the previous day. Not realising how 
badly she had damaged her foot, Car­
roll had pushed on with the test — 
sucessfully carrying out the fireman’s 
carry and the run, dodge and jump — 
before succumbing to the pain and 
seeking medical aid.
“You have to put it in perspective,” 
said another cadet, Sally Reid, refer­
ring to Carroll’s stoicism. “If someone’s 
guts are coming out and you have a 
broken foot, it’s nothing. It’s what’s 
expected.”
All cadets, male and female, experi­
enced sore shins at some time during 
their training, says cadet Susannah 
Reed, but most grin and bear it. Reed 
also broke her wrist when she fell off 
the obstacle course. Jodi Johnstone lost 
six weeks out of training after dislocat­
ing a shoulder when she fell out of a 
tree as she attempted to secure a flying 
fox, while a knee injury temporarily 
knocked cadet Sue Manning out of the 
physical program. “A podiatrist would 
probably have a heart attack if they 
saw our footwear,” she laughed.
Amenorrhoea is another side effect 
of their military training. According to 
Reed, about half the female class of 95 
had experienced interruption to their 
menstrual cycle as a result of the 
physical and emotional stress of the 
course.
Despite the toll, the cadets support 
Duntroon’s rigorous physical training. 
“We think we should do it,” they said. 
“Every officer needs to understand 
infantry training.” The strong female
D o in g  it  to u g h : female officer 
cadets are put through their paces 
at Duntroon — Pictures:
RAYSTRANGE
support network helped them survive 
the physical and mental demands. Did 
they ever think about, leaving? “Every 
day!” laughs Affolter.
“This is not a university,” says Cap­
tain Hannah Myssonski, a 1988 gradu­
ate, back at the college as officer 
commanding Long Tan Company. 
“The majority of training is physical, so 
you are going to get injuries.” All 
training at Duntroon is relevant, says 
Myssonski, because it is “character 
building”.
Combat fitness training is essential 
for female cadets as well as for males, 
reasons Duntroon Commandant 
Brigadier Simon Willis, because of the 
ambiguity of the front line in modern 
warfare. “The Gulf War showed the 
definition of the front line can be very 
blurred," says Willis. “There is always 
the possibility a rear-end officer will be 
required to take command.”
Punch accepts army thinking that 
women need a minimum degree of 
fitness to be able to defend themselves, 
but says, “The question is, can we do it 
differently and get the same results?"
Injuries in military recruits are a 
concern to military forces worldwide, 
says Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Pat­
terson, commanding officer in charge 
of the medical centre at Duntroon. 
“The most common trend is a prepon­
derance of lower-limb injuries, with 
females having higher injury rates 
than males. Lower-limb injuries are a 
topic of great concern at RMC. We see 
a lot of shin splints and knee Injuries 
here, not many bone fractures. Lots 
turn out to be ligament strains. In the 
past there has been a tendency for 
people to strap up their ankles and put 
up with it.
“I would not be surprised if in five 
years we do things a lot differently. 
Maybe we need to look more closely at 
anatomical lower-limb standards. A lot 
of cadets come at 17 or 18 when they are 
not skeletally mature."
Says Harris, “In barracks we are 
forever trying to rework our program to 
assume a start at zero-level fitness and 
to work up gradually throughout the 
course, working on whole body 
strength.”
The cadets wear running shoes for 
long-distance runs, reserving army 
boots for endurance marches, field 
exercises, drill, combat training and 
most other daily wear. To help prevent 
impact injuries in field exercises more 
attention is being paid to ensure lighter 
cadets carry lighter loads.
For Punch, the issue is clear cut. 
"Training won’t change overnight but 
it does have to change," he says. “Any 
change to training has to ensure it does 
not produce another gulf stream of 
discrimination at a time when equal 
employment opportunity in the ADF is 
doing quite well. We don’t want to set 
that back with an unthought-out 
position.”
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; 3 - iMlaSli C lo c k w is e  fr o m  m a in  p h o to  ..: g e tt in g  up  th e re  is  a lm o s t  a s  m u c h  t r o u b le  a s  g e tt in g  
a c ro s s .
P h a s e  2 o f  th e  a d v e n tu ro u s -  
t r a in in g  p a c k a g e  re q u ire s  
p u tt in g  th e  n e w  ro p in g  s k i l ls  
t o  th e  te s t  o n  a re a l fe a tu re .
N e g o t ia t in g  o b s ta c le s  12m  
a b o v e  th e  g ro u n d  p u ts  a n e w  
s la n t  o n  a n  o ld  p ro b le m .
M a x im u m  c o n c e n tra t io n  ... 
s a fe ty  h a rn e s s e s  d o n ’t  re d u c e  
th e  n e c e s s ity  to  o v e rc o m e  
n a tu ra l fe a rs  in  a n  u n n a tu ra l 
e n v iro n m e n t.
P re p a ra t io n s  ta k e  p la c e  a t T h e  
R o c k , a lo c a l fe a tu re  n e a r 
1 R T B . R o c k  c l im b in g  and 
a b s e il in g  w a s  c o n d u c te d  on  
th e  fe a tu re .
B e la y e rs  e n s u re  th a t  n o  rea l 
d a n g e r is  p re s e n t w h ile  
n e g o t ia t in g  th e  h ig h -w ire  
o b s ta c le  c o u rs e .
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KAPOOKA’S latest addition to 
recruit training began its official histo­
ry at 1RTB recently as the first recruit 
platoon negotiated the high-wire 
obstacle course.
remove any^eal Manger from the course 
but overcoming natural fears still-presents 
a challenge. ."
The course includes1 a number- of mid­
air obstacles suchjas cargo nets; trapezes 
and an abseiling wall.
Even for experienced abseilers and 
climbers the course is physically -taxing 
and requires maximum effort and concen­
tration.
Rec Murray said the high-wire* bourse 
was a good test for the physical training 
conducted at 1RTB.
“Some obstacles require a lot of upper- 
body strength just to hang on but. for the 
last few weeks we have been getting pretty
fit.- - V .;.-'
“It is realistic when you are' hanging 
there —  you forget sometimes that you are. 
safe and you want to hang on for.dear life.”-
PI Commander 22 PI -Lt Paul 
O’Donnell said the package provided a 
good break from the recruits’ normal train­
ing routine and let them see another angle 
to.military life.
“We put them through the course to 
give them confidence in the equipment and 
their mates who are belaying them and just 
‘ to build selfesteem,” Lt O ’Donnell said.
“So it’s a number of things —  not only 
do they become familiar with basic climb­
ing and abseiling equipment, they learn to 
break that fear of heights as an individual.”
Because 22 PI was only 25 strong, the 
training package was reduced to two days.
On day two, 22 PI moved to The Rock 
(a local feature) where the newly learnt 
skills were practised on natural features.
Rec Mark McPherson said the training 
package was an unexpected addition to ' 
what he thought recruit training would 
entail. ...
“The [adventurous training] has been 
really relaxed and you get to try something 
that not too; many other people get to try,” 
Rec McPherson said.
Story and photos by W 02 
GRAHAM MCBEAN
The aerial obstacle course is part of a 
three-day adventurous-training package 
for C Coy recruits who are trialling a new 
10-week training syllabus.
But if t/iere were any dissenters to this 
new addition to training then it was hard 
trying to find someone to say so.
In fact, Rec Ryan Murray, 22 PI C Coy, 
reckoned it was an excellent idea.
“It is quite scary at first but it gets your 
confidence up — but to begin with I was 
scared totally," Rec Murray said.
“It is quite hard physically and you feel 
like you are going to fall.”
Safety precautions such as belayers
ARMY, May 1996,
New platoon trains failed recruits
to be civilians
By LOUISE SHUTER
THE Army is about team 
work and mateship.
If anyone fails, the mili­
tary machine must still go 
on.
At least that has been a 
long-standing philosophy 
until Kapooka Comman­
dant Col David Buchanan 
had a vision for the new 
Weary Dunlop Platoon to 
start on February 12.
It is a rare sort of pla­
toon in that it doesn’t train 
recruits to be soldiers so 
much as civilians.
It is a kind of half-way 
house preparing the re­
cruits who failed to make 
the grade, whether for 
medical, psychiatric or 
motivational reasons, to 
move back into civilian 
life. -
Col Buchanan com­
pares the platoon with Ka- 
pooka’s midlife upgrade 
where they are not chang­
ing the nature of the facili­
ties so much as bringing 
them up to 1990s stan­
dards.
But unlike the $21 mil­
lion upgrade, the new pla­
toon is being run on a 
shoestring with no direct 
funding.
Col Buchanan saw the 
need for a more caring 
way of dealing with recruit 
discharges, and is hoping 
the bricks and mortar fa­
cilities will follow.
In the meantime they 
arc making do with old 
accommodation quarters, 
tucked away on the far 
side of the base.
He said the Army had 
always had a system of en­
titlements for soldiers who 
were discharged, but it 
needed updating.
Recruits being dis­
charged will spend a week 
or two in the Weary Dun­
lop Platoon where they 
will be offered the services 
of counsellors, doctors, 
chaplains, career advisors 
and army staff who will 
assist them to move back 
into the civilian work 
force.
“The world has changed 
and the Army has changed 
with it,” Col Buchanan 
said.
“The expectations of 
society about the way 
people ought to be treated 
has changed.”
Col Buchanan said 
there was more focus on 
human rights, equal op­
portunity and anti-discri­
mination, and the Army 
was mindful of these 
changes.
“I have a duty of care, 
as far as possible, for the 
people under my care, and 
not just the people who 
arc succeeding.”
Col Buchanan said the 
Army had a great deal of 
compassion for recruits 
having difficulties during 
training, but in the past 
that compassion seemed 
to stop the minute a re­
cruit was discharged.
“In the past, in a sense, 
they were written off,” he 
said.
Every recruit lost costs 
the Army $30,000, and 
they then had to spend an 
additional $30,000 to re­
place them.
Without even consider­
ing the up-front costs of 
recruitment advertising, 
travel, inductions and 
medical checks, each re­
cruit costs $1500 a week to 
train throughout the 12- 
week course.
Col Buchanan is intro­
ducing programs to re­
duce recruit “wastage" by 
introducing physical 
training that has less in­
jury risk and offering a 
more interesting and 
challenging course.
The results arc already 
showing with recruit was­
tage dropping from a high 
16.8 per cent this time last 
year to 12.1 per cent.
Col Buchanan is pre­
dicting an even lower av­
erage wastage of 10 per 
cent.
“This is not a growth 
industry,” he said.
Recruits not going on, 
called holdovers, previ­
ously remained in uniform
and lived in the same com­
pany area while awaiting 
their discharge.
Under the new scheme 
recruits will be taken out 
of uniform and will live in 
the Weary Dunlop pla­
toon area over the other 
side of the base.
They will be removed 
from training and placed 
in the administrative sys­
tem with the platoon com­
manded by Lt Sharon 
Parker and overseen by 
Personnel Staff Officer, 
Major Colin Gould.
Col Buchanan said he 
saw the new platoon as an 
exciting opportunity for 
Lt Parker, who at a young 
age (she is 23) has a free 
hand to “get in and make 
it work”.
While Lt Parker has had 
only a short career in the 
Army, having graduated 
from Duntroon in 1994, 
she has already distin­
guished herself with a 
commendation for saving 
a two-year-old girl from 
drowning at Howard 
Springs in the Northern 
Territory.
Lt Parker, who was sta­
tioned at Darwin when it 
occurred in February last 
year, was with her platoon 
at Howard Springs when 
the girl fell into the water.
“Her father was under 
the weather and her 
mother was nine and a half 
months pregnant,” Lt 
Parker said.
The mother went into 
labor, while Lt Parker 
breathed life back into the 
toddler.
“There was a lot of 
panic going on and my 
Army training helped 
there,” she said.
It is a quality Lt Parker 
expects to use in her latest 
challenge with the Weary 
Dunlop platoon.
Lt Parker said many of 
the recruits gave up jobs 
to join the Army, did not 
have much money and had 
real concerns about where 
they would go when they 
did not make it to the 
march out parade.
NEW PLATOON HEADQUARTERS: The accommodation blocks earmarked for 
the new Weary Dunlop Platoon.
HOWEVER HUMBLE: Lt Parker gives a guided tour of accommodation blocks. pictures: d e b o r a h  Pa rker .
“Many have a Holly­
wood idea about what 
basic training is going to 
be like and not making it 
doesn’t come into that,” 
she said.
“They have not got a 
Plan B.
“Wo are their Plan B.
“We will come up with a 
lot of the answers.”
She has been liaising 
with the Department of 
Social Security and the 
CES in Wagga to discover 
entitlements and employ­
ment prospects in recruits’ 
local areas.
Lt Parker will be offer­
ing recruits scii-motiva- 
tion training and even 
help with resumes and 
practice interviews.
Her staff were under­
going counselling courses 
so they can assist with in­
dividual needs.
Major Gould said the 
recruits were at different 
stages of training, some 
coming to the platoon 
after discovering they 
were not coping after only 
three days, while others 
may have been forced out 
of training through a 
medical injury after 10 
weeks.
With most recruitment 
done through word of 
mouth, the Weary Dunlop 
project is also seen as a 
good public relations ex­
ercise in recruits leaving
the Army with a more po­
sitive attitude and a sense 
that they were treated 
fairly.
Recruits discharged at 
their request have mini­
mum entitlements, but re­
cruits with maximum enti­
tlements such as those 
injured during training 
will be sent back to their 
place of enlistment where 
they can undergo pro­
grams such as retraining in
fields like bookkeeping or 
clerical duties.
“We will make them 
members that society will 
want back in,” Lt Parker 
said.
ANYONE FOR POOL?: Even Instructors need a break. Lt Parker and Major Gould 
try out the facilities.
BEFORE VIEW: Major Gould and Lt Parker discuss a facelift to the old accommodation quarters that will
house the new platoon.
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One of the recruits in training at Wagga demonstrates that water is no obstacle when transport is provide by a flying fox.
Y ou’re  in  th e
It's been a hard day's training and Recruit S. J. Mussig shows it. Photos by Jones
Becoming a soldier has changed, yet recruits still have to survive the change between military and civilian life, writes Graham Cooke.
Army recruits go through a physical assessment.
T
HE SKY. a lte r­
nately  golden 
su n sh in e  and 
grim clouds, is as 
changeable as a 
sergeant-m ajor's 
mood. Colleen Milliken, seven 
weeks a member of what used 
to be called a man’s army, al­
lows herself the luxury of a 
shiver.
"It’s going to be cold tonight," 
she says with a little, forced 
laugh.
That’s one of the few things 
Milliken can count on as an al- 
most-raw addition to the Austra­
lian Army’s First Recruit Battal­
ion at Kapooka, just outside 
Wagga. Times have changed, but 
the differences — some would 
call it a chasm — between civil­
ian and military life remain.
As she is quickly discovering 
on exercise First Fling, an intro­
duction to sleeping under can­
vas for many of the Kapooka 
newcomers, the army is not 
“just other job".
No-one seriously tries to pre­
tend it is. For the vast majority, 
joining up is the biggest deci­
sion of their lives, possibly the 
biggest decision they will ever 
make.
Yet there have been subtle 
breaks with the past. Recruit 
Milliken is an example. Perhaps 
no more than a couple of years 
ago she would probably have 
been on her way home, booked 
as unsuited for army life.
Instead she is back in train­
ing after hospital treatment and 
a stint in the Digger James Pla­
toon, a special unit designed to 
bring recruits up to a minimum 
level of fitness.
She admits that “PT" (physic­
al training) was her greatest 
worry, despite needing the hos­
pital treatment after blisters on 
her feet turned septic, but she 
never entertained thoughts of 
quitting.
"It’s been my heart's desire to 
join the army . . .  i t’s what I 
want to do with this part of my 
life," the self-confessed Jill of 
All Trades from Batemans Bay 
says. ’Tve done a lot of travel­
ling and had plenty of jobs 
from au-pairing to secretarial 
Now I’ve got fresh goals and 
challenges."
Her commander at Kapooka, 
Colonel David Buchanan, agrees 
that it would have been all too 
easy for Milliken to have be­
come a statistic: part of the 
drop-out rate that sees the fe­
male component of the average
Eye’s right for a career
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make it a manageable culture 
shock,"
If society is changing, so is 
the army, albeit at a slower 
pace. "We are an inherently 
conservative organisation which 
appeals to traditional values 
such as service and sacrifice, so 
we might be a couple of years 
behind the prevailing trends." 
he says.
"But you must remember 
that, just as the recruits come 
from a new generation, so do we 
who train them. We do move 
with the times, and we do adapt 
to new attitudes."
Conservative and traditional­
ist it may be, but increasing 
numbers of Australians appear 
to be comfortable with the way 
of ife the army offers. Unlike 
Britain, which is experiencing a 
recruiting crisis. Kapooka's in­
takes are down only because
threPeeL Cetnht hby the ‘ime the army ^  t e r n a r y  ‘here are fewe? places to fill fl.
hree-month basic training at 1990s, where computer games mental Sergeant Major'Warrant "Kancial restrictions, a higher 
»placing sport as the fav- Officer Class One Colin Lee be- ;Pan,  normaI retention rate, and 
occupation of thousands lieves ill-fitting footwear is'one ? e « at. members of the dis­
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of the curses of civilian and ;of teenagers, more and
^ s h o w e d  a woman who i t i S S  E ®
enters Kapooka is twice as like- forres . . .  ...---------- -----------------
ly Jo  .be discharged as a man; Colonel Buchanan says this ries * * *  WB'
New recruits are also intro­
duced to the "beep 
test” — a shuttle run 
exercise known to 
any athlete who has 
aspired to elite com­
petition.
Failure to reach 
stage 5.5 on the test
t^be^di^chai'ged™“  ^  ' ikely haS led ‘° S°me "creative ten- 
for medical rea­
sons and, up to a 
short while ago, 
four times as like­
ly to be dis­
charged for < 
ju d u rin g  
training," he says.
"The obvious 
inference was tha: 
there was some 
thing wrong with 
our training meth 
ods. We did a lo 
of research into 
this and can 
vassed all the pop­
ular reasons, such 
as discrimination 
in a male-domi­
nated organisa­
tion.
"But it wasn’t 
until we brought 
physiotherapist that 
came down to i
4 Done a lot of 
travelling and 
had plenty of 
jobs . . . .  now 
I’ve got fresh 
challenges }
system has yet to 
show it has a lasting 
influence on improv-
in charge of multimillic 
pieces of equipment as a matter 
of routine." he says. "They have
to be good.
"That is why A ustralian 
forces are always among th
a sports sion" between the recruiting 
e found it and training arms of the force, 
imple factor — especially when the overall dis-
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The fact this has been whit- civilian to army life," Colonel currem readmess of the army to
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problem perhaps the biggest flection of a revised training “All we carwe can hope to do
meet emergencies.
Continued on Page 19
mg on as regulars, means there 
have been no recent difficulties 
in meeting recruiting targets.
So if the quantity is right, 
does it follow that quality is 
there also?
Colonel Andy Reynolds, direc­
tor of public affairs for Defence 
Public Relations in Canberra, 
thinks so, citing examples of a 
corporal who performed the har­
bour-master duties at Mogadi­
shu while on duty in Somalia, 
means relegation to and arh™ Hn s;milar ranl< who 
Digger James and a Z  de fact0 adm‘nistrator 
rigid get-fit regime, r  ‘?L -en' lre eas' e rn half of 
Apart from the anec- C l S ° dla for *“  months, 
dotal evidence pro- „T® are ^-year-olds
vided by recruits r.!e. of multimillion-dollar 
like Milliken. this
The facts 
about 
life in 
the forces
Facts and figures from last 
year's census of the Austra­
lian Defence Force:
■  In March 1995 there were 
58,385 serving ADF mem­
bers, down by 10,889 on 
Ihe time of the last head­
count, four years earlier,
«R°ifn ^ eSe' 45 per cent(26,104) were in the army, , 
25 per cent (14,845) in Ihe 
navy and 30 per cent 1 
(17,436) in the air force. j
■  The ADF remains over- I
whelm ingly male (86 per ' 
cent), with 53 per cent ei~ ! 
Iher married or in a recog-1 
nised de facto relationship, J 
Nearly 14 per cent h a d l  
partners who were also 
serving. jj
■  There were 43,290 de- I 
pendent children of defence ■ 
force members.
B More than half of all per­
sonnel (56 per cent) had ■ 
been serving less than 10 
years. Just 10 per cent had 
been members for more 
than 20 years.
•  The ADF has a relatively 
young workforce with 49 per 
cent aged between 20 and 
29.
Females tend to be younqer 
than males.
■  The proportion of serving 
members with tertiary quali­
fications was 57 per cent — 
a significant increase on the ; 
34 per cent recorded in 
1991. Eleven per cent held
a BA degree or higher.
■  Just under two-thirds (65 
per cent) ol members with a 
spouse or partner said they 
had been separated for ser­
vice reasons in the previous 
year.
-  GRAHAM COOKE
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Rec Mark Charlton, 6 PI, gets serious on the 
bayonet-assault course during the final stages 
of the gruelling Challenge. Soldiers following in 
Rec Charlton’s footsteps will benefit from 
sweeping changes to the way 1RTB conducts 
recruit training. Instructors posted to Kapooka 
will undergo a two- to three-week recruit 
instructor development course aimed at ‘train­
ing the trainer’. A new regimental-wing system 
will provide benefits to instructors as well. 
Photo by S gt N oe l Gilby.
t'Sl
No personnel 
at RISC in 
new  Kapooka
Involuntary postings for 1 RTB
SWEEPING changes to the way 
1RTB conducts recruit training have 
seen the abolition of the Recruit 
Instructor Course (RISC) and the 
introduction of involuntary postings to 
Kapooka.
________ By Sgt Noel Gilby________
Postings to 1RTB are no longer volun­
tary but by consultation with career advis­
ers through SCMA.
The dreaded RISC has been replaced 
by a two- to three-week recruit instructor 
development course to be undertaken on 
posting to 1RTB.
Comdt 1RTB Col Mark Sampson said 
RISC had been binned because it had 
become a barrier to soldiers volunteering 
for a posting to the battalion.
“Soldiers found the RISC daunting and 
felt they shouldn’t have to prove them­
selves as instructors again after completing 
subjects one for corporal and sergeant,” 
Col Sampson said.
“The RIDC differs from the RISC in 
that if you failed the RISC you didn’t come 
here but no action was taken to improve 
you. On the new course we will work on 
you until you pass.”
The RIDC includes subjects required of 
a recruit instructor in the ‘90s with partic­
ular emphasis on an instructor’s ability to 
have a recruit retain knowledge.
Col Sampson said the RIDC would not 
relate to IRTB’s TMP but more to a sol­
dier being able to instruct on anything.
“The RIDC relies on your attitude, not 
your background or experience.
“It will be a case where instructors will 
look for and understand why a particular 
recruit is not picking up a lesson or is 
slower than his or her peers.”
In line with the RIDC, the battalion has 
introduced a regimental-wing system  
where every company will be in charge of 
a particular competency.
A Coy, for example, would still have 
recruit platoons but could also be the sub­
ject-matter experts for field training; B 
Coy could become the small-arms experts.
Instructors will be divided into junior, 
intermediate and senior levels, depending
on experience, and taught how to teach all 
lessons o f all wings.
“The idea is that within two years of 
arriving here as an instructor, you would 
have been trained on and delivered train­
ing on every element o f every competen­
cy so that when you leave here you will be 
an allrounder,” Col Sampson said.
“By the time you walk out the door 
you would have just about passed your 
next subject one course.”
Instructors will also have instructional 
specialties above the wing subjects.
He said instructors in Field Wing 
could qualify as a combat medic, for 
example, because it would also run the 
medical training. It would also qualify an 
instructor in competencies such as GPS 
and Project Ninox equipment.
The regimental-wing system also 
allows better integration of reservists as 
instructors and has the full support o f all 
training group commanders.
Col Sampson said he was adamant 
soldiers would not be adversely affected 
within their corps by a 1RTB posting.
“As SCMA identifies people for pro­
motion or corps training, this system  
enables us to post that soldier to a gener­
al-studies wing, v'hich will give him or 
her up to three months to go on course.
“No-one posted to Kapooka will suffer 
within their corps because they can’t be 
released for a trade or promotion course. I 
guarantee that.”
